Spain and the First World War : neutrality and crisis. by Salvadó, Francisco J. Romero
Spain and the First World War : neutrality and crisis.
Salvadó, Francisco J. Romero
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/1722
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
SPAIN AND THE FIRST WORLD
WAR: NEUTRALITY AND CRISIS
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of London
By Francisco J. Romero Salvadó
Queen Mary and Westfield College
20 June 1994
(LN N)
Uy
Abstract of thesis
The subject of this thesis is a study of Spain during
the First World War. The Spanish case is analyzed as the regional
version of the general crisis which engulfed the rest of Europe
during these years. This crisis was produced by the ideological
militancy and social struggle caused by four years of
devastating international conflict. It heralded the arrival of
mass politics which put an end to a previous era marked by
hierarchical and clientelist politics.
This thesis examines how the maintenance of strict
neutrality did not save the existing regime in Spain from the
impact of the conflict raging in Europe. Spain did not enter the
war but the war entered the country and, ironically, a conflict
in which Spain did not take part was to alter its contemporary
history.
The analysis explores the gradual disintegration of the
foundations of the ruling system, the Liberal Monarchy restored
in December 1874, during and as a consequence of the First World
War. Considerable attention is paid to the impact and importance
of the war in producing the decay of the Liberal Monarchy. This
process is examined at two levels: the political polarization and
subsequent division of the country which was provoked by the
debate about belligerence or neutrality, and the social and
economic transformations that Spain underwent as consequence a
of its privileged position as a supplier to both sides. The
result was galloping inflation, widespread social discontent and
political turmoil. Under these pressures, the hegemonic system,
based on electoral falsification, widespread patronage and mass
apathy, collapsed and gave way to an inexorable process of
growing working class and right-wing militancy which led to the
military coup of 1923.
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PREFACE
The First World War constituted a turning point in
modern European history. It was a devastating conflict which
produced massive economic dislocation, social distress and
discontent throughout the continent. Hitherto the existing
governing elites had managed to cling to power through a variety
of Liberal political systems which in fact disguised the monopoly
of power enjoyed by the privileged propertied classes. After the
First World War that would no longer be possible. It heralded the
arrival of a new era, that of mass politics. Europeans would
irretrievably move away from the world of 1914 as the dominant
forms of hierarchical, clientelist and elitist politics broke
down. The ruling orders were confronted with the unwelcome
prospect of more genuine democracy and from 1917 with the
fast-advancing threat of Socialism. It initiated a period of
ideological militancy and political mobilization unknown in
Europe since 1848.
Spain was not an exception. In fact, the Spanish case
has to be regarded as the regional version of the general crisis
which engulfed Europe during those years. The impact of the Great
War inflicted a deadly blow on the Restoration Monarchy which had
ruled the country since 1875. In vain, the Spanish governing
classes struggled to keep the country away from the conflict. The
official neutrality of the state did not save its political
system. Spain did not enter the war, but the war entered Spain
and its economic and political impact eroded the fragile
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foundations of a political system which had so far been based on
the passivity and subservience of the population.
A chronological order to the narrative has been adopted
so as to facilitate a sense of evolution. The analysis traces
developments from the outbreak of hostilities in Europe and the
subsequent process of disintegration of the ruling political
system in Spain throughout the years of the conflict. The first
chapter is an introduction in which particular emphasis is placed
on the fact that foreign problems played an important part in the
growing loss of hegemony of the Restoration Monarchy. The second
chapter examines the socio-economic impact and the ideological
split of the country produced by the war. The third and fourth
chapter have extraordinary importance. The period covered,
December 1915-April 1917, has traditionally been ignored by most
historians. Yet it constituted the crucial moment in which the
crisis of the ruling system became a reality and could no longer
be concealed. In the third chapter, the rebellion of key
institutions--bourgeoisie, labour movement and army--is analyzed.
In the fourth, the secret war fought in Spain between Allies and
Central Empires and the process by which the country was close
to abandoning neutrality are both thoroughly investigated. In the
fifth chapter, the final crisis of the ruling system is fully
explained. Its analysis is divided into three sections. Firstly,
the insurrection of the military, the subsequent mobilization of
all the progressive forces of the state and the break-up and
discredit of the governing elites, are scrutinized. Secondly, the
showdown in August 1917 between government and working class is
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investigated. Finally, the destruction of the ruling political
system is studied. The sixth chapter is an account of the failure
of the governing elites to find a new stable political
settlement. The bankruptcy and lack of credibility of the new
political solutions in both the domestic and international fields
are fully examined. The seventh and last chapter is an
examination of the way in which the effects of the First World
War destroyed the existing liberal system but failed to provide
a valid alternative. Thus the following years would be marked by
the throes of an ailing ruling order which although politically
dead still managed to survive for almost five more years.
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1.-The outbreak of the War:
Since 1875 Spain had been ruled by a constitutional
monarchy. The architect of the new ruling order was the shrewd
politician Antonio Cnovas del Castillo. His main objective was
to reach a political settlement which could put an end to the
years of civil strife, military pronunciamientos and general
instability which had characterized the earlier part of the
century. He was to be largely successful. The restoration of the
Bourbon Monarchy in the person of Alfonso XII and the
constitution of 1876 were his achievements. He devised a
political system which seemed to be modern and democratic. For
the next four decades two ruling monarchist or 'dynastic'
parties, the Conservative headed by Cánovas himself, and the
Liberal led by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, alternated in power. The
rotation in office of these two political groups was so
systematic that the Canovite order was known as Turno Paci'fico
('Peaceful Rotation').
In fact, the Restoration settlement was far from
democratic. All the constitutional trappings actually served to
conceal the monopoly in politics enjoyed by a governing elite.
That political class was formed by the representatives of the
ruling privileged landowning oligarchies of Castilian wheat
growers and Andalusian wine and olive oil producers. As the years
went by, the group also included large financial interests such
as banks, state companies or big concerns like railways. Most
dynastic politicians were linked with landowning interests or
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formed part of the boards of directors of railways, banks or
other large enterprises. Thus liberal democracy in Spain, as in
most European countries at the time, was actually a sham and a
way to disguise a blatant reality in which the privileged groups
in society maintained their supremacy. In the Spanish case, it
perpetuated a social infra-structure that permitted the
co-existence of modern liberal institutions with a semi-feudal
soclo-economic order.
Yet Cánovas broke with a past marked by intolerance and
exciusivismo. After 1876 both Liberals and Conservatives agreed
upon a system of regulated rotation through which they shared the
spoils of office, patronage and administrative graft. Neither
dynastic formation was a modern political group seeking to win
the vote with clear-cut and attractive programmes. On the
contrary, there was hardly any difference between either dynastic
party. They were artificial groups created from above. They did
not even bother to campaign before polling day as the system was
based on electoral falsification. During the Restoration period
elections did not produce governments in Spain. It was the
government which made the elections. The Minister of Interior
('Ministro de La Gobernacián') manipulated the results so that
the government always obtained an overall majority. The ruling
system avoided confrontation or competition and instead sought
compromise and stability. The party in power at election time
respected the strongholds of the dynastic opposition and even
the most important seats of such enemies as the Republicans on
the left and the Carlists on the right.
8
At the top of the Canovite edifice, the Crown played
a crucial role. The Monarch was not only the Commander in Chief
of the army but he also had the power to appoint and dismiss
governments. He was the one who ensured the smooth functioning
of the Turno. Any Prime Minister, to whom the King gave the
decree of dissolution of parliament, knew that the new elections
would inevitably give him an overall majority to rule
comfortably. At the bottom, the caciques were the kingpin of the
entire political structure. They were the local notables, the
bigwigs and influential bosses of each locality. They could be
landowners or their agents, officials, moneylenders, lawyers or
even priests. It was they who delivered the expected majorities
to the governments in Madrid. The caciques made universal
suffrage, granted in 1890, inoperative. They ran their areas as
personal fiefs. They had unlimited powers to settle local
affairs, choose judges, appoint officials, undertake public works
and even levy taxes in accordance with their will. No government
would dare to move against them as its position in office
depended on them. They filled the gap left by the lack of real
political mobilization and took advantage of their key role as
links between the central administration and the country. Hence
the caciques could systematically violate the law with impunity
and build a clientelist network based on patronage and
self-interest. Their friends were rewarded and promoted and their
enemies coerced, arrested and in some cases even murdered. (1)
The Canovite system worked relatively smoothly during
the first two decades after 1876. Its continuity depended on mass
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apathy and political demobilization which was facilitated by the
nature of Spanish society in the last quarter of the XIXth
century. Thus it benefited from the economic and cultural
backwardness and the lack of national integration. High
illiteracy, poor transport and communication systems and the slow
process of urbanization favoured the development of the
patron-client network in which caciquismo was rooted. It was
obvious that as the country advanced economically, socially and
culturally the Canovite status quo would run into increasing
difficulties. Nevertheless, it is significant the extent to which
foreign policy problems contributed to the erosion of the
foundations of the Turno PacIfico. Three dates were to be
crucial: 1898, 1909 and 1914.
Defeat in the war against the United States in 1898 and
the subsequent loss of the remnants of the overseas Empire--Cuba,
Puerto Rico and the Philippines--thoroughly discredited the
regime. The feeling of impotence and decline was such that a
movement of criticism against the ruling system was born. The
so-called Regeneracionismo found in the caciquista system the
epitome of all that was wrong in the country. Its entrenchment
was the proof that Spain was backward, undeveloped and divorced
from progress. An elite of intellectuals known as the Generación
del 98 became the leading force denouncing the corruption of the
dynastic elites. Simultaneously, the Turno parties began to lose
ground in the most important cities. They could not ignore the
fact that an increasing number of Republicans were elected in the
larger towns. It was apparent that the urban population was
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politically aware and elections could not be easily rigged there.
The vote was still conducted in the old way but more repression
and bribery was needed to get the desired results. Catalonia, the
economically most advanced area, was the first to destroy the
grip of the caciques. It had been worst hit by the loss of the
lucrative Cuban markets for their textile goods. The Catalans
called into question the nature of the Restoration system and
created their own parties. In 1901 the newly established Lliga
Regionalista,	 representative of the Catalan industrial
bourgeoisie, obtained a sweeping victory. After 1905,
Regionalists and Republicans were in control of Catalan politics.
Furthermore, the two ruling parties were affected by internal
problems. By the turn of the century, the two historical leaders,
Cánovas and Sagasta, were dead. Not being based on ideological
lines but on patronage, their parties were bound to be divided
by factional squabbles. Additionally, the new King, Alfonso XIII,
took advantage of the new situation to attempt a restoration of
Royal prerogatives. He would further the disintegration of the
Turno by often trying to implement the maxim 'divide and
conquer'. After 1898, the dynastic leaders also abandoned their
traditional caution in foreign policy. Hitherto the Restoration
politicians had followed in international matters the so-called
"recogirniento or total isolation from the two hostile blocs
which were being formed in Europe. After the defeat at the hands
of the United States, Spain, without throwing in her lot with
either of the two camps, initiated a timid approach towards
France and Britain to guarantee the status quo in the Western
Mediterranean. A treaty signed with France in 1900 gave
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possession of Guinea and the Western Sahara to Spain. In a new
treaty signed at Algeciras in 1906, confirmed one year later at
Cartagena, France, Britain and Spain recognized their spheres of
influence in the area and Spain was granted a strip of land in
Northern Morocco. (2)
Without the possession of Tangier, the richest Moroccan
port which became an international city, the occupation of a
desert zone in Morocco inhabitated by fierce and rebellious
tribes caused problems to Spain right from the start. Imperialist
adventures were very unpopular. Stories told by the many
thousands of returned soldiers from the lost colonies of the
appalling state of the medical and logistical services of the
army increased the lack of enthusiasm for any new colonial
enterprise and diminished the credibility of the system.
Furthermore, the chronically burdened government budget could
hardly afford to undertake new colonization projects. In 1909,
the government was drawn into a minor war to defend Spanish
mining concessions against continuous attacks by Moorish
guerrillas. The call-up of reservists that summer, most of them
married workers, was met by a General Strike against the Moroccan
campaign. In Barcelona and other Catalan towns, the revolt got
out of control. During the so-called" Tragic Week" of July 1909,
barricades were erected and churches burnt down. The riots were
finally suppressed with great violence. Over 175 people were shot
and five more were executed later. The sequel to those events was
the fall of the Conservative cabinet in October. Its Prime
Minister, Antonio Maura, constituted one of the exceptional
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dynastic leaders who had advocated a revolution from above.
Realizing that in order to save the social order some political
reforms were needed, Maura sought to replace the artificial
caciquista mechanism with a modern programme with which to
attract the Conservative and Catholic middle classes. His
regenerationist experiment was halted by the events of 1909.
Maura never forgave the role played by the Liberals. The latter,
deeply upset by Maura's attempts to tamper with the ruling
system, had fiercely opposed his administration and had taken
advantage of the situation created by the Tragic Week to oust him
from power. Maura refused to alternate with them in office. In
January 1913 Maura demanded power on his terms and affirmed that
the Conservatives under his leadership would never rotate with
the Liberals. A few months later, the bulk of the Conservative
party abandoned its leader and, led by the ex-minister and rich
lawyer, Eduardo Dato, accepted the continuity of the Turno
fiction. A minority formed mainly by young Conservatives followed
the dismissed leader and created the Maurista movement. Maura was
the first and last dynastic politician who would have a genuine
mass following. The result would be the first serious split in
one of the two dynastic parties.(3)
The outbreak of the First World War was to make
impossible the continuity of the constitutional sham. The
European conflict brought about enormous social and economic
strains which by strengthening the hand of the national
bourgeoisies and working classes against the traditional
supremacy of the landowning oligarchies altered the relation of
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forces in most countries. Food shortages, economic dislocation,
social distress, scarcity and inflation produced the political
awakening and ideological militancy of the masses. Under those
pressures, the existing forms of hierarchical, clientelist and
elitist politics broke down. The traditional governing elites
found it impossible to put the clock back and return to the world
of 1914.
Spain would not be an exception. In fact, the war
initiated a crisis of authority of the ruling political system
which can be regarded as the regional version of the general
crisis which engulfed the rest of Europe during those years.
Spain, if well spared from the human slaughter, experienced as
much as the other European states the effects of the conflict.
Her official neutrality could hardly hide the intensity of the
debate between the supporters of the Central Empires and those
of the Allies, nor could it check the increasing militancy and
ideological awareness produced by the impact of the conflict on
the daily lives of the Spaniards. Hence the Restoration system
that so far had rested on the demobilization and passivity of the
people entered a period of irretrievable crisis. The crisis of
hegemony or authority of the ruling order was produced by the
inability of the governing elites successfully to face the
arrival of mass politics and their subsequent challenge to
clientelism and patronage as a source of power. The First World
War destroyed the foundations of the Canovite status quo.
Ironically, a war in which Spain did not intervene was to
influence decisively her contemporary history. (4) The dynastic
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politicians were determined to keep Spain out of the conflict
regardless of the price. They succeeded in doing so but it was
beyond their power to prevent the conflict from entering Spain.
The very day that hostilities broke out in the
continent, the Conservative cabinet declared the official
neutrality of Spain. On 25 August Prime Minister Dato wrote to
his former chief Maura noting that the lack of compromises with
either side facilitated the official neutrality. Yet he also
pointed out other very revealing facts:
"Our position is not to abandon that policy. We would
depart from neutrality only if we were directly threatened
by foreign aggression or by an ultimatum.. . Germany and
Austria are delighted with our attitude as they believed us
committed to the Entente. France and Britain cannot
criticize us as our pacts with them are limited to Morocco.
Moreover, we do not owe them anything since in the dreadful
year of 1898 they did nothing for Spain. . .1 do not fear
that the Allies would push us to take sides with or against
them. . . They must know that we lack material resources and
adequate preparation for a modern war. Even if the country
was ready to launch itself into a military adventure, our
collaboration would have little consequence. Would we not
render a better service to both sides by sticking to our
neutrality so that one day we could raise a white flag and
organize a peace conference in our nation which could put
an end to the current conflict?. We have moral authority
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for that and who knows if we shall be required to do
Thus among the main motives behind Spain's neutrality
were the recognition of her political and diplomatic isolation
as well as the economic weakness and military disorganization of
the country. Furthermore, the dispute in Europe was not regarded
as affecting Spanish interests, while there was always the hope
that by maintaining an impartial position Spain could play the
leading role in organizing a peace summit and therefore gain in
the diplomatic field what could never be achieved on the
battlefield.
The view that Spain could not effectively wage a modern
war and therefore should not get involved in the conflict was
shared by nearly everyone in the country in the summer of 1914.
On 1 and 7 August, the National Executive Committee of the
Socialist party and its trade union the Union General de
Trabajadores (TJ.G.T.) published a statement which set out their
opposition to intervention in such a terrible conflict where
workers would be the main victims. In an article in La Veu de
Cabalunya, Francesc Cainbó, the leader of the Catalan Lliga
Regionalista, also commented that a poor and badly armed country
like Spain should stay out of the European war. Equally, Antonio
Maura wrote to Dato that he was prepared to go to the Cortes in
order to applaud the decision taken by the government. Maura
pointed out that the war would inevitably have a deep impact on
Spain and regretted that the fate of the country might well be
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in the hands of foreign powers or depend on others' fortunes.
Thus when on 30 October, 1914 the Cortes opened after the summer
recess, the declaration of neutrality was warmly applauded by all
the political parties. Dato firmly noted that Spain had not
received the smallest provocation from any of the belligerent
nations and desired to remain aloof from the horrors of the war.
In the unlikely event of the country being provoked by an act of
aggression, Dato promised that the government would hasten to
appeal to parliament in order to defend the honour, the liberty
and the independence of the nation. (6)
However, right from the start, there were dissenting
voices in the country. On the one hand, there were the ultra
right-wing Carlists who, led by Vzquez de Mella, wasted no time
in disseminating their pro-German feelings. On the other hand,
the Republican Radicals led by Alejandro Lerroux did not hide
their support for the Allied cause and even began to campaign for
open intervention in the conflict. There were rumours that it had
been discussed in military circles whether Lerroux should be
court martialled and shot. Lerroux's reputation was that of a
demagogue and a troublemaker. Thus the British Ambassador, Arthur
Hardinge, felt deeply embarrassed when in early November he
received a note from the Madrid committee of the Radical party
requesting him to forward to the British Prime Minister an
assurance of their best wishes for the success of the Entente in
the war. The British ambassador complied but not before informing
the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Marquis of Lema, of the
Radicals' message. (7)
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The attitudes adopted by Carlists and Radicals were
hardly a surprise to anyone. The real shock came with the
publication on 19 August, 1914 of an article called
"Neutralidades que matan".('Fatal Neutralities') in El Jjiario
Universal, mouthpiece of the leader of the Liberal party, the
Count Romanones. It was said that it had been written by the
Count himself, although authorship was claimed by Perez
Caballero, a former minister under the Liberal cabinet of Moret
in 1907 and former Ambassador in Paris. Even if Romanones did not
write it, his was the inspiration. The article constituted a
clear appeal to Spain to cast in its lot with the Entente:
"... Geopolitical, economic and diplomatic imperatives
impose collaboration with the Entente. Spain is surrounded
by the Allies, the sea-lanes are controlled by them, the
vast bulk of our trade is with France and Britain and
theirs is the largest portion of foreign investment in our
country. Moreover, Spain's economic life depends upon
Britain's coal and American wheat. . . our collaboration with
them would only represent the logical continuity of the
international policies undertaken by different Spanish
governments between 1900 and 1913. . . Neutrality unsupported
by the neutral's own force is at the mercy of the first
strong state which finds it necessary to violate it.. . The
Balearic and the Canary Islands, the Galician coasts are
undefended. . . If Germany wins, will she thank us for our
neutrality?. No, she will try to rule the Mediterranean.
She will not take French continental territory. She will
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seize the African coast from Tripoli to Fernando P00.. . We
shall lose our hopes of expansion in Morocco. We shall lose
our independence. We shall lose the Balearic Islands. Nor
will German expansion in the economic and industrial domain
compensate us for the ruin of the countries with whom our
interests in those respects have been up to now identified.
On the other hand, if the Allies triumph they will owe us
no debt of gratitude and will remodel the map of Europe as
they think fit.. .There are fatal neutralities!. (8)
The impact of the article was considerable. The leader
of the Liberal party was publicly criticizing the policy adopted
by the government at the outbreak of the war. Romanones' argument
did not necessarily advocate entering the war but openly demanded
that Spain should move closer towards the Allied camp. This was
therefore patently at odds with the strict neutrality declared
by Dato. Romanones had clearly damaged the position of the
government and in the long-term this was to hurt his own image
as future Prime Minister. Romanones himself claimed in his
memoirs that at this stage the King shared his views. The Count
argued that although his intention was not to push Spain into the
conflict, his duty was to let the Allies know that Spain was
prepared to adopt a neutrality favourable to them. Realizing that
he was not in tune with the country, Romanones tried a new
approach. In El Imparcial of 4 September, 1914 he insisted that
neutrality did not imply isolation as that would be inconsistent
with the economic interests and conditions of modern Europe. He
also denied any personal responsibility for the article UFatal
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Neutralities" and recognized the impracticality of abandoning
neutrality. Dato's formal declaration in the Cortes on 30 October
of the Spanish position on the war was quickly endorsed by
Romanones. The British Ambassador commented that neither Count
Romanones nor any responsible man would now venture to support
a departure from neutrality. (9)
By the autumn of 1914, if the general consensus among
Spaniards was to remain away from the battlefields, hopes for a
short war or for a peaceful solution in which Spain could play
a decisive role faded away. The Socialist journalist Luis
Araquistáin caught perfectly the changing mood of public opinion
towards the war issue. According to Araquistáin, this could be
divided into three phases: during the initial stage the conflict
was followed as if it were a game and people even placed bets as
on a horse race; a second and critical period began in 1915 when
Spaniards started to take sides, the final and active phase was
already evident by 1916 coinciding with a movement of agitation
and mobilization around the neutrality question. (10)
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2.-The Year 1915: The critical phase
By 1915, the conflict had definitely entered the
peninsula. Politically and ideologically, many Spaniards began
to take sides. Economically, the country was dramatically
affected by the European dispute. The placid life of the Turno
governments was reaching its end as the country saw its normal
existence altered by forces unleashed by the war.
Most of the population, especially those in the
countryside, regarded the ideological and political issues of the
conflict with indifference. Their living standards would
inevitably be hurt by the hardships and shortages brought about
by the war but they did not understand the struggle of ideas and
concepts behind the actual fighting. Yet for many social,
cultural and political groups based in the cities, the European
conflict became a question of obsessive concern. The war was
almost immediately perceived as an ideological clash in which
each of the warring factions came to symbolize certain
transcendent ideas and values. The quarrel between the partisans
of the Allies and of the Central Powers generated a violent
debate around the issue of neutrality. Rather than merely
reflecting contrasting opinions, it reflected a deep pre-existing
spiritual division within the Spanish people which the war did
not create but only exacerbated. It was such a bitter polemic
that it had the moral quality of a civil war: A civil war of
words". It represented a verbal clash between the two Spains
which was a portent of the real civil war that still lay a
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generation in the future. (1) Passions reached such a pitch that
families and friends were often divided and many cinemas refused
to give news on the conflict in order to prevent fights.
The two dynastic parties generally kept to the formula
of neutrality. Dato banned all public meetings relating to the
international issue in an effort to avoid the divisions and
arguments that finally pushed Italy into the war in May 1915.
Realizing the poor quality of the Spanish army, the Conservative
government decided to pursue comprehensive military reform and
sent a military and naval commission, led respectively by Major
Garrido and Captain Carranza, to Washington to purchase weapons
and supplies. That operation would last until late l917.(2)
As public opinion began to split, dynastic politicians
would desperately cling to formal neutrality. However, some of
them could not avoid being identified with one side or the other.
Romanones and his friends in the Liberal party had clearly cast
their lot in with the Western Powers. For political rather than
ideological reasons, those Liberals who disputed Romanones'
leadership and backed that of his rival, the Marquis of
Aihucemas, tended to be regarded as Gerrnanophiles. Even within
the Conservative party, there existed divisions. The Minister of
Interior and Eduardo Dato's right hand man, José Sanchez Guerra,
and the Minister of War, General Ramón Echague, were considered
to support the Central Powers. On the other hand, Dato and his
Foreign Minister, the Marquis of Lema, were regarded as good
friends of the Allied cause. As early as 7 August 1914, the
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Spanish Ambassador in London, Merry del Val, had called at the
Foreign Office and stated under instructions of his government
that Spain was desirous of doing anything she could for the
protection of British interests and subjects. A few days later
a Spanish request to have a naval officer and one other Spanish
officer follow the operations of the British army and navy, was
promptly granted. In 1915, British diplomats judged the existing
Spanish administration to be the best possible given the existing
conditions, and by June the French Ambassador informed his
British counterpart that insulting letters had been addressed to
the Marquis of Lema by the German Ambassador, Prince Ratibor. (3)
Nevertheless, despite personal sentiments, both dynastic parties,
with the outstanding exception of Romanones, managed to conceal
their internal differences and give an image, until the end of
the war, of cohesion regarding the declaration of neutrality.
There is abundant literature concerning the ideological
division of Spain between Germanophiles and Francophiles. (4)
Although an accurate definition of both sides in ideological,
social or political terms is difficult, it can be affirmed that
in general terms the so-called "Official Spain" was Germanophile
and "Real Spain" was Francophile. The more economically backward
Castille supported the Central Powers and the more dynamic areas
of the periphery the Allies. The Right wanted a victory for the
Imperial forces and the Left for the Western Democracies. The
main Gerrnanophile voices in the country were those of the clergy,
the army, the aristocracy, the landowning elites, the upper
bourgeoisie, the court, the Carlists and the Mauristas. All
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regarded a victory of the Central Powers as a triumph for those
who defended such catholic and traditional values as monarchism,
discipline, authority and a hierarchical social order. On the
other hand, the main Allied supporters were the Regionalists, the
Republicans, the Socialists, the professional middle classes and
the intellectuals. In fact, those who wanted to transform the
existing oligarchical liberalism into a genuine democracy.
As the conflict went on, neutrality began to lose its
initial meaning. On the one hand, the friends of the Allied cause
would increasingly regard it as a sham and thus would switch to
positions ranging from benevolent neutrality to diplomatic
rupture with Germany and even open intervention. On the other
hand, it was evident even to the most rabid Gerrnanophiles that
with the country surrounded by the Entente Powers and the British
fleet controlling the seas, to join forces with Germany would
amount to military suicide. Hence they became champions of a
strict neutrality as the best way to support the Central Powers.
They were not in fact neutral but pragmatism forced them to
accept neutrality as the best solution. Their advantage was that
their pro-German feelings could be easily disguised under the
vague facade of a neutrality that they presented as
representative of patriotism, espaflolismo and opposition to
foreign interference in Spanish affairs, while the case of the
pro-Allied forces advocating entry into the war could be shown
as the work of foreign agents bordering on treason.
Many supporters of the Central Powers were Francophobes
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rather than Germanophiles. They put forward historical examples
such as Morocco and Gibraltar to argue that Spain had nothing to
gain from an Allied victory, while the triumph of the German
armies could favour Spanish interests. Germany represented the
best defence of the West against Russian barbarism. The most
outstanding case of Francophobia was that of the Catholic church.
Its hierarchy and its main journal El Debate portrayed the Kaiser
as God's sword. Despite Wilhem's Protestantism, he was regarded
as a Catholic Prince in disguise raised up to chastise immoral
and faithless France with divine vengeance and to restore the
temporal power of the Pope. Throughout the four years of war, the
Church was the institution which offered the most unyielding
position and the most coherent ideological support for the German
cause. Not even the invasion of Catholic Belgium softened its
stand. Many would argue that it was God's punishment of the
nation which had allowed the construction of a monument to Ferrer
Guardia, the Spanish Anarchist executed in 1909 after being
accused of being the mastermind of the week of riots and
destruction of churches in Barcelona known as the Tragic Week.
After the Bishop of Southwark's tour of Spain in October 1915,
he declared that only the Bishops of Madrid and Ciudad Real were
friendly towards the Allies, but the Primate and the rest of the
clergy had made clear their pro-German sympathies and hatred of
French Republicanism. (5)
The army did not present the same cohesive front as the
church. Most of the officers were not Germanophiles in the
strictest sense of the word, but they admired the efficiency and
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discipline of the Prussian army. There were some outstanding
examples of Francophile Generals such as Miguel Primo de Rivera
or Eduardo Lopez Ochoa, but the majority were well aware of the
inability of the Spanish army to participate in the European
conflict and thus they loathed the idea of departing from the
initial strict neutrality. Furthermore, Allied reports warned
that there existed a military party, containing among others, the
Minister of War General Echague, which was not only very
confident of a final German victory but was also hoping that if
the Entente was badly beaten, Spain could, under some pretext or
another, annex Portugal. (6)
Carlists and Mauristas were the two political parties
which voiced Germanophiles feelings more openly. Their strong
catholicism, monarchism and conservatism pushed them against
Protestant Britain and Republican France. (7) The speech delivered
by the Carlist spokesman Vázquez de Mella on 31 May, 1915 marked
the official U-turn from outspoken Germanophilia to an all-out
defence of strict neutrality. The Italian example made the
supporters of the Central Powers in Spain realize that there was
no way the country could side with Germany. Henceforth those
journals close to Carlism and Maurismo such as El Correo Espaflol,
La Tribuna, El Universo and La Accio'n would adopt the line that
patriotism and internal independence forbade a departure from
neutrality. Ironically, the leaders of both movements disagreed
with their followers. The Carlist Pretender, Don Jaime, was
fighting in the Russian army, and Maura continually disappointed
his Gerrnanophile followers when he alluded to international
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affairs and stressed that Spain was inevitably linked by cultural
and economic realities to the Western powers. The Conservative
statesman was inclined to defend a neutral stance which was
clearly benevolent towards the Allies. The British Ambassador,
Sir Arthur Hardinge, regarded Maura as a pro-Allied leader who
had to act with caution so as not antagonize his pro-German
followers. After Maura's speech at the Royal Theatre on 21 April,
1915, the British Ambassador wrote:
"...Maura is too much of a statesman to believe in the
possibility of Spain pursuing a policy of hostility to
France and Britain which would have involved the
repudiation of agreements such as that of Carthagena to
which he had been a party himself. . . his followers were
greatly taken aback when Maura proclaimed himself a
convinced supporter of the Entente with the Allies.. .Least
of all did they expect that his remarks would support the
policy of Romanones... ". ( 8)
Similarly, Hardinge wrote after a speech by Maura in
Berlanga on 10 September, 1916:
.The important point in it was Señor Maura's
account of his own part in the Carthagena agreement of
1904 and of his defence of that agreement as dictated
by the interests of Spain in Morocco and the
Mediterranean, and by her natural affinities as a
Western power. . . I am inclined to think that Señor
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Maura was playing to the gallery, for the clerical
elements of his party were a little depressed by his
evident attachment to the Carthagena agreement and
only became responsive when he took 10 abusing
Cardinal Richelieu and indulging in mournful
references to Gibraltar. But these trimmings do not
affect the general character of the dish which he
served up to his political supporters.. .1-us present
policy proved to be identical to bha of Count
Romanones... ". (9)
The Court was the last important pro-German stronghold.
It was led by the Queen Mother, the Austrian Archduchess Maria
Cristina, and considered victory for the Central Powers as the
best guarantee of survival for the old order. Naturally, the
English Queen, married to Alfonso in 1906, defended her country
of birth. Alfonso XIII was regarded by all the Allied diplomats
as a genuine and real friend of their cause. It was even alleged
that the article "Fatal Neutralities" expressed the feelings of
the Monarch and that it had been written by Romanones in order
to please him. Most of Alfonso Xlii's apologists emphasized that
he remained throughout the four years of war above political
tendencies. Yet it seems that the main objective of the Spanish
Monarch was to consolidate his personal position at home and
abroad so as to play a leading role in the new European concert.
He aspired to the role of mediator in the conflict and if
possible to benefit from it by enlarging the Spanish colonial
empire. In order to achieve that purpose the King in 1915 set up
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a Bureau to deal with prisoners' conditions, deportations,
general information about missing citizens and soldiers of the
belligerent countries, humanitarian aid, pardons, etc. By the end
of the war, his role had been crucial in obtaining 50 pardons and
5,000 repatriations, tackling 25,000 cases of relatives in
occupied territories and investigating the whereabouts of over
250,000 missing persons or prisoners of war. However, after the
March Revolution in Russia and the entry of the United States
into the war, Alfonso adopted an increasingly Germanophile
position which he was able to conceal under the perfect cover of
defending Spanish neutrality. (10)
The intellectuals constituted the main defenders of the
Allied cause in Spain. They had been the traditional adversaries
of the church competing for control of education and culture. The
European conflict placed intelligentsia and clergy in different
camps. The intellectuals were not only admirers of Republican
France and democratic Britain but also Germanophobes who detested
the authoritarian system that the Central Powers espoused. In a
sense by supporting Britain and France, the historic enemies of
Spain, they were choosing Europe over Spain. They were opting for
a future Europeanized Spain, modern, secular and democratic in
place of the tradition-ridden, priestly, oligarchical Spain that
was. These intellectuals were known as the Generation of 1914.
Many of them such as Perez Galdós, Perez de Ayala, Unamuno or
Valle Inclán had been members of the Generation of 1898. They
were now joined by younger poets, academics and writers of whom
a perfect example would be Manuel Azafla, President of the Madrid
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Atheneum. On 10 July 1915, Perez de Ayala published in Iberia the
first expression of solidarity with the Allies. The Valencian
novelist Vicente Blasco Ibáflez produced a series of pamphlets
during the war denouncing German violence and barbarism. He would
turn those into his famous book "Los cuatro jinetes del
apocalipsis" ('The four horsemen of the apocalypse') which then
became a Hollywood film. In January 1917 a coalition of
intellectuals presided over by Perez Galdós formally established
the anti-Gerrnanophile League. They made no secret of their belief
that the outcome of the conflict would determine the future
political order of Europe. Thus a victory for the Allied forces
would bring about the democratization and modernization of the
continent. Spain would then be able to free herself from the
oligarchy, backwardness and caciquismo in which she had stagnated
for so long. The magazine Espafla was the main publication of the
pro-Allied camp. It was edited until February 1916 by Ortega y
Gasset and then by the Socialist Luis Araguistáin who relied on
British financial support to keep the magazine afloat. Spain's
intelligentsia contributed with articles to promote the Allied
cause and in its pages there appeared the first manifesto of the
anti-Germanophile League calling for the defence of liberalism
and democracy and exhorting Spaniards to fight the false
neutrality defended by the Germanophiles whose real objective was
to prevent the country from achieving the progress and liberties
which were represented in the war by the Western Powers. Plo
Baroja and Jacinto Benavente constituted the two notable
exceptions within Spain's cultural elite. Ironically, both seem
to have been Germanophiles for the wrong reasons. The
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pseudo-anarchist Basque author, Plo Baroja, believed that Germany
was the only power which could shatter clericalism in Europe.
Benavente, for his part, published a manifesto in La Tribuna on
18 December, 1915 which was signed by a long list of secondary
figures in the artistic and academic world. He defended the
pro-German neutralists in Spain from the accusations of
reactionaries by alleging that, unlike those who based their
international views on fatalistic and geographic imperatives,
they were the defenders of an independent Spain, free to align
with the countries she deemed appropriate. Furthermore, the
playwright remarked that he believed in a future socialist world
order and this could be best created by Germany, the cradle of
Socialism. Thus Jacinto Benavente and Plo Baroja sponsored the
Imperial cause for reasons diametrically opposed to those of the
church and the Right. (11)
Catalanists and Republicans were the principal
political groups to side with the Allies. The main leader of the
right-wing Catalan Lliga Regionalista, Francesc Carnbó, himself
never publicly departed from neutrality. On some occasions in the
Cortes he even used the example of the German Empire to demand
for Catalonia the same kind of autonomy that the German Lander
enjoyed. But the overwhelming majority of the Catalan political
elite were outspoken Francophiles. Historical links with France
and admiration for the principles and ideals defended by the
"sister" nation made most Catalanists believe that a French
victory represented the best hope for the fulfilment of their
nationalist aspirations. There were more than 2000 Catalans
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fighting in France in the so-called Catalan Legion. The contacts
between Catalan Nationalists and French Republicans created
serious problems for many governments in Madrid. (12)
On the international question, Republicans represented
the opposite view to that of Carlists and Maurisbas. Right from
the start, they demonstrated where their sympathies lay.
Republicans from all the different groupings made clear that a
French victory would be a triumph for the cause of Republicanism
in Spain. According to them, the country had to side with the
Western democracies or it would remain a backward non-entity in
Europe. Their press like Alejandro Lerroux's El Radical,
Marcelino Domingo's La Lucha and Roberto Castrovido's El Pals
were the mouth-pieces of the Allied cause. During the conflict
Lerroux became the leading pro-interventionist spokesman. On more
than one occasion, he was attacked by hostile neutralist crowds
and had to run for his life. His shady reputation did not help
him nor did it benefit the Allied cause. The British Embassy
regarded him as an adventurer and an embarrassment. His speeches
and actions were seen by the Allies, particularly in the first
year of the war, as a gift to the Gerrnanophiles and as a useless
provocation to the government. On 26 May, 1915 in a speech at
Santa Cruz de Tenerife Lerroux equated the kind of neutrality
defended by the Dato cabinet with cowardice. There were all kind
of rumours in June 1915 that the Radicals were plotting to bomb
27 German ships in Barcelona with a view to drawing Spain into
the conflict. Earlier that year, Lerroux himself had become
involved in the messy business of mediating in a transaction
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between Spanish groups who intended to sell rifles and ammunition
to the British firm Vickers. Prime Minister Dato was enraged when
he heard that Lerroux had asked for a commission of £120,000
partly for his own services and partly as an outright bribe to
be offered to Dato himself. (13)
A different image was presented by the Reformist party
led by the Asturian Melquiades Alvarez. Since its creation in
1912 that political group had adopted an accidentalist stand.
Thus without abandoning its Republican principles it had vowed
to accept the existing regime if this was prepared to carry
through a real process of democratization. Alvarez initially
approved of the neutrality adopted by the government, but
gradually moved to support a more benevolent attitude towards the
Allies. On 1 May, 1915 he declared in Granada that Spain should
side with France and Britain even if defeated. This was welcomed
by the Allied diplomats as it appeared to be based on a
principled assessment of the political reality, unlike that of
Lerroux which seemed motivated mainly by profit or demagogy. In
September 1915, Alvarez visited Paris and on his return he had
become the chief spokesman for the Allied cause in Spain. (14)
The neutrality issue also had an impact on the labour
movement. The organized working class in Spain was divided
between Anarcho-Syndicalist and Marxist currents. The first was
represented by the Con federación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and
the second by the Socialist party (PSOE) and its trade union the
Union General de Trabajadores (UGT) These two organizations would
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adopt different positions to the war. The CNT had been created
in 1910 and had only just emerged from years of repression by the
time of the outbreak of the hostilities in Europe. Its membership
of only 15,000, mainly concentrated in Catalonia and Andalusia,
meant that its influence was relatively small. This trend would
not change until the end of the First World War when the CNT's
membership increased dramatically turning it into the main
workers' organization in Spain. The Anarcho-Syndicalists adopted
an internationalist stand condemning the war and refusing to take
sides in what they regarded as a capitalist struggle. Despite the
fact that some leading Anarchists in Europe such as the Italian
Malatesta, the Russian Kropotkin and even the French
Anarcho-Syndicalist trade union, the CGT, sided with the Allies,
the overwhelming majority of Spanish Anarchists and Syndicalists
remained committed to neutrality. Their determination to adhere
to that formula was confirmed in a Congress held in Ferrol in
February 1915 which concluded with the watchword, "Revolution
before War". During the last years of the conflict, Anarchist
intransigence and violent class warfare would become an asset to
the Germans who cleverly manipulated and used some of the
extremist elements in the CNT for their purposes.(l5)
The Socialists presented a different picture. In 1914,
with only one Deputy in the Cortes and electorally allied to the
Republicans since 1909, they still had a long way to go to catch
up in size and influence with their European counterparts. Yet
with almost 100,000 members in the UGT and with a solidly
centralized and carefully built organization, the Socialists
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could claim to speak in the name of the Spanish proletariat. The
outbreak of the war caught them completely unprepared. Initially
they proclaimed their internationalism and denounced the
'imperialist contest'. However, as it became clear that the
Second International had failed to prevent the war and Germany
invaded neutral Belgium in the summer of 1914, the Socialists
began to change their initial stance. Soon the editorials in El
Socialista were pointing to German militarism as the main cause
of the war. The Socialists' new position was clearly revealed in
an article on 12 September, 1914 called "Formas de Neutralidad"
('Ways of being neutral'). It portrayed the European war as a
struggle between the Central Powers defending the old order and
the Entente which was fighting for progress and democracy. It
argued that Socialists, unlike the reactionary elements in the
country, believed that Spain should remain neutral because of
economic and military deficiencies, but that neutrality should
be benevolent towards the Allies. Thus Socialists and Republicans
were in virtual agreement. This pro-Entente position was
confirmed by the rhetoric of the old and authoritarian Socialist
leader Pablo Iglesias. On 5 November, 1914 Iglesias expressed in
the Cortes his support for the Allied cause. A few months later,
Fabra Ribas, a member of the PSOE's National Executive, published
a pamphlet entitled 'El socialismo y el conflicto europeo:
Kaiserismo, he ahI el enemigo" ('Socialism and the European
conflict: Kaiserism, the enemy!'). At the 10th Congress of the
party held at the Casa del Pueblo in Madrid between 24-31
October, 1915, Iglesias and the PSOE's leadership defeated the
internationalist opposition. Two questions were dealt with: the
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Continuity of the conjunción or alliance with the Republicans and
the attitude towards the war. Through its tight control of the
apparatus of the party, the National Executive imposed its views
on both matters. Iglesias himself and his right-hand man Julián
Besteiro, a University professor, spoke on behalf of the
continuity of the conjuncio'n and won by a narrow margin of 3,106
to 2,850 votes. The internationalist motion was also defeated by
4,090 to 2,018 votes. Henceforth with the PSOE leadership firmly
in control and the alliance with the Republicans confirmed, the
Socialists became one of the outspoken defenders of the Allied
cause in Spain. (16)
In the struggle to incline Spanish neutrality towards
one or the other of the warring blocs, the Allies could count on
important economic and geographic advantages. It seemed evident
that unless the Western Powers were close to being badly beaten,
no Spanish administration would contemplate the idea of moving
closer to Germany. Yet these initial advantages were outweighed
by an active and masterly strategy conducted in Spain by the
Central Powers which gave them the initiative virtually
throughout the four years of war. Their strategy can be divided
into two phases: until early 1916, they followed a diplomatic
campaign; for the remainder of the conflict, that campaign was
reinforced by a very well organized intelligence network whose
activities ranged from sponsoring press offensives against
unfriendly politicians to financing both Anarchist groups in the
peninsula and rebel guerrillas in Morocco. The objective was to
ensure that Spain would never abandon her neutrality.
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Until late 1915, there are hardly any references to
German espionage in Spain. The dismantling of a wireless
apparatus in a Carmelite convent at Portugalete (Bilbao) in
October 1914 was probably an isolated case. (17) Yet by then the
Director of the British Intelligence Service had already noted
the close relations established between the German Embassy and
the clergy, military and upper classes as well as Germany's
influence on right-wing newspapers such as ABC, El Correo
Espaflol, La Correspondencia Milibar, El IJebabe and El
Universo. (18)
In fact, Germany had the advantage over her rivals in
two important respects. Firstly, the cause defended by the
Central Powers could easily be portrayed as synonymous with that
of the forces of order in Spain. Through its control of the
right-wing media, the German offensive created an image of
Germany as the best friend of the Monarchy and the ruling
political order, while the Allies were described as supporters
of revolutionary and Republican groups in the peninsula.
Secondly, Germany's efficient press campaign was far superior to
that pursued by the Western Powers. The Allied press campaign did
not take off until early 1916, and was mainly due to the
activities of pro-Allied elements like the journalist and leading
Socialist Luis Araquistáin who managed to convince the British
Secret War Propaganda Bureau to subsidize a propaganda offensive
which could counter that of the Central Powers. (19)
One example of Germany's skilful propaganda was her
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ability to exploit the Portuguese case to create bad blood
between the two peninsular states, and, indirectly, between Spain
and Portugal's friends, the Entente. In October 1910, after a
turbulent and violent decade, Portugal proclaimed a Republic of
a clear radical character. Subsequent relations with Spain, which
certainly had a hand in some of the conspiracies to restore the
Portuguese Monarchy, were far from friendly. Unlike Spain's
neutrality, Portugal's was openly benevolent towards the Allies.
As early as October and November 1914, the British Embassy in
Madrid was warning the Foreign Office that some Spanish circles
and the King himself would be unhappy if Portugal threw in her
lot with the Entente. The conservative British Ambassador, Sir
Arthur Hardinge, even wrote that Britain should never sacrifice
her friendship with Spain to Portuguese ambitions or
exigencies. (20)
Throughout 1915 the pro-German press in Spain
continually referred to the support given by the Western Powers
to the Leftist Portuguese Republic. The British Foreign Office
and the Ambassador at Lisbon, Lancelot D. Carnegie, reached the
conclusion that Portugal should not become a belligerent as she
was more useful rendering services as a neutral. Furthermore, the
active participation of the Portuguese Republic in the war would
present Germany with a golden opportunity to promote ill-will
between the two neighbours and would be disquieting and unwelcome
to almost all the dynastic politicians and the King. Carnegie was
therefore instructed in July 1915 to let the Portuguese Foreign
Minister Soares know that the British government was anxious that
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Portugal should not become a belligerent. During the following
months both Hardinge and Carnegie pursued the same line with
other Portuguese Ministers and the President of the Republic,
Bernardino Machado. The Portuguese politicians recognized that
intervention in the war might make matters more difficult between
the two peninsular states and expressed their fear that if the
Allies got badly beaten, reactionary and monarchist elements in
Spain could either foment a revolutionary outbreak in Portugal
to overthrow the Republic or else find an excuse to proceed with
a full-scale invasion. Hence they indicated that they were
against declaring war on Germany, although the provocative and
violent attitude of the latter finally forced the Portuguese to
break off diplomatic relations and to withdraw the Ambassador in
Berlin. (21) As a result Germany herself declared war on Portugal
in March 1916. The Portuguese example and the extreme care
displayed by the British diplomats revealed the Allies' deep
insecurity with regard to Spain. They felt that Germany could
always exploit her excellent relations with the Spanish Court,
army and church and embarrass the Entente on sensitive problems
such as Portuguese intervention.
Additionally, Germany's other major advantage was that
she had ample room to manoeuvre on territorial concerns. It is
highly unlikely that the Germans really believed that Spain could
be tempted to the extent that she would decide to enter the war.
Yet it proved to be an astute approach by which the Central
Powers could both show their "Spanish friends" the value of
maintaining that friendship and also put sufficient pressure on
39
the government to maintain strict neutrality in the conflict.
The advantage enjoyed by Germany can easily be seen if
it is understood that her real aim was to prevent any Spanish
administration departing from the position adopted in August
1914. Unlike in the Italian case, where the territory coveted by
the Italians belonged to the Habsburgh Empire, the Germans could
promise territories to Spain that did not belong to them or their
Allies. Thus knowing that geographic and economic factors barred
Spain from aligning with her in the war, Germany could not only
be generous with promises in exchange for an almost impossible
alliance, but also hint that Spain's strict neutrality might be
rewarded in the new European order which would arise after a
German victory. On the other hand, the Western Powers had to face
the dilemma of either rejecting any territorial re-settlement and
thereby confirming the idea spread by the Gerrnanophiles that they
were historic enemies who had always sought to weaken and
humiliate Spain, or else sacrifice valuable territory merely to
secure Spanish gratitude.
German diplomacy was relatively successful in 1915. It
is well documented how its initiative permeated different Spanish
political circles. Western diplomats were thrown of f balance when
friendly Spanish politicians, obviously reacting to the Germans'
introduction of territorial concessions to the agenda, approached
them with demands that they should match these concessions. As
early as January 1915, Prime Minister Dato confided to Hardinge
that there were rumours that pro-German elements were looking for
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a new candidate for the Spanish throne to whom Tangier, Gibraltar
and Portugal had already been promised by the German Embassy.
Dato naturally dismissed them as pure fiction, nevertheless he
noted that the strongest argument among Germanophiles was that
Germany had never done Spain any harm in the past, and might
conceivably do her some good. (22) One month later, the Spanish
Ambassador in London, Merry del Val, confirmed that his
government and King were determined to maintain neutrality, but
he pointed out that the Germans were organizing regular
propaganda by buying up newspapers and intriguing with the
clergy. They had also offered Spain Gibraltar and Tangier. The
Foreign Office believed that what the German Ambassador in
Madrid, Prince Ratibor, had actually promised was that if Spain
were to take Gibraltar and Tangier, Germany would not
interfere.(23) The extent of the concessions the Germans were
prepared to offer kept changing throughout the rest of the year.
Sometimes only Gibraltar and Tangier were on offer, at other
times they included control of Portugal and French Morocco as
well. It might be argued that these concessions were increased
in order to create a deeper impact in Allied circles. The sources
of information cannot be doubted as they included such figures
as the Count Romanones and the editor of the Correspondencia de
Espafia, Leopoldo Romeo, and also French and British citizens who
had been in contact with the Spanish Monarch. (24)
The Allies had a certain interest at the outbreak of
the hostilities in drawing Spain in on their side. On 17 August,
1914 a secret report issued by the Admiralty War Staff on 24
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December, 1912 was circulated. The advantages of an alliance with
Spain were underlined:
"Under existing conditions, in the event of a war between
the Triple entente and the Triple Alliance, the strategic
position in the Mediterranean limits in a marked degree the
offensive operations of the Entente.
• . . The accession of Spain to the Triple Entente as an
active partner would introduce a change which may make its
influence felt through all the plans of the Triple
Alliance. Spain could possibly put an arny of 50,000 men
into the field, in addition to the reserves kept at home
and the garrisons of distant positions. . . The mere knowledge
that the Franco-British command of the Mediterranean was
backed by 50,000 troops would introduce a fresh element
into the situation which Italy could not afford to ignore,
and which might in time help to weaken her adhesion to the
Triple Alliance. Italy is peculiarly vulnerable to
amphibious attack.
The other results of a Spanish adhesion to the Triple
Entente would be, first, addition of the Spanish ships of
war to the sea forces at the disposal of the Entente--which
though providing a small increase of strength only, would
be of considerable service in certain directions; and,
secondly, the right of our own ships to use certain Spanish
ports.
sum up
Should Spain join the Triple Entente, the militazy
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situation would be improved to the extent by which the
Spanish army could increase the effect produced by the
Franco-British maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean in
the later stages of a war.
British overseas commerce in the Atlantic would be more
safely conducted and more easily defended.
No corresponding disadvantages worthy of consideration
immediately present themselves". (25)
Simultaneously, in 1914 the British Foreign Office
felt it vitally important to break-up a possible German
intelligence centre at Tangier and concluded that if France would
agree, the best solution would be to let Spain have Tangier as
the price of her alliance. (26) Yet, as emerged from the
Admiralty's report, the Italian position was crucial when
considering the advantages of a possible understanding with
Spain. Hence the neutrality adopted by Italy and her entry into
the war on the side of the Western Powers in May 1915 certainly
cooled the Allied initiatives towards Spain. Neither France nor
Great Britain was unhappy with the neutrality adopted by Dato and
there is no evidence that they tried to influence the Spanish
government to reconsider its position. In any case, what the
Entente probably expected was a formal approach from the Spanish
administration offering intervention in exchange for territorial
concessions, but it never intended to take the first step.
The Data cabinet was not prepared to abandon formal
neutrality. Hence it rebuffed all the German offers as well as
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avoiding any approach to the Allies. However, Spanish
politicians, particularly those regarded as friendly, kept
alluding to the necessity of obtaining some territorial gain.
Their main objective was to acquire Tangier. Yet they did not and
could not promise anything beyond their friendship and moral
support. Obviously, the Entente could not consider this as an
acceptable basis for discussion.
On 18 April, 1915 Romanones spoke at Palma de Mallorca.
He already hoped to succeed Dato in the government, and in order
to do so he needed the support of all the factions of his Liberal
party. Thus Romanones had to be careful not to lay himself open
to charges of pro-intervention. Hence his former pro-Allied views
were somewhat played down. Nevertheless, once more he insisted
that Spain should remain loyal to the international line she had
begun before 1914. Isolation was not an option for any European
state at the current time. The Count also pointed out:
"...The possession of the Moroccan coasts is one of the
most sure means of defending our interests in the
Mediterranean. . . for this reason the Liberal and
Conservative governments have maintained the agreements of
1904, 1905, 1907 and 1912. . . It is natural that the
government should observe silence but we who have no such
responsibility are obliged to declare that the possession
of Tangier constitutes a national aspiration... '. (27)
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Learning of Romanones' speech, the British Foreign Office
instructed Hardinge not to push the question of Tangier. The
French Foreign Minister Delcasse wished to leave the question
open. (28) A few days later, Maura repeated the same argument at
Madrid's Royal Theatre: ".. . The future of Tangier must be Spanish
and only Spanish.. . without Tangier, Spain cannot possibly fulfil
her mission in the Protectorate...". (29). Two other leading
Liberal politicians known for their pro-Entente sympathies,
Gonzalez Hontoria, a former Under-Secretary of State at the
Foreign Office, and Perez Caballero, former Ambassador in Paris
and Foreign Minister with the Moret cabinet in 1910, reached a
similar conclusion. In an article in El ABC, the former pleaded
for unity of purpose among the many Spanish factions in order to
concentrate public opinion on a definite goal. That goal ought
to be the ultimate acquisition of Tangier. Perez Caballero
declared in El Mundo that Spain had only one ambition in the
Mediterranean and that was the occupation of Tangier. Moreover,
he suggested that France had accepted that fact in 1902 and that
Britain's interests would in no way suffer. But such an object
could only be obtained by loyalty and friendship towards France
and Britain. (30) The King himself showed a keen interest on the
subject. This was the impression that both Monsieur Cooreman and
the Bishop of Southwark gained after their meetings with Alfonso
XIII in March and October 1915 respectively. (31) The Spanish
Monarch even obtained the good will of the Russian Ambassador,
Baron Budberg, in order to put pressure on the Allies to obtain
Tangier. (32)
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The Western Powers were open to any suggestions but
they were not prepared to give territory without gaining
something in return. However, that was what the Spanish King
seemed to imply in his conversation with Monsieur Cooreman:
• .His Majesty expressed friendly sentiments but said that
he was in difficult position between the Germans, who were
supported by the Spanish Right and who offered him
Gibraltar, Morocco and a free hand in Portugal, and the
Allies who seemed not to feel gratitude for the services
which he had rendered them. The King refrained from stating
what he expected from the Allies, but Monsieur Cooreman
derived the impression he had Tangier in mind. His Majesty
did not apparently mention the nature of the services to
which he made allusion... ". (33)
To the Allies, the strategy followed by the Spanish
Monarch and the dynastic politicians amounted to virtual moral
blackmail. Not lending their ears to the impossible German offers
could not conceivably be regarded as services rendered to the
Allied war effort. Between the months of May and November 1915
France and Britain had to consider how to deal with Spanish
territorial claims. The British believed that active Spanish
assistance could be of value and therefore an arrangement should
be made in exchange for her intervention. In July, the British
War Office supported the idea of giving Tangier to Spain and
together with the Admiralty were inclined to think in positive
terms about exchanging Gibraltar for Ceuta. Simultaneously,
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however, objections were also being raised: the French had to
agree and there was the problem of continuous anarchy in the
Spanish zone in Morocco. It was seriously doubted that Spain
could maintain order and assure security for European life and
property. Thus there was always a strong case for not pushing
matters and instead waiting for the Spanish government to make
a formal approach both with its demands and with what it was
prepared to offer in return. After talks between the British
Foreign Minister Grey and his French counterpart, Cambon, this
was finally the policy adopted by the Entente. (34)
Dato never contemplated the idea of departing from
neutrality and consequently he never approached the Allies with
any proposal which could have jeopardized the non-involvement of
his country in the conflict. Yet his problems were not over for
the impact in Europe was to make itself dramatically felt on the
Spanish economy and society. Dato's inability to tackle the
growing economic crisis brought about his downfall in December
1915.
During the conflict Spain underwent a profound social,
demographic and economic change. She took advantage of her
neutral status to supply both camps, foreign intervention was
eliminated in the internal market and new outlets, which had to
be abandoned by the belligerent nations, were taken over. The
country experienced its first industrial take-off. The period of
the Great War was a time of unexpected economic growth but it
also seriously eroded the fragile foundations of the established
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ruling order. The war years were ones of extraordinary profits
but equally of staggering price rises. They would bring about
prosperity but they would also exacerbate the overall misery of
the nation. (35)
During the first months after the outbreak of
hostilities, the Spanish economy was in a state of disorder and
confusion. There were difficulties in obtaining raw materials
abroad and international credit was harder to procure.This
adversely affected the stockmarket and financial and banking
institutions. Yet by early 1915 a previously unknown phase of
expansion of the economy began. The radical drop in imports
together with the rising volume and prices of exports meant that
a poor nation, almost overnight, saw a sudden flow of gold across
her frontiers. Spain experienced a period of rapid accumulation
of capital which was created by a highly favourable Balance of
Trade: (36)
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Balance of Trade. 1914-1920
Value
In millions of pesetas Gold
Imports	 Exports	 Balance
1914	 1,169	 937	 -232
1915	 1,367	 1,454	 + 87
1916	 1,531	 1,975	 ^443
1917	 1,556	 2,541	 +985
1918	 1,683	 2,437	 +754
1919	 2,119	 2,470	 +611
1920	 2,571	 1,875	 -706
Volume
Index. -1913=100
	
Imports	 Exports
	
79'O	 7419
	
7719	 98'O
	
68'9	 105'O
	
52'9	 102'l
	
43'l	 7318
	6 '9	 l01'8
	
100'O	 79'6
After the years of war, this kind of artificial
protection disappeared and Spain returned to her traditional
position of deficit. A golden opportunity was thus missed as
profits were not wisely ploughed back to re-organize and
rationalize the economic infrastructure. During the war, as
exports grew and imports dwindled, the Balance of Trade
registered an era of fabulous profits. Hundreds of new businesses
and joint-stock companies were established and the Bank of Spain
increased its gold reserves from 674 million pesetas in 1913 to
2,500 millions in 1917. However, the amount of money in
circulation also increased from 1,931 million in 1913 to 3,866'9
million in 1919. Prices shot up dramatically causing a situation
of rampant inflation which led to shortages, widened the gap
between rich and poor and initiated an internal migratory current
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that dislocated the weak foundations of the Spanish economy. Thus
in the year 1915 an inflationary cycle began stimulated by an
unchecked rise of domestic prices which, by 1920, were 223'19%
above those of 1914, the explosion in external demand, the
difficulty in importing basic products and the increase of gold
reserves. Additionally, between 1914 and 1920 the peseta would
lose half of its purchasing power.
Evolution of Prices.(1914-1920): (37)
Semesters
April 1909-March 1914
April 1914-September 1914
October 1914-March 1915
April 1915-September 1915
October 1915-March 1916
April 1916-September 1916
October 1916-March 1917
April 1917-September 1917
October 1917-March 1918
April 1918-September 1918
October 1918-March 1919
April 1919-September 1919
October 1919-March 1920
April 1920-September 1920
Countryside	 Cities
100	 100
106	 106'9
llO'8	 107'7
117'l	 113'8
118'4	 117'6
123'4	 120'3
125'6	 l23'6
139'8	 136'l
149'3	 145'4
172'8	 161'8
178'S	 167'7
190'9	 180
208'l	 192'3
220'3	 202'3
Furthermore, this economic and financial boom was
extremely uneven. Industrial production expanded more rapidly
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than that of agriculture and therefore the prices of manufactured
products rose more rapidly than the others. The boom benefited
only certain regions and certain social classes as profits were
mainly monopolized by a rising industrial bourgeoisie. Industrial
regions consequently entered a phase of feverish activity while
other areas of the peninsula were devastated by scarcity,
shortages and inflation. The mining sector went through a golden
age, particularly the production of coal in Asturias. The
chemical and hydroelectric industries also expanded greatly. The
Catalan textile concerns experienced a period of massive growth
as they could now supply not only to most belligerent nations but
they also made inroads into traditional British markets in Latin
.\merica. The Basque steel, iron and shipping companies also
increased their profits, especially the latter which benefited
from the spectacular rise in transport costs. Finally, the
banking sector was the other great winner of the period. In four
years the number of financial companies and private banks
doubled.
While the war favoured the expansion of certain
industrial and financial enterprises, it also exacerbated the
regional, social and economic differences in the country. For
example, while the forced reduction of imports caused gold to
flow into the national coffers and brought about prosperity for
the Catalan and Basque middle classes, it also meant severe
scarcities of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, rising prices
and worsening living standards for rural and urban workers.
Substantial profits were reaped above all by speculators who
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facilitated the exportation of virtually anything required by the
war machinery regardless of the consumption needs or welfare of
the Spaniards, and by profiteers who hoarded production in
expectation of a boom in prices. Furthermore, the railway network
proved unable to cope with the increased volume of traffic and
virtually collapsed. Foodstuffs, raw materials and basic items
were sold freely abroad without any limit. The regions of Central
and Southern Spain suffered most tragically from the effects of
the war. A current of migration from the countryside to the
cities and from the South to the North began to assume
significant proportions. Salaries could not keep pace with the
rising prices of such basic products as sugar, eggs, bread,
potatoes, meat and dairy products. There was widespread
unemployment and scarcity. Consequently, for most people this
period was one of crisis characterized by food shortages, a fall
in real salaries and severe material distress. It was a situation
popularly described as Crisis de Subsistencias. (38)
The uneven impact of the war on the Spanish economy and
society sparked of f continuous food riots, mutinies and popular
protests. The mobilization of social forces which had previously
remained politically passive contributed to the breakdown of
existing forms of hierarchical and clientelist politics,
confronting the governing elites with the uncertainties of
popular politics, the unwelcome appearance of more genuine
democracy, and the rapidly advancing threat of Socialism.
In 1915 the first signs of popular discontent, social
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unrest and economic hardship were becoming evident. The Dato
administration proved unable to cope with these new realities.
It initiated the nationalization of foreign-owned assets in Spain
and of the external debt. By 1920 half of the foreign assets had
been nationalized and the external debt had been liquidated.
However, the Conservative government failed miserably to solve
the Crisis de Subsistencias. Rather Spain's socio-economic crisis
rapidly deepened with the return of over 40,000 Spanish workers
from other European countries and Latin America, the introduction
by the belligerent countries of quotas in their imports and of
restrictions in their exports. Shortages, unemployment and
inflation were the results. In September 1914 a Junta de
Iniciativas was set up under the direction of the former Minister
of Interior and right-wing Conservative Juan de la Cierva. Its
objective was to channel, co-ordinate and implement a series of
initiatives to deal with the crisis. In February 1915 Cierva
resigned and the Junta was dissolved. Thereafter Juntas
Provinciales de Subsistencias, formed by the Civil Governor, the
Mayor and a delegate from the Treasury, were created in each
capital. None of their attempts to control and regulate prices
and exports of basic products led to any positive outcome as
prices kept rising and profiteers and speculators prospered. The
Conservative cabinet, like the following Turno administrations,
proved unable or unwilling to fight those who benefited from the
exceptional circumstances provided by the war. This was scarcely
surprising, as those profiting were most often the very same
local notables and caciques to whom the political class owed its
votes. Simultaneously, the attempt in June 1915 by the Minister
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of Finance, Gabino Bugallal, to issue a loan to cover the
Treasury Debt fell very short of expectations as capitalists
preferred to invest in the shares of shipping or textile
companies.
By late 1915 the government seemed to have abandoned
its efforts to find solutions for the economy. Dato insisted that
the military reforms should take precedence in the list of
parliamentary business over every other item, including the
budget. on 6 December, the Liberal leader, Count Romanones,
backed by the Republican, Radical and Carlist minorities
presented a proposal which amounted to a motion of censure. He
requested the Chamber to declare that the duty of the government
had been to submit an integrated patkage of economic and
financial measures appropriate to the crisis through which the
country was passing. Romanones demanded that the Chamber should
proceed without delay to the introduction and discussion of such
a bill and to that of a budget suited to the internal needs of
the country and to the most pressing requirements of its
Treasury. Realizing that he had lost the 'goodwill' of the other
dynastic party, Dato resigned. (39)
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3.- The Romanones administration: the domestic challenge:
The Liberal leader, Count Romanones, rapidly formed a
new government after the fall of Dato in December 1915. The Count
was known for his cynical approach to politics, a shrewd ability
in party manoeuvring, a skilful gambler's style with regard to
important issues and for his good contacts at Court. The Count
was regarded by many as the perfect example of the Turno
professional politician: a man without clear cut ideological
principles or political ideas, but able to remain in power by his
clever manipulation and control of the electoral machinery and
its clientelista foundations.(1) His record in internal party
manoeuvring and opportunism was above that of his peers. In 1909
he was one of the Liberal notables who encouraged the then party
leader Segismundo Moret to take advantage of the turbulent
situation created by the crushing of the anticlerical and
antimilitarist riots of that summer to join forces with the
Republicans and oust Antonio Maura, the Conservative Prime
Minister, from office. Once this was achieved, Romanones was one
of the leading Liberals who exploited the fact that Moret was too
close to the Republicans, to end both his Premiership and his
leadership of the party and replace him with José Canalejas.
After Canalejas' murder in November 1912 Romanones took over the
leadership of the Liberal party thereby defeating all the other
faction leaders. In fact, he managed to outmanoeuvre them by
claiming the right to take utemporaryN charge of the Premiership
as he was then the Speaker of the Lower Chamber. (2 One year
later, Romanones was behind the initiative to split the
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Conservative party and reconstruct the rotational basis of the
Turno which had been opposed by Antonio Maura, the Conservative
leader, since his fall from power in October 1909. There were
increasing rumours that the other Liberal notables, annoyed by
the Count's rise to power, were plotting his downfall. Romanones
was not prepared to let his main rival, the Marquis of Alhucemas,
form a new cabinet which might have represented the end of his
supremacy in the Liberal party. Hence he preferred instead to
back a Conservative government with which to re-organize the
Turno. The Count's strategy also brought to a halt an important
move led by Melquiades Alvarez and other moderate Republican
elements. They had almost come to accept the Monarchy when the
King had collaborated in the fall of Maura from power. Alvarez
had created the Reformist party in April 1912 with the objective
of both preventing the "authoritarian and clerical" Maura from
returning to office and incorporating representative sectors of
the Republican middle classes and intelligentsia within the
Monarchist camp in exchange for educational, constitutional and
social reforms. From June 1913 the Reformists agreed to take part
in a coalition government headed by the Marquis of Alhucemas.
This might have led not only to a renewal of the Liberal party
but also to a realignment of political forces and the
democratization of the system. Yet this initiative was
successfully blocked. Maura's refusal to rotate with those whom
he regarded since 1909 as unprincipled and treacherous Liberals
was an obstacle to Romanones' scheme. But the Count kept the
leadership of his party when on 29 October, 1913 the bulk of the
Conservative party, known henceforth as Idóneos, decided to
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abandon Maura and form a cabinet presided over by the rich lawyer
and former Minister Eduardo Dato. The Turno PacIfico survived but
the Conservative party was irretrievably divided between
Maurisbas and Idóneos. (3) Thus the Count's successful bid for
power in December 1915 was a kind of confirmation that he was the
strong man of the political system who had been pulling the
strings since October 1913 and now wanted to be in personal
charge. (4)
Romanones' second administration was to last from
December 1915 to April 1917. This period is crucial to an
understanding of the crisis of hegemony of the Constitutional
Monarchy which would explode in 1917. During this stage the final
breach between government and the governed, between Espafla
Oticial and Espafia Real, began to take shape and could no longer
be concealed. It opened an era in which the dynastic politicians
lost once and for all their leading role in political society and
found their exercise of power increasingly questioned by all
sections of the political spectrum.
The programme Romanones outlined at the opening of the
Cortes in May 1916 was widely welcomed. The government promised
to solve the Crisis de Subsistencias by stimulating the economy
through a vast plan of economic and financial measures to fight
shortages, inflation and unemployment, to foster agriculture,
public credit and transport, to prevent the export of capital and
emigration, to strengthen national defence, to modernize the
judicial and educational systems, to reduce expenses in Morocco
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and to maintain strict neutrality. (5) Yet the impossibility of
delivering any of these promises, plus Romanones' own continuous
U-turns confirmed the mounting evidence that both Turno parties
lacked the ability to adapt themselves to the changing
circumstances brought about by the war and increased the general
disillusionment with the established order. Now the Zeitgeisl. was
the spirit of corporatism.(6) Three key groups--the industrial
bourgeoisie, labour movement and army -resorted to corporatist
solutions in the search for mechanisms of self-defence through
which their particular interests would be better protected.
Additionally, unlike the other dynastic leaders before or after
him, Romanones became directly involved in the international
question. Spain under his government came very close to joining
the Entente forces. This would cost him the Premiership. At the
time of his departure from office, Romanones left a country more
polarized than ever before by the neutrality debate, his own
party was split and broken, and the bourgeoisie, army and
proletariat were eagerly awaiting the moment to strike against
the Turno. The seeds of destruction of the existing order had
been planted. The crisis of hegemony of the Liberal Monarchy was
a reality.
During the sixteen months that the second Romanones
administration lasted the divorce between society and state
became more pronounced than at any other time since 1875. The
rapid economic, social and ideological changes produced by the
Great War meant that the regime's lack of grass roots support or
popular appeal in a period of mass mobilization could no longer
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be concealed. Different social sectors, upset by the inability
of the government to satisfy their demands, resorted to
corporatist solutions in order to protect their respective
interests.
1.-The Labour Movement:
The organized labour movement had always been divided
ideologically and geographically between two antagonistic camps:
a Marxist tendency concentrated in Castille, Asturias and the
Basque Country and an Anarcho-Syndicalist dominant among the
workers of Catalonia, Levante and Andalusia. Their evolution and
strategies were very different.
Marxism was represented by the Spanish Socialist Party
(PSOE) and its trade union, La Unión General de Trabajadores
(UGT) Spanish Socialism suffered from several diet iciencies which
to a large extent explain its failure to establish its hegemony
in the organized labour movement. The Socialist leader, Pablo
Iglesias, and the National Committee based in Madrid exercised
their intransigent authority through their control of the party,
trade union and daily newspaper, El Socialista. Lacking an
intellectual tradition, they interpreted Marxism through the
writings of French Socialists such as Jules Guesde and Paul
Lafargue, which actually bore little relation to the Spanish
situation. Hence they defended reductionist, rigid and
deterministic positions. The preservation of the purity of the
movement was considered paramount and thus the PSOE isolated
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itself from contacts with other progressive forces which might
'contaminate' it with bourgeois ideas. They had an almost blind
faith in the future victory of Socialism in the world. Official
party rhetoric was therefore full of revolutionary fervour and
promises of a classless society after the establishment of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. In practice, however, Spanish
Socialists employed an extremely moderate and reformist strategy.
They concentrated on the daily struggle to obtain immediate gains
and under the strict control of Iglesias, emphasis was laid on
discipline and organization. Moreover, in spite of the corrupt
character of the Turno PacIfico, the Socialists subordinated the
economic struggle to political and electoral initiatives. In
fact, the first Socialist Councillors were not elected until
1905. The hollowness of the PSOE's strategy, torn apart by
internal tensions between revolutionary theory and legalist
action, limited the appeal and hindered the growth of the
movement. Absorbed by political matters, they established their
headquarters in Madrid when industrial Barcelona should have been
the main focus of their activities. The evolution of Spanish
Socialism was thus slow and even painful but built on a solid
organizational basis. Its strength mainly lay among the labour
aristocracy of Madrid, the Asturian miners, and the workers of
the steel and shipping concerns of the Basque Country.
On the other hand, Spanish Anarcho-Syndicalism had
always followed an irregular evolution: moments of euphoria and
mass membership were often followed by state repression and the
movement's subsequent virtual disappearance. Yet socialist
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centralism, authoritarianism and politicism hardly appealed to
Catalan workers or Andalusian landless peasants. Direct action
and violent methods were not alien to them since they could not
obtain redress for their grievances from a corrupt political
system that either failed to understand the Catalan class
struggle or was completely dependent on the votes delivered by
the Andalusian caciques. Nevertheless, far from constituting a
real threat to the regime, anarchist terrorism and
insurrectionalism were regarded as a nuisance to be dealt with
by police repression. Moreover, the loose character of its
organization facilitated its destruction. By the turn of the
century, the movement had been crushed and only in 1907 did a
revival seem to take place when Solidaridad Obrera was created
in Barcelona to organize the local trade unions regardless of
their ideological leanings.
After the anticlerical and antimilitarist riots which
took place in Barcelona in July 1909, known as the Tragic Week,
and the repressive response of the central administration the two
movements came to different conclusions. The Socialists abandoned
their traditional isolationist stand and in November 1909
established a conjuncio'n or Alliance with the Republicans. During
this period, the Socialists made a more systematic use of the
strike weapon initiating a series of nation-wide strikes in 1911
and 1912. Yet their main concern remained the electoral and
organizational aspect of the conjunción. It seemed to pay off
when Pablo Iglesias became the first Socialist Deputy in May
1910. Furthermore, an number of important intellectuals like
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Julián Besteiro, Luis Araquistáin and Andrés Ovejero decided to
join the party.
Shortly after the creation of the Republican-Socialist
alliance, Solidari dad Obrera and other non-Catalan and
non-Socialist trade unions met at Barcelona in October 1910 with
the objective of setting up a national organization: La
Confederacio'n Nacional del Trabajo or CNT was created. From the
beginning the recently created CNT was divided between a moderate
syndicalist tendency and an anarchist hard-line. The former
seemed to gain the upper hand when young leaders like Salvador
Segul and Angel Pestafla imposed their views. Terrorist methods
of "propaganda by deed" were discarded and instead emphasis was
placed on the creation of a powerful organization. Nevertheless,
the CNT continued to be more militant than the UGT. Revolutionary
Syndicalism borrowed from the French Confederabion Generale du
Travail constituted its main ideological philosophy. It rejected
politics and concentrated on the economic struggle by means of
direct action spearheaded by a powerful trade union movement.
Thus the Syndicalists were soon behind a series of ill-timed
outbursts and badly co-ordinated strikes. At the end of 1911, the
CNT was declared illegal by a Barcelona judge. Then, following
the assassination of the Liberal Prime Minister Canalejas in
November 1912, a crackdown on the organization forced the
Confederation to endure a clandestine existence. (1
After the outbreak of the First World War, the
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Socialist movement with experienced cadres, a patiently-built
organization and 84,762 members in the IJGT was clearly the
leading and most important force in the Spanish labour movement.
The CNT did not begin its reconstruction properly until 1915 and
by then had only 15,000 militants. Apart from the traditional
tactical and ideological differences, the pro-Allied position of
the Socialist leaders as opposed to the neutral stand of the
Anarcho-Syndicalists seemed to widen the gap between both
organizations. The impact of the war was such, however, that for
the first time the dream of the unity of the Spanish proletariat
was almost realized.
The hardship and distress brought about by the European
conflict had to be borne mainly by the working classes. While
some areas in the North and the East of the country experienced
a dramatic economic boom and industrial expansion, the Centre and
the South were terribly hit by unemployment and recession. The
workers' conditions therefore varied according to the region. In
Valencia, Barcelona, Vizcaya, Asturias, Santander and León,
salaries during these years increased by more than 100% while in
Extremadura and Andalusia by only 50%. Nevertheless, at no time
did salaries catch up with prices. (2 The enforced return of
thousands of Spaniards working abroad, internal migration from
the agrarian South to the industrial cities of the North or
Madrid, the sudden end of crucial imports and the rising trend
of exporting basic products were different features of this
period which all combined to destroy the semblance of social
harmony in the country. Furthermore, while fortunes were being
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amassed by industrialists, a galloping inflation rate was eroding
the living standards of the workers. In many cases,
recently-arrived migrant workers to cities such as Barcelona had
to endure appalling living conditions, derisory wages and
insecurity of employment. To make matters worse, the
entrepreneurial inefficiency of the parvenu bourgeoisie was
matched only by the prodigality with which it squandered its
profits. Much new found wealth was frittered away on ostentious
display rather than rationally invested in industry or
agricultural modernization. Such cavalier disregard for the
living conditions of those on whose backs the wealth was created
could hardly fail to antagonise Spanish workers.(3)
In early 1916 the Crisis de Subsistencias had become
a reality. In only two years the prices of basic staples had
risen alarmingly: 1. kg. of bread by 24'3%, 1 kg. of beef by
3315%, 1 kg. of cod by 57'8%, 1 kg. of potatoes by 35'2%, 1 kg.
of chick-peas by 20'2%, 1 kg. of rice by lO'5%, 1 kg. of sugar
by 18%, a litre of milk by 13'8% and a dozen eggs by 30 '9%. (4)
As workers' wages could not keep pace with prices, resentment,
discontent and hatred against the authorities mounted. Food
riots, social unrest and violent clashes with the Civil Guard
became a common feature all over Spain.
After a steady loss in membership during the first year
of the war, from late 1915 onwards the labour movement
experienced a remarkable advance in numbers of militants and
simultaneously achieved a previously unknown strength in national
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politics. Membership of the trade unions shot up within this
period mainly for two reasons: the employers' willingness to
satisfy their demands for fear of losing markets at this
extraordinary moment when huge profits could be made, and the
inflationary cycle which pushed workers to fight in order to
maintain their basic living standards. Between 1910 and 1918 the
industrial proletariat grew by 60%. In particular the numbers of
miners, dockers, textile workers and those engaged in transport
and metallurgy increased. (5) This was a crucial moment in which
the organized labour movement was to become aware of its strength
and potential to challenge the status quo. Thus the more
effective and constant social struggle resulted in a massive
display of working class mobilization. In 1916 social unrest and
strike activity increased dramatically. 2,415,304 working days
were lost in comparison to 382,885 in 1915. The violent and
militant mood of the workers could be seen all over the country:
during the first months of 1916 Barcelona was rocked by a wave
of strikes. Initially only bricklayers, metal workers and bakers
were involved but by March it had become almost a general strike.
There were numerous bloody events: 'Scabs' were often attacked
and even shot by Syndicalists. Several workers were also wounded
by the police or arrested. In late January there were popular
protests in Valencia, Castellón, Palencia and Bilbao. In February
there were demonstrations demanding jobs and bread in Málaga,
Santander and Saragossa and a general strike began in Valencia.
In March social unrest spread to Murcia, Valladolid, La Rioja and
Bilbao. There were riots in Logroño leaving one dead and five
wounded. There were violent clashes in the docks of El Ferrol and
65
the mines of La Carolina (Jaén), RIO Tinto (Huelva) and La Union
(Cartagena). In La UniOn alone nine people were killed and fifty
wounded. (6)
Despite the revolutionary mood of the workers and the
general spirit of militancy, the Socialist leadership did not
change its traditional attitude: fierce rhetoric in speeches and
articles in El Socialista, while extreme moderation and caution
in practice. Pablo Iglesias and his colleagues showed more
interest in international issues and the electoral campaign.
There was an evident gap between the ruling elements of the party
and the workers.(7) Nevertheless, there was continual pressure
for action from the Socialist rank and file which could not be
ignored forever.
During the first months of 1916 El Socialista and
Espafla published a series of defiant and aggressive editorials
attacking the Romanones administration for not dealing with the
Crisis de Subsist: enci as satisfactorily and accusing the
government both of condoning violent repression of the strike
movement and of siding with the employers in the social
conflicts.(8) In practice, however, the Socialist leadership
continued to be as cautious and legalist as usual. As early as
20 January, 1916 the provincial federation at Orense called upon
the National Committee of the UGT to organize a general stoppage
across the country to force the government to do something about
the social crisis. The Committee brushed aside the idea, deeming
it harmful for the organization. Instead delegations from party
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and union visited Romanones at least three times between January
and March to apprise him of the dissatisfaction of the workers,
to protest against the repressive methods used by the authorities
and to demand relief measures to solve the social and economic
crisis.(9) Romanones' personal record hardly suggested that he
would heed the calls for redress.
Romanones' chicanery was rapidly confirmed when on 25
February the Count sacked his Minister of Finance, Angel Urzaiz:
one of the very few Turno politicians who was regarded by both
right and left as an honest man trying to seek genuine remedies
for the social distress. Romanones insisted that he was forced
to dismiss his Minister as Urzaiz had frequently acted on his own
without consulting the other members of the Cabinet. Yet Urzaiz
argued that the real reason he had to go was that his economic
measures were damaging certain privileged interests. (10) He was
replaced by Miguel Villanueva, Logroflo's main cacigue and one of
the leading Liberal notables, who immediately reversed Urzaiz's
measures. Yet the Socialist party continued to devote most of its
energies to campaigning for the general elections scheduled for
9 April. Romanones once more proved to be a master in the art of
trickery and deception. He promised to organize clean elections
and even spoke against article 29, which permitted the automatic
return of Deputies when they were unopposed in their
constituencies and thus constituted the most important weapon in
the armoury of the local caciques. In fact, a record 145
Deputies, more than a third of those in the Congress, were
returned by means of article 29. ?nong them were all the five
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candidates for the province of Guadalajara, Romanones'
stronghold. In the elections of March 1914, 93 Deputies had been
elected in this way. Under the Minister of Interior, Santiago
Alba, the elections were fixed as usual in Madrid. (11) The new
chamber of April 1916 had a majority of 235 Liberals and 86
Idóneos. The Republican-Socialist conjuncio'n returned only 13
Deputies, among them just one Socialist, Pablo Iglesias. It was
such a shameful spectacle with all the main dynastic leaders
having several family members in the Congress with them that it
was known as the "Cortes of the relatives".(12) The tone of the
Socialist editorials suggested that they were genuinely surprised
and outraged by the way in which the elections had been conducted
as if this was the first time!. In editorials both in El
Socialisba and Espafla they affirmed that Spain was not yet ready
for Socialism. They distinguished between a reactionary
plutocracy and a progressive bourgeoisie. The former was
represented by the Monarchy and the oligarchies, the latter by
the Republican and Regionalist parties. The Socialist editorials
revealed that the best known dynastic politicians were members
of the boards of the main national companies. They affirmed that
this was proof that within the existing system the country was
dominated by a few privileged interests. The Socialists concluded
that it was in the interest of both proletariat and bourgeoisie
to remove the Bourbon Monarchy and replace it with a modern
capitalist Republic. (13)
The XII Congress of the UGT held at the Casa del Pueblo
in Madrid on 17-24 May was a turning point in the history of the
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Spanish labour movement. The seeds for the mobilization of its
militants in an open challenge to the state were sown there.
Moreover, the first initiatives were made to seal a pact with the
CNT. Nevertheless, they were adopted reluctantly by a leadership
under constant pressure from the rank and file.
Two days before the opening of the Congress, the
National Committee of the UGT had been discussing different
solutions to deal with the socio-economic crisis. Pablo Iglesias
backed by his right-hand man, the Madrid-born Councillor and
moderate leader of the plasterers' trade union, Francisco Largo
Caballero, argued that the working class consciousness had not
yet been formed. Thus the workers should avoid a direct
confrontation with the state. Iglesias stressed that it was not
prudent to call for a general strike. The people were hungry and
under such conditions they could only carry out "epileptic
movements'1 . The UGT should therefore work for the discipline and
organization of the proletariat and not force it into dangerous
initiatives. In the end a motion presented by the more radical
railworkers leader Daniel Anguiano and Largo Caballero was
endorsed by the rest of the National Committee. This argued that
in order to give an impression of strength a campaign of
agitation should be initiated through meetings and demonstrations
to force the government to tackle inflation and unemployment. (14)
The revisionist Socialist and Professor of Logic at Madrid
University Julián Besteiro was commissioned to draw up the final
resolution. It was introduced into the agenda of Congress on 22
May and received overwhelming approval. The main points were the
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following:
"The current crisis is not only hurting the proletariat. A
good part of the bourgeoisie is also suffering from this
obsolete regime which is sacrificing the welfare of the
majority of the citizens for the sake of a minority of
plutocrats.
Thus this message is directed to all those hurt by the
policies of the present government and whose agreement is
deemed fundamental for a common campaign of national
protest.
It is proposed:
1. To demand once more from parliament and government: the
reduction of transport fares; the implementation of public
works; the regulation of exchange and trade; the
suppression of industrial privileges; an end to
unproductive expenditure, particularly the criminal war in
Morocco.
2. To prepare the public and to secure a response from
parliament and government, the UGT is to organize an
intense campaign to attract as many militants as possible.
3. After that campaign one day of demonstrations and
meetings is to be held throughout Spain in order to attract
as many people as possible.
4. The National Committee with reports from the provinces
and the collaboration of the regional delegates is to be
empowered to determine in a period of three months whether
it is convenient to organize one day of nation-wide
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stoppage.
5. If after the one day nation-wide stoppage, government
and parliament do not give a satisfactory response, the
National Committee is to summon the regional delegates and
together decide what line of action should be adopted". (15)
The motion was carefully phrased in very moderate and
legalistic terms. The Socialists regarded government and
parliament as the only possible sources of a solution to the
crisis. Only if they failed to provide one would more active
initiatives be adopted. Yet this motion constituted the party's
first response to the demands from below. Moreover, the
Socialists' scheme not only sought to appeal to the proletariat
through a long campaign of propaganda and mobilization but also
insisted that the objective was to win over alL those damaged by
the crisis. Consequently, the UGT-PSOE leaders took an important
step forward in becoming the champions and main partners of the
Republican-Socialist conjuncio'n.
At the same Congress,a crucial boost was given to the
hopes of working class unity. A resolution from the Asturian
delegates, Isidoro Acevedo and Manuel Llaneza, calling for the
collaboration of both trade unions was overwhelmingly approved.
It may appear contradictory that while stressing their Republican
commitments the Socialist leadership was also making overtures
to the more radical CNT. However, this rapprochement can be
explained by several factors. Firstly, the socio-economic crisis
was being felt acutely by the entire labour movement. Moreover,
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there had always existed the hope that workers' unity could be
achieved. There was a general consensus among the rank and file
of both CNT and UGT in 1916 that the tragic situation made it
essential. On 4 May 1916, the Madrid bricklayers' trade union had
demanded that the UGT's National Committee initiate contacts with
the CNT. On 23 May, during the XII UGT's Congress the marble
workers' trade union had also advocated the necessity of both
organizations working together for common goals. Later, there was
the motion introduced by the Asturian miners. The pressure of the
militants could no longer be ignored by the Socialist
leadership. (16) Nevertheless, the old-guard reformist UGT's
leaders had historically been reluctant to collaborate with their
Anarcho-Syndicalist counterparts. The Socialists were concerned
with the discipline and centralization of the movement and
despised the lack of co-ordination and violent methods of
Anarcho-Syndicalists.It seems that even the moderate Acevedo and
Lianeza did not believe in alliances with the CNT. They had been
obliged to move such a resolution against their own principles
since this was a compromise voted in Asturias by the miners whose
interests they represented. (17) Iglesias and his colleagues must
have felt that they could not turn down the proposal as this
would have infuriated the Socialist rank-and-file. Moreover, they
probably realized that with the CNT struggling to re-emerge and
still with a very low membership this was the best moment to
clinch a pact on their own terms. The UGT would thus, they hoped,
become the leading force within a unified labour movement.
Secondly, it was a particularly opportune moment because the CNT,
whose Congress was taking place in Valencia at the same time as
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the one held by the UCT in Madrid, had clearly expressed its
desire to collaborate with the Socialists. On 11 May, the
Anarcho-Syndicalists stated that aim and were invited to send a
delegation to Madrid. The fact that the CNT was largely
controlled by moderate Syndicalist leaders such as Salvador Segul
and Angel Pestafia, who were concerned mainly with the
organization of the movement, and the temporary decline of those
Anarchists bent upon doctrinal purity and violence, made the idea
of joining forces more attractive to the Socialists. (18)
There was hardly any revolutionary aspiration in the
Socialist strategy. When at the UGT Congress the Anarchist
delegate, Mauro Bajatierra, spoke in defence of the use of
sabotage in the economic struggle, Pablo Iglesias quickly opposed
the idea arguing that in such a case the labour force would
become the main victim of its own tactics and besides it would
place the workers in an inferior moral position. (19) Furthermore,
on 6 June, a delegation of the UGT headed by Julián Besteiro
visited the Prime Minister, handed him the conclusions of the
Congress and exhorted him to solve the problems of shortages,
unemployment and inflation. Once more, the Socialist leaders were
behaving as moderate bureaucrats informing the government well
in advance of their plans in an attempt to avoid having to take
more active measures. (20)
Nevertheless, the fuse had been lit and could not be
extinguished. The final push came from Angel Lacort, a leading
Anarchist from Saragossa, who organized in his city a meeting of
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delegates from both the UGT and the CNT. The UGT was represented
by Largo Caballero, Julin Besteiro and the moderate Vicente
Barrio who had presided over the Socialist Congress the month
before, and the CNT by Salvador SeguI and Angel Pestaña. On 17
July, 1916 the historic Pact of Saragossa was signed by both
parties. For the first time in the history of the Spanish labour
movement the two rival movements had decided to form a common
front in order to force the government to take action over the
socio-economic crisis. Romanones panicked and ordered the arrest
of all those who had been present in Saragossa.
Furthermore, increasing Romanones' worries, the UGT-
CNT Alliance had arrived in the middle of the most important
strike in Spain since 1912: that of railway workers against the
CompaflIa del Nox-te begun on 12 July. The importance of this
strike lay in the fact that the workers' demands were not only
for the customary pay rises but also for official recognition by
the company of the existence and right of the local trade union
to represent its militants. The company categorically refused as
it preferred to deal with workers on an individual basis
encouraging personal contracts and opposing their organization
into a trade union. Both government and company were to suffer
a dramatic defeat while the labour force gained one of its most
important victories. Yet it was to be a Pyrrhic triumph. Right
from the start, the cabinet revealed its true colours. Rafael
Gasset, Minister of Public Works and leading figure of one of the
most influential Liberal factions who also owned El Imparcial,
one of the most important Liberal mouth-pieces, refused to act
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as mediator and openly sided with the Company. At that stage, the
railworkers' leaders Trifón Gómez, Daniel Angulano and others
would have backed down with the blessing of the UGT's National
Committee if it had not been for the resolution of the militants.
Alleging that a transport strike was a national disaster, the
government made good use of all its resources to defeat the
workers: the Cortes was quickly closed, constitutional guarantees
were suspended, martial law was declared, leading trade unionists
were arrested and the militarization of the rail services was
ordered. Andrés Saborit, a member of the UGT's National committee
and on close personal and ideological terms with Julián Besteiro
and his revisionist position, had been surprised in Asturias by
the outbreak of the strike. In an exceptional and unexpected
display of audacity and against the orders of the National
Committee, on 16 July Saborit was able to persuade the Asturian
miners to launch a strike in solidarity with the cause of the
railworkers. Romanones lost his nerve. Despite all his chicanery
and tricks, he did not have the ruthlessness to order a
bloodbath. Romanones was a politician who preferred to do a
U-turn and seek a solution which would permit everyone to save
face. This was achieved when on 18 July all the conflicting
parties accepted the mediation of the Institute of Social Reforms
headed by the moderate and veteran Republican Gumersindo
Azcárate. On 29 July the Institute ruled in favour of the
workers' demand for the official recognition of their trade
union. On 9 August a Royal Decree passed by the government
recognized the legal character of the trade unions as the
representative of the workers in their disputes and forced the
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companies running public services to accept that fact.(21
The crucial victory in the railway strike gave an
important boost to the morale of the labour movement, now
strengthened and united by the Alliance sealed in Saragossa. The
campaign of mobilization proposed in May and temporarily
disrupted by the events of July was therefore resumed with
greater zeal. It began with a rallying call on 30 September in
El Socialista. The Casa del Pueblo, Madrid's Socialist
headquarters, appealed to public opinion to join with the united
working class in demanding the common goal of solutions for
unemployment, inflation and shortages from the government. Five
days later El Socialista accused the plutocratic regime of being
unable to fight speculators and caciques. The Socialist newspaper
proposed a number of remedies for the crisis including a tax on
farmland, nationalization of uncultivated land and prohibition
of exports of those basic commodities which were scarce at home.
The tension between fierce rhetoric and moderation in demands
still remained. Furthermore, a regime which was deemed
incompetent and corrupt was given plenty of advance warning about
every single initiative adopted by the labour leaders. Romanones,
denounced during the summer by the Socialists as one of the main
shareholders of the largest mining company in Morocco and
therefore a prime example of the plutocracy in power, was still
approached and briefed on all matters by these very same
Socialists. 22 On 15 October, a day of demonstrations and
meetings was organized in Madrid at which Francisco Roldán, the
General Secretary of the CNT, joined forces with the leading
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elements of Spanish Socialism. For more than a month thereafter
UGT and CNT members shared the same platforms in rallies all over
the country.
Despite the apparent collaboration and goodwill
between Anarcho-Syndicalists and Socialists, there were always
tensions which were never fully resolved. Yet until late 1917 the
UGT-PSOE was to be the hegemonic force and the CNT would follow
that lead with a certain reluctance.
Firstly, there were always petty local clashes in the
mutual competition for control of certain sectors of the labour
force. Perhaps the most important incident took place in
Barcelona when Anarcho-Syndicalists tried to take over La Naval,
a dockers' trade union which constituted one of the few remaining
Socialist strongholds in the city. Largo Caballero had to travel
to the Catalan capital twice in August and September 1916 to
obtain the promise of the Syndicalist leaders that they would
persuade their militants to back down. (23) More damaging in the
long-term for the relations of both organizations was the
different attitudes that each adopted towards the international
issue and the government.
Another source of conflict was their different
position towards the European war. The growing pro-Allied stand
displayed by most Socialists clashed with the neutralism of the
Anarcho-Syndicalists. The victory of the pro-Republican and
pro-Allied position proposed by the Socialist leadership in the
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PSOE Congress of October 1915 represented the start of an all-out
campaign in favour of the Western Powers' cause. A final attempt
by neutralists in the Madrid section of the party on 26 November
1916 to pass a motion which called on the workers to concentrate
on the labour struggle and remain aloof from the Imperialist
conflict would be swiftly defeated by the official party line
espoused by Saborit and Besteiro. (24) Simultaneously, the tone
of Editorials in El Socialista and Espafla would become more and
more unrestrained. From the second half of 1916 onwards, a clear
commitment to the Entente and standard attacks on German
militarism would give way to a more belligerent mood. In December
1916 El Socialista would use patriotic slogans, questioning why
the country had to undergo the disaster of 1898 and the senseless
adventure of Morocco yet was doing nothing to defend the national
honour when Spain's fleet was being sunk by German submarines.
The Socialists would just stop short of advocating intervention
as in the first months of 1917 they would be accusing Germany
of breaching Spain's neutrality and pressing the government to
break diplomatic relations with her. News of the Russian
Revolution in March 1917 would be received with enthusiasm and
regarded as an Allied victory. In a series of articles under the
headline Aga±nst the German Spirit s', El Socialista would argue
that the overthrow of Tsarism was a proof that the Russian people
wanted to carry on fighting. It was therefore a defeat for those
traitors seeking peace with the Central Powers. Now the end of
absolutism in Russia had helped clarify the real nature of the
war: a struggle between Democracy and Autocracy. 25)
78
On the other hand, the CNT never abandoned its early
internationalism. The message was that the workers should not
waste their time with a bourgeois war. Hence the
Anarcho Syndicalist newspaper, Solidari dad Obrera, attacked
interventionism and argued that faced with the idea of fighting
an alien war the proletariat should stage a revolution. (26) On
16 September 1916, the CNT confirmed its intention to participate
in the campaign of mobilization organized by the UGT and queried
what attitude the Socialist trade union would adopt if the
Rornanones cabinet was to declare war on one of the two sides. (27)
The question was ignored by the UGT. The international conflict
was thus not deemed an issue worth spoiling the UGT-CNT honeymoon
period. Nevertheless, there was always the danger that if Spain
did enter into the war they could find themselves in two hostile
camps.
Finally, more threatening to the labour alliance was
that the impatience shown by the CNT towards the blatant
passivity of the government totally contradicted the caution and
prudence advocated by the UGT. The impotence or the unwillingness
of the Romanones administration was revealed in full. Its only
positive response came with the passing of the Ley de
Subsistencias on 6 November, 1916. This law basically amounted
to the same emergency measures adopted by the Conservatives one
year earlier, but now complemented with tough talk: the
government was empowered to reduce tariffs in order to allow the
import of basic commodities, to acquire foodstuffs and raw
materials and sell them at regulated prices, to expropriate
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production which was deemed essential for the life of the nation,
and finally to create a Junta Central de Subsistencias to
supervise the whole affair. (28) This Junta was quickly set up on
14 November and two Socialists, Garcia Cortés and Matlas Perez,
accepted the invitation to join it. The hollowness and bankruptcy
of the new body was unmistakable. Lacking any executive powers,
it could only offer advice and ideas which mostly went unheard
by an administration too weak or too frightened to take measures
which might harm the interests of those caciques and speculators
making profits out of the Crisis de Subsistencias.
The Socialists were not prepared to endorse hasty
actions. On 19 October, Francisco Roldán, General Secretary of
the CNT, had already made clear that an all-out strike should be
launched within a period of 30 days. The UGT 's Central Committee
was shocked and decided to appeal over Roldán's head to Segul and
the other Syndicalist leaders in Barcelona. The impasse remained
for exactly one month. On 19 November, Francisco Roldán and two
Anarchists, Gabriel Calleja and José Villanova representing
Saragossa's labour movement and Barcelona's textile workers
respectively, met at the Casa del Pueblo in Madrid with the UGT's
National Executive Committee and all the Socialist regional
delegates who had led the campaign in the provinces. A final
strategy was to be decided. Yet what Roldân and the other two did
not know was that a few hours earlier the UGT leadership had met
with its appointees to the Junta Central de Subsist encias and had
supported the proposal presented by Andrés Saborit that a
nation-wide stoppage of only 24 hours should take place on 18
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December and that time should be given to the government to
assess whether the Ley de Subsistencias and the Junta were
working successfully. Hence Roldn and the two Anarchists found
themselves isolated at the gathering. The CNT Secretary was even
reminded by Julián Besteiro that when his colleagues had signed
the Saragossa Pact they had accepted the conclusions approved in
the UGT's Congress of May. (29) It was a diplomatic way of letting
the CNT know that its initiatives had to be subordinated to those
decisions adopted by the Socialists. The next day El Socialista
published the resolution to carry out a 24 hour nation-wide
stoppage on 18 December and just in case Romanones had failed to
read the paper a Socialist delegation visited him that night.
The actual 24 hour stoppage on 18 December was a
complete success for the labour movement and an example of
organization and efficiency. Romanones himself recognized and
praised this in the pages of El Liberal. The Conservative press
had a different opinion and regarded it as the tyranny of the
trade unions endeavouring to impose their will on the rest of the
nation. The weakness of the Liberal government encouraged the
labour movement to continue with its damaging campaign. (30) The
same night another Socialist delegation headed by Julián Besteiro
once again informed the Prime Minister of the distress of the
working class and warned him of more resolute actions yet to come
unless the government adopted radical measures.
During the first months of 1917 the economic situation
worsened, social unrest increased and the government was found
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wanting. In Barcelona cabinet-makers declared a strike which was
particularly violent with numerous clashes involving fire-arms.
The Catalan textile industry was hit by strikes in Sabadell. In
Bilbao, in January the metal workers went on strike paralysing
its most important industrial concern, Altos Hornos de Vizcaya.
In Cádiz, a transport strike disrupted the life of the city for
several weeks. There was a general strike in Saragossa in
February. The dispatches of Civil Governors revealed their
impotence faced with the distress of their provinces. The
Governor of La Palma de Gran Canaria suggested in February the
creation of soup kitchens to feed the starving population. The
collapse of the orange export industry and the closure of many
mines brought unemployment and misery to Eastern and Southern
Spain. Food riots and popular demands for bread and work became
a common feature in the provinces of Valencia, Castellón, Murcia,
Seville, Córdoba, Jaén, AlmerIa and Huelva. The government was
bombarded with letters from the local authorities asking for
extraordinary measures to avoid the economic collapse of these
areas. The inability of the Romanones administration to act
showed not so much its wickedness as the bankruptcy of the
existing system. Madrid was a perfect example of this incapacity.
There the Socialist councillors and members of the Junta de
Subsist encias demanded the introduction of fixed prices for bread
and the seizure of livestock. It was attempted in February but
a concerted offensive by wheat-growers and cattle-owners forced
the government to back down. (31)
Even the moderation of the Socialists had limits.
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Under pressure from the rank and file and also from the more
militant CNT and getting only hollow promises from the
government, they realized that the time for action was
approaching. They decided to be at the forefront of a modernizing
movement in Spain, stressing that far from adventurism, their
objective was a political revolution which would bring about the
democratization of the country. (32) The Socialist strategy was
thus to throw in its lot with the middle classes in order to
appear not as dangerous radicals but as partners in the
achievement of the so long-delayed bourgeois revolution.
On 12 January Pablo Iglesias expressed precisely the
contradiction between the traditional Socialist prudence and the
urgency to take active steps to topple the regime. The veteran
leader observed that it appeared as if the King had gone to a
mental hospital and chosen the nine most dangerous patients to
form a government. Still the Socialists waited for two months
before embarking on an active course. The lack of positive
measures to fight inflation and unemployment, the sudden closing
of the Cortes in February and then the report of Garcia Cortés
and MatIas Gómez describing the Junta de Subsistencias as a
powerless and useless institution finally prompted the Socialists
to adopt a more forceful stand. (33)
On 1 March the Republican Alliance was consolidated
when Julián Besteiro, Andrés Ovejero and Garcia Cortés, members
of the PSOE's National Executive Committee, shared a platform at
the Casa del Pueblo in Madrid with Roberto Castrovido, the
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leading Republican Deputy and editor of El Pals, and Marcelino
Domingo, the fiery Catalan Republican. The message was that by
closing the Cortes, Romanones had confirmed that the ruling
system could not respond to the needs of the country. Only a
Republic could bring about democracy and answer the demands of
public opinion. (32) On 6 March the regional delegates arrived at
the capital to report the general mood of their areas. The
following day, El Socialista gave a full account of what had been
discussed and agreed. The conclusion was that the stoppage of 18
December had not been enough. Living standards kept falling and
prices rising. The dramatic situation demanded drastic
action. (35) Hostility towards the regime reached its peak a week
later when Santiago Alba, Minister of Finance and cacique of
Valladolid, launched a plan to tackle the debt of the Treasury
by resorting not to direct taxation but by appealing to the
patriotism of the country and issuing bonds for a loan of a
nominal value of almost 1000 million ptas redeemable over 50
years by means of quarterly withdrawals to bear interest at the
rate of 5%.p.a. El Socialista described it as the total victory
of plutocracy and caciquisrno over those in the system who still
had hopes that it could be reformed from within. While hunger
kept spreading across the country, the Socialist journal
observed, this administration was still studying the problem and
promising solutions in the near future. The time was up. The only
valid solution was to get rid of a regime which only cared about
the privileges and interests of a minority. (36)
On 25 March, the CNT published a manifesto calling for
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a workers' Assembly to discuss the gravity of the crisis which
they described as "to be or not to be". Thus, on 27 March,
delegates from both Trade Unions met at the Casa del Pueblo in
Madrid. The University Professor Julián Besteiro, who had become
the virtual substitute of a chronically-ill Pablo Iglesias, again
drew up the manifesto which was unanimously approved and signed
by SeguI and Pestafia for the CNT, representatives from the UGT's
National Committee and by the regional delegates. The main points
of that remarkable document were:
To the Spanish proletariat and to the country:
After our campaign of protest.. .against the abuses of the
administration and the political class of this
country. . . the general strike of 18 December 1916. . . should
have produced some relief to the evils suffered and
recognized by everyone. Nevertheless, despite our pacific
warnings and our constant complaints. . . unemployment and the
Crisis de Subsistencias every day brings more discomfort
and misery to the proletariat.
Is there any Spanish ruler who could affirm that our
unbearable living conditions are not the consequence of a
regime of privileges, of a constant orgy of private
ambitions, of an unchecked immorality, which find in our
public institutions a shelter which should instead be
provided for the fundamental interests of the
people?.. .Railway companies, shipowners, mining
concessions, industrialists, cattle-dealers, wheat-growers,
profiteers, middlemen, trusts. . . find protection in our
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governments while people perish or emigrate...
• . . It is no longer possible to deceive the country with
promises or brilliant speeches...
Why should we keep complaining or what is the use of
the general recognition of the justice of our demands by
the very same rulers if a solution is not provided?...
• . . All these evils, perceived every day by the workers,
have convinced them that the partial struggle of each local
trade union against the employers is not enough to solve
their grave problems.
The organized labour movement has therefore concluded that
it must be united in the common fight against a system of
government which protects exploitation. Responding to this
belief, representatives of La Union General de Trabajadores
and of La Con federaciOn General del Trabajo have
unanimously agreed:
1. After considering that neither government nor parliament
have done anything to meet the demands presented by the
representatives of the working class and in order to force
the ruling class to introduce fundamental changes which
guarantee a minimum of decent living standards, the general
strike, the most powerful weapon in the hands of the
proletariat, is to be used for an indefinite period of
time.
2. Henceforth, without interrupting its campaign of social
demands, the labour movement is to adopt all those measures
deemed necessary to proceed with success in the preparation
of the general strike.
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3. Those who are signing this document feel that their duty
is to organize and lead the movement and to determine the
date on which the general strike is to take place.. (37)
Romanones responded with the usual methods adopted by
the Turno leaders when they felt that their world was being
challenged: workers' centres were closed, constitutional
guarantees were suspended and those who had signed the manifesto
were arrested. This decision was encouraged by the Monarch who
told the British Ambassador that the government had to show
resolve as workers were threatening the state. (38) The only
disturbances and clashes took place in Valladolid organized by
the local Socialist leader, the controversial maverick Garcia
SolIs, against express orders from Madrid. (39) Nevertheless,
public opinion turned in favour of the workers' leaders and they
had to be released on 3 April. There was a consensus in Spain
that the with the passing of the Ley de Subsist enci as the
government enjoyed a monopoly of power. It could regulate prices,
impose quotas and take all sort of measures; yet those faculties
were not being exercised. The cabinet was accused of choosing to
repress social turmoil instead of preventing it by offering
positive alternatives. (40)
In the spring of 1917, the labour movement was more
united than ever before. The Socialists, never truly committed
to revolution, had managed so far to mobilize the proletariat and
lead the CNT in an open challenge to the state. Yet their
strategy rested on the belief that they should behave not as
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agents of agitation but of the construction of democracy. Thus
the manifesto signed in March was not a declaration of war on
capitalism. On the contrary, it was an invitation to the
bourgeoisie to take its hegemonic position in society and
collaborate with the working class in the removal of the
oligarchical regime.
2.-The bourgeoisie:
Spain constituted in 1914 one of the most clear
examples of the persistence of the old regime. (1) The bourgeoisie
failed throughout the nineteenth century to complete its
historical task and seize control of the political apparatus of
the state. The Restoration system devised by the astute
politician Cánovas del Castillo in 1875, represented the
consolidation of a reactionary coalition formed by Crown, Army
and the financial and landowning oligarchies of Southern and
Central Spain. The institutionalization of caciquisrno or the
uncontested supremacy of the local powerful in their areas in
exchange for the return to the Cortes of the official Deputies
provided the foundations of the Canovite edifice. Under a facade
of liberal devices such as constitution, parliament and even
universal suffrage two monarchist or dynastic parties,
Conservative and Liberal, enjoyed a monopoly of power. Both
parties were actually the same factions of professional
politicians who represented the interests of Andalusian fruit and
olive oil producers and Castilian bankers and wheat-growers. The
more dynamic commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of the
88
periphery were minor partners of the ruling coalition. They were
granted social peace and economic protection but denied access
to the major political decision-making centres.
The Spanish defeat of 1898 at the hands of the United
States paved the way for the consolidation of different political
forces which had been left out of the Turno PacIfico. The moral
and psychological effects of the end of the overseas colonial
empire and the loss of lucrative markets galvanized the energies
of those who felt that the Canovite system had to be reformed or
destroyed. The progressive urban middle classes had been
organized in Republican parties that were too fragmented to
present a coherent alternative to the ruling order. Moreover, the
Catalan industrial bourgeoisie decided to back an autonomous
political formation in 1901, the Lilga Regionalista: a socially
conservative group and pragmatist in politics which envisaged a
decentralized modern capitalist economy with its representatives
holding the reins of power in Madrid. Part of the strategy
consisted in using the autonomist lever to exert pressure on the
central government and obtain economic concessions for Catalonia.
In Barcelona in 1905 army officers, offended by what they
regarded as intolerable anti-Spanish editorials and cartoons,
ransacked the offices of both the Catalan satirical magazine,
Cu-Cut and of the Lliga Regionalista's newspaper, La Veu de
Catalunya. The inability of the government in Madrid to re-assert
the authority of civil power provided the first opportunity for
all the Catalan Republican and Regionalist groups to join forces
in the so-called Solidaritat Catalana under the leadership of the
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Lilga and its intelligent and Machiavellian spokesman, the lawyer
Francesc Carnbó. Only the fiery anti-clerical demagogue, Alejandro
Lerroux, remained hostile. This appeared to confirm the ambiguous
and dirty character of Restoration politics. Central governments
in Madrid had financed and propped up Lerroux in Barcelona just
to create trouble for the Regionalists and woo the workers with
false promises. The elections of 1907 smashed caciquismo once and
for all in Catalonia when Solidaritat won 41 out of the 44
parliamentary seats. Yet the Alliance was short-lived as the
Lliga was soon to reveal the ambiguity of its programme. The
anarchy, violence and disorder of the Tragic Week in 1909
stretched to the limit the conservatism of the Lliga whose
leaders, frightened by the revolutionary events, rapidly moved
away from Solidaritab and preferred to pursue on their own a
pacted Home Rule for Catalonia. The remaining Republican factions
formed a conjunción with the Socialists in November of that year.
The conjunción was soon to lack the two strongest Republican
factions: the Republican Radical party created by Alejandro
Lerroux in 1908 and the Reformists set up in 1912 by the Asturian
pragmatist Melquiades Alvarez as a moderate and "accidentalist"
Republican formation which was prepared to accept the Monarchy
in return for the real democratization of the regime. (2)
A turning point was reached during the years of the
First World War. Both ideological and economic factors determined
the new zeal with which the bourgeoisie represented in
Regionalist or Republican groups attempted to storm the Turno
stronghold. The European conflict produced an unexpected economic
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prosperity and rapid industrialization which stimulated
movements of democracy and self-determination. The nation no
longer possessed the overwhelmingly backward economy and peasant
social structure on which its deep-rooted oligarchical system had
hitherto rested. This process of urbanization, economic growth,
political awareness and social mobilization strengthened the
positions of both bourgeoisie and proletariat and diminished that
of the landowning oligarchy. As a result the new rising forces
tried to wrest political power from the traditional governing
elites. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that Spain
did not constitute an isolated example in the continent. In fact,
the Spanish case was the regional version of that crisis of
hegemony which engulfed the other European states during these
years. Generally, this crisis had as distinctive features a
mutinous officer corps, dissident national minorities, a
radicalized proletariat, alienated intellectuals, shortages of
food and raw materials, general strikes and peasants'
uprisings. (3)
The Romanones administration represented that crucial
stage at which the dynastic politicians clearly lost their
leading status in society. It marked the moment in which the
Lliga Regionalista led by Carnbó initiated its frontal offensive
against the ruling system. The industrial and commercial
bourgeoisie was the main beneficiary of the economic profits
reaped from their control of war production. As the bourgeoisie
grew richer, its confidence increased and so it did its desire
for political power.
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Cambó was the mastermind behind the plan to carry out
a political revolution which would breach once and for all the
Turno fortress. He would gain in 1917 the enthusiastic support
of the Republican parties and the Socialists. Nevertheless, the
seeds of that campaign had been carefully sown in 1916.
In 1915 Catalan industries discovered seemingly
endless opportunities to export their products. The textile mills
in particular, were inundated with orders from north of the
Pyrenees and had to work around the clock to meet demand. In
other sectors of Catalan industry, the disappearance of European
competition from the Spanish market acted as a firm stimulus to
import substitution. Among the industries to benefit from this
development were electrical goods, engineering, metallurgy and
vehicle construction. A similar process of capitalist development
took place in the Basque country, Asturias and Santander. The
main beneficiaries were the Basque metallurgical and shipping
companies and the coal-mine owners of Asturias. (4) Soon business
and industrial organizations throughout Spain, and particularly
the employers' organizations in Catalonia, maintained a constant
stream of demands and petitions to Madrid, where the Lliga
politicians forcefully advocated the virtues of advanced
capitalism. The two major demands were the concession of free
port status for Barcelona and the concession of export subsidies.
They were met by delaying tactics from the Dato administration
and finally felt insulted when Cádiz, a non-industrial town, was
granted the status of a free port. Moreover, the conflict between
Catalan industrial interests and Castilian wheat lobbies was
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exposed when the latter campaigned in Valladolid against the
Catalan demands.
The situation worsened when the Liberals, the dynastic
party most clearly identified with Castilian agrarian interests
and with Spanish centralism, returned to power in December 1915.
Santiago Alba, the rising star in the Liberal party and an
ambitious politician with regenerationist ideas for Spanish
agriculture but also the leading cacique of Valladolid, the wheat
lobby's stronghold, was appointed Minister of Interior and
therefore the man to supervise the elections scheduled for April
1916. The Lliga felt provoked when Alba organized the so-called
Castellana Pact, an extensive coalition of diverse forces in
Catalonia ranging from the remnants of dynastic groups to
Lerroux's Radical Party and left-wing Catalanists in order to
beat the Regionalist party. (5) The result was the opposite of
what was intended: the Lliga Regionalisla not only managed to
increase its vote in the city of Barcelona, where it obtained an
overwhelming victory, and to maintain the size of its vote in the
rest of the region, but also was prepared to mount an all-out
offensive against the ruling oligarchies in Madrid. (6)
The objective of the Lliga was to consolidate the
hegemony of Catalan capitalism in Spain. This was to be
accomplished by selling the idea of an "Espanya Catalana" whereby
a politically autonomous Catalonia offered a backward agrarian
Spain a blueprint for the creation of a modern capitalist
economy. (7) In order to achieve that purpose, the Catalan party
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knew it had to gain access to positions of power in Madrid and
this was barred as long as the Turno politicians were in full
control of the situation. For this task, Francesc Carnbó proved
to be one of the shrewdest statesmen of the Restoration period.
A man with the ability of creating, leading, organizing and
changing, as the situation required, all sort of coalitions of
often disparate groups in which the Lliga was to be the dominant
force.(8) He had already masterminded Solidaridad Catalana in
1907 and would repeat the manoeuvre ten years later. The
difference was that whereas in 1907 it was a struggle for
political hegemony in Catalonia, now it was a battle for control
of the entire country.
Cambó's offensive began on 21 May, 1916 in a speech
given during the so-called day of "Fiesta de la Unidad". In a
threatening tone, the Catalan leader declared that Catalonia was
a nation with its own characteristics and identity and promised
to discuss in the Cortes the recognition of Catalan as an
official language and the question of Home Rule. Cambó's
lieutenants, Rahola and Ventosa, gave similar speeches the same
day in Barcelona. (9) The promise was fulfilled when the subject
was first raised on 4 June by the Regionalist Senator Abadal in
the Senate and then on 7-8 June by Caxnbó himself in Congress.
Carnbó demanded a profound modification of the structure of the
state stressing the fact that Catalonia was a nation which
demanded recognition of its own language, and an Assembly with
its own executive to administer the internal business of the
region. He caused a major upset when he warned that if his
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demands were not satisfactorily dealt with, his party could seek
redress in the peace conference at the end of the hostilities in
Europe.
The Catalan issue took up a great deal of the
parliamentary agenda during June 1916. Most newspapers in Madrid
accused the Lliga of separatism. There were a succession of
Deputies, including the majority of those returned from Catalan
provinces, who to a greater or lesser extent criticized the
Regionalist initiative and emphasized that the Lliga with just
13 out of 40 Catalan parliamentarians could only claim to speak
for a minority in Catalonia. Lerroux embraced Romanones in the
corridors of the Cortes and promised the government his total
support to fight Catalan separatism. Eventually, the Prime
Minister himself declared on 8 June that he was not going to take
part in a dialogue with the Lliga which actually amounted to
political blackmail. Romanones showed more moderation a week
later when he recognized the existence of a Catalan question. Yet
he observed that there were other pressing problems which needed
to be urgently examined by the Cortes. His government, he
declared, was prepared to listen to anyone, providing no threats
were uttered. Taking a very mild and appeasing stance, the Count
denied that he had refused a dialogue but confirmed that there
was an immense gap between what his cabinet could grant and what
the Regionalists demanded. (10)
The Lliga only found a degree of sympathy from the
Maurista movement and even the Mauristas were divided in their
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attitude. Maura represented the most important example of
Conservative regenerationism. Since 19 1 he had preached the idea
of a revolution from above as the only way to prevent an
insurrection from below. Maura's formula was an attempt at
replacing the artificial character of the Conservative party,
only in power because of the manipulations of the local caciques,
with a genuine mobilization of the Catholic middle classes. Maura
and Carnbó had established cordial relations in 1907 when the
former had been Prime Minister and the latter had been a leading
member of Solidaridad Cabalana. Unlike Liberal administrations
characterized by centralism and veiled support for people like
Lerroux, Maura had sought to meet some of the regionalist demands
with his ill-fated Ley de Administración Local. He always
regarded the Lliga as the Catalan example of what he sought for
the rest of the country. In 1913, when in an internal coup the
Conservative elite ousted Maura from the leadership of his party,
a unique phenomenon in Restoration politics took place. A
'Maurista' movement from below, mainly formed by conservative
middle class youth, emerged to rally around the dismissed leader.
Maura was the only dynastic politician who ever achieved this.
A total devotion to Maura and an anti-establisbment campaign
could, however, hardly conceal the internal differences within
the Maurista movement. There were those with reformist and
Christian-Democratic leanings, whose most outstanding
representative was the Aragonese Lawyer Angel Ossorio. They
sought to democratize and modernize the political system. On the
other hand, there were those Mauristas like Goicoechea, leader
of the Maurista Youth, and Delgado Barreto, editor of the party
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newspaper La Accián, who represented an authoritarian,
nationalist and ultra-conservative current in Spanish
politics. (11) Those differences became more evident from 1916.
Angel Ossorio who had been Governor of Barcelona in 1909 showed
a tolerant attitude towards the Lliga and the regionalist
question. On 31 May, 1916 he published an article in La Accio'n
called the "Catalan Warning" in which he praised the activities
of the Lliga, described as an school of citizenship, and attacked
the false espaflolismo of Lerroux. However, at the same time,
another leading Maurisba, Gustavo Peyrá, the rabid centralist and
hard-liner from Gerona, was writing to Maura with an opposite
view. Peyr claimed that the Lliga was a separatist party that
exploited the weaknesses of the central governments in Madrid and
whose activities should be investigated by the Spanish Embassy
in Paris. He also stated that he was in total agreement with the
Captain General of Barcelona, General Alfau, that no concessions
should be made to the Lliga. (12) Maura felt himself compelled to
intervene in the debate. On 30 June and 1 July he adopted a
middle course in the Cortes. He warned that separatism would be
a national disaster but he also applauded the noble spirit of the
Lliga and invited its representatives to join other political
forces to achieve common objectives.
Maura, Romanones and most politicians misunderstood
Carnbó's strategy. The Catalan leader was far from a separatist
or isolationist. In fact, the Catalan question in parliament was
not its sole aim, as many believed, but just part of a very
carefully devised plan which had as its main goal the disruption
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of the activities of the governing elites. Cambó and his party
were determined to show that Spain could no longer be ruled
without the goodwill of the Catalanists. Amidst the heated debate
on the Catalan question, the leader of the Regionalist minority
revealed both his bitterness at the present position occupied by
his party in Spanish politics and the determination to change
that:
"We, the Regionalists represent a unique case. . .We spend
our time fighting governments, and yet we are a group of
men prepared to govern, who have been born to govern, who
are ready to govern, who have shown skills to govern. . . and
nevertheless we seem doomed to remain in the
opposition. . . . (13)
In his June speech Cambó had constantly attacked the
artificiality and the hollowness of the Turno. He had in mind a
realignment of political forces in the country in which the Lliga
and Catalan industry would each play a leading role in the
process of political and economic modernization of Spain. In the
offensive against the dynastic parties, Alba was singled out as
the man to bring down.Cambó wrote in his memoirs:
"The government formed by Romanones was weak. . . There was
only one man with the aspirations and conditions of
Caudillo: Santiago Alba.
.Alba was not only clever, but also an intelligent man,
with a political culture above the other Liberal
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notables...
• Alba regarded me as a future enemy, as the man who could
deny him the post to which he aspired. Thus, from the first
moment, his obsession was to fight me. By doing that, he
was not only adopting a personal position, but also
following his anti-Catalan feelings...
.Alba had chosen to give me battle and I had accepted the
challenge and was prepared to go to the end...
.Alba constituted an obstacle not only to my person but
to any attempt at Catalan participation in the government
of Spain. My duty was to stop him or at least to prevent
him from seizing the leadership of his party...". (14)
Leaving personal resentments aside, Cambó reveals how
Alba was, because of his youth and personal charisma, the strong
man in the Turno. If this was to be destroyed, Alba's rising
career would have to be stopped. This task was facilitated by the
fact that soon after the elections of April 1916 Alba abandoned
his post of Minister of Interior to become Minister of Finance.
This was the position from which he could either reach the top
or else expose by his fall the inadequacies and contradictions
of the regime. In fact, the latter was to happen.
Alba endeavoured to increase his prestige with an
ambitious scheme of economic and financial reforms. It gave the
Regionalists the chance to mount an impressive coalition against
the government. Alba's aim was to carry out a ten-year programme
of public works, naval, military and cultural reforms
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representing a total expenditure of 2134 millions of pesetas.
However, prior to proceeding with his so-called Plan of National
Reconstruction, the Castilian Minister argued that it was
necessary to solve the budget deficit which had kept growing
particularly since the start of the Moroccan campaign in 1909 and
which by 1916 amounted to 850 millions of pesetas. He therefore
announced his intention of levying a tax on excess war profits
earned by industry and trade, but not by agriculture. (15)
Industry and trade were not prepared to bear the brunt
of the costs and sacrifice their recent gains while the landed
oligarchy would be unaffected. Cambó was able to utilise Alba's
tax proposal to build up a formidable coalition of economic
groups and hence become the undisputed leader of the industrial
classes The duel between Carnbó and Alba in the Congress
represented the clash between the rising industrial bourgeoisie
and the ruling landowning oligarchy. (16) Yet Cambó's success was
also determined to a great extent by two factors: firstly, the
internal factionalism and personal rivalries which characterized
the dynastic parties played strongly against Alba. Thus many
dynastic notables, jealous of Alba's meteoric career, were happy
to see him badly mauled in parliament. A glaring example was
Count Romanones who saw his leadership endangered by a possible
victory of his own Minister. Carnbó wrote: "The Count had to make
efforts not to applaud me.. . after that campaign Romanones kept
giving me signs of his personal sympathy". (17) Secondly, the very
foundations of the existing system made it impossible to
introduce a modern economic programme. The dynastic parties were
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prevented in practice from undertaking any lasting
regenerationist measures by the glaring fact that they were not
supported by public opinion and their remaining in office
depended on the local caciques who exchanged votes for control
of their local fiefs. Thus although the budget deficit kept
growing, governments could not introduce a modern fiscal system
which would have hurt the interests of those to whom they owed
their positions. (18)
In Congress on 3 June and two days later in the
Senate, Alba presented for the first time officially his economic
and financial programme, including his tax on excess war profits
made by industry and commerce but not by agriculture. A campaign
was immediately launched to wreck it completely. The campaign was
to be conducted both inside and outside of the Cortes.
Business and industrial concerns mounted an impressive
and noisy protest against Alba's measures.It was a model of
economic mobilization and organization previously unknown in
Spanish history that reflected the growing strength of the
national bourgeoisie. At no time would it be matched by
preparedness or willingness on the part of the government to
defend its plans. Even before Alba had officially presented his
programme in the Cortes, right-wing journals like ABC had
published editorials showing their opposition. Catalan
industrialists were the first to express their resolution to
fight to the last the tax on excess war profits. In La Veu de
Catalunya, the organ of the Lliga Regionalista, Camnbó's
101
lieutenant, Ventosa,described it as an economic monstrosity and
a criminal attempt to hurt industry in Catalonia and Spain as a
wh le. Basque industrialists followed suit. Led by the shipping
owners, they demanded the withdrawal of the tax. Soon all the
more important commercial and industrial organizations, the
so-called fuerzas vivas of the nation, had joined forces. Most
vociferous among them were Foinento del Trabajo Nacional de
Barcelona, Asociación de Navieros de Bilbao, CIrculo de la Unián
Mercantil e Industrial de Madrid, Cáinara de Comercio de Zaragoza,
Union Gremial de Valencia and Industria y Navegacio'n de Sevilla.
There were several arguments used to attack Alba's tax proposals.
It was claimed that the tax would halt investment, frighten away
capital and would therefore hurt production. It was described as
unfair since it affected industry and trade but not agriculture.
Moreover, its retroactive character, they suggested, would be
anti-constitutional and would introduce a fatal precedent. A more
cynical argument, although probably true, was to point out that
the lack of preparation by the administration made it impossible
to carry out successfully the imposition of such an ambitious
law. Obviously they were not prepared to collaborate with the
state and make matters easier. The peak of the protest took place
when representatives of the industrial elite attended a meeting
on 28 June 1916 in Madrid at the Hotel Palace. The leading Basque
industrialist, Ramón de la Sota, set out their conclusions: the
tax was unfair and harmful. Hence it was to be fought to the end.
A commission then went to the Cortes to meet leaders of the
different parties and inform them of their resolutions. Carnbó was
well aware of them. He had been present at the gathering and had
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declared his total support for the industrialist cause. (19)
As had happened with the labour movement, the
industrialists were assuming the role of defending their
interests in an open clash with the state. The gap between Espafla
Real and Espafla Oficial was becoming a worrying fact for the
Turno politicians.
In the Cortes, Alba fought with determination for his
economic plans. He tried to appeal to the patriotism of the
Chamber and several times expressed his readiness to seek a
compromise. It was all in vain. Cambó brilliantly marshalled the
hostile campaign against Alba's Bill. On 17 June his right-hand
man, Ventosa, fired the first warning shot. Four days later, the
Chancellor obtained a partial victory when a Royal Decree was
passed establishing the personal liability of managers and
directors of those companies which could be affected by the tax
on excess war profits. It was bound to infuriate the opposition.
On 24 June Gabino Bugallal, Minister of Finance in the former
Conservative cabinet, on behalf of his party, voiced the distress
of his group with regard to the retroactive character of the
Bill. He also expressed his intense disappointment at the
government's resort to Royal Decrees. On 26 June Cainbó initiated
a destructive all-out offensive. The Lliga leader virtually
quoted the arguments put forward by the industrialists and warned
that the introduction of such Bills would signal the divorce
between country and government. Cambó's intervention was followed
by those of the spokesmen of all the parliamentary groups.
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Antonio Maura, Gabino Bugallal, the right-wing Conservative and
leader of his own group Juan de la Cierva, the Basque Deputies
connected with shipping and iron interests Fernando Maria Ibarra
and Horacio Echevarrieta, Alejandro Lerroux, the left-wing
Catalanist Felipe Rodés, Melquiades Alvarez and the parliamentary
leader of the Republican-Socialist conjuncio'n, Julián Nougués,
took part in the debate. All of them, to a greater or lesser
extent, found fault with Alba's Bill. The only outright support
came from Lerroux. This was unlikely to raise the spirit of the
Chancellor. That day nine Liberal Deputies introduced a motion
of confidence in Alba's programme. It was won with 150 votes in
favour. That victory was actually a deadly blow to the Minister's
hopes. With all the other parliamentary groups absent, only 150
out of 235 Liberal Deputies were backing him up. Henceforth Alba
attempted a conciliatory approach but all his calls for reaching
an understanding went unheard. Carnbó and his friends practised
a successful obstructionism throughout July. The position of the
government, forced to take a defensive stand, was so desperate
that many believed that the outbreak of the railway strike had
provided the perfect excuse for closing the Cortes on 13 July.
Alba vowed to continue the defence of his plans after the summer.
Nevertheless, they had already been mortally wounded. (20)
Ironically, Alba could not count on the support of the
left. He was neither trusted nor believed by the labour movement.
His tax was deemed fair and necessary but there was widespread
scepticism as to whether such a corrupt system could introduce
any progressive legislation. Luis Araquistáin expressed exactly
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the feelings of his fellow party men when in the magazine Espafia
he wrote: "This tax is needed but I cannot see how someone like
Alba can really be all for it'. He concluded that Alba's economic
regenerationism was just a facade. The real issue was a struggle
for power in the Liberal party. Araquistáin's suspicions were
shared and continually put forward in editorials both in El
Socialista and in Espafla. The Socialists argued that it was all
a comedy whose real object was to get more money from the people.
In the end, the brunt of the expenditure would have to be borne
by the working class. On the other hand, Cambó, although regarded
as the natural class enemy, was viewed in a comparatively
favourable light as the man to develop modern capitalism in
Spain. According to Socialist theory, a bourgeois democracy had
to be established in Spain before even thinking about the triumph
of Socialism. Cambó seemed the appropriate politician to carry
out a bourgeois revolution in the country. Cambó's attacks
against the government were described as a catapult to destroy
the obsolete regime. Espafia even devoted its entire number of 22
June to the Catalan question and the two leading figures of
Catalan Regionalism, Francesc Cambó and Prat de la Riba,
contributed two articles. On 2 July, Carnbó was invited by the
PSOE to give a speech at the Casa del Pueblo in Madrid. There he
won his audience over when he declared that the only two real
forces in the nation were Catalan Nationalism and Socialism. (21)
When the Cortes opened again in September the plan of
resuming the debate about the tax on excess war profits had to
be abandoned since as Alba himself recognized, the most urgent
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task was to present the budget for the following year. In fact,
it was not going to be discussed any more. The tax was
effectively dead and buried. On 30 September the Chancellor read
to a packed chamber the final version of his economic programme.
He divided his finance measures into two: an ordinary budget and
an extraordinary one, known as The Plan of National
Reconstruction, which embraced a vast amount of naval, cultural
and public works measures for the following ten years. Alba asked
for the collaboration of the minorities to accomplish his
programme and expressed his willingness to enter into a positive
dialogue with them.
Alba's hopes were soon dashed. On 21 October his
programme was rejected by the Assembly of Industry and Commerce.
The industrial elites of the nation did not trust Alba and wanted
his head. Cambó decided to go in for the kill. The Catalan
politician wrote:
"Our purpose was not to have any of his Bills passed, not
even the ordinary budget.. . we continued our campaign
throughout 1916, analysing every detail of each
Bill.. .He. (Alba) had to see how one after another of his
Bills were being torpedoed before his eyes. . .He had to go
through the shame of not just failing to have his grandiose
project approved, but not even having, as any ordinary
minister, his budget passed... . (22)
Thus the Lliga Deputies in parliament launched
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themselves once more into a meticulous cross-examination and
dissection of every single measure in Alba's programme. Cambó
described the Chancellor's pr jects as either tolerable,
acceptable or unacceptable. He conceded that some measures of
national reconstruction were imperative but he concluded that
Alba's plan was not the one the country needed. Many of Alba's
proposals were certainly essential to the well-being and
prosperity of Spain, but, however desirable in theory, they were
unacceptable in the form in which they had been submitted; their
details had not been thought out and they would be unjust in
their operation. Cambó further contended that many of the items
which figured in the extraordinary budget ought to have been in
the ordinary one and that their inclusion in the former was only
a device on the part of the government to balance the accounts
of the ordinary budget and to delude the public as to the actual
annual deficit. In fact, the Lliga's leader blamed the
"senseless" Moroccan adventure as being the main cause of the
heavy deficit in the budget.(23)
Political intrigues, personal rivalries and the
growing unpopularity of the government played into Carnbó's hands.
Furthermore, a deadlock occurred when Reforrnists and
Conservatives insisted on discussing first the ordinary budget
while the government wanted to deal with the extraordinary one.
The parliamentary debate on 20 and 21 November killed off any
remaining hopes of passing the economic programme before the end
of the year. Whereas Lerroux offered his total support, all the
other parliamentary groups refused to give the government a blank
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cheque for a ten year programme. (24) Two alternatives remained
open for the government: either to decree a permanent session of
the Chamber, a most unpopular precedent, and try to force the
budget through before the end of December, or else find a formula
of consensus by means of which the old budget for 1916 could be
adapted and revived for 1917. After hard bargaining, the second
alternative was agreed on 16 December. It represented the final
nail in the coffin of Alba's personal prestige and confirmed the
loss of credibility of the Turno parties. The Conservative
administration was discredited for failing to provide solutions
to the economic crisis and had not even managed to pass the
budget. One year later, and after promises of marvellous
improvements to come, only the Ley de Subsistencias, outlined in
the previous chapter, had been passed and it soon proved to be
an utter failure. The Liberal cabinet was in total disarray.
Spain's economic life was dependent on a budget dating back to
December 1914.
The former Liberal Minister and close friend of
Santiago Alba, Natalio Rivas, expressed clearly in his memoirs
the state of bitterness and crisis which reigned over the Liberal
camp in December 1916. He wrote on 11 December that Borbolla,
cacique of Seville and one of the leading notables of the Liberal
party in Andalusia, had told him that Alba, who still counted on
the King's support, should be able to lead his own cabinet in
January. Rivas wrote that Romanones was losing his grip on the
party. There were many rumours of plots within the party to
deprive him of the premiership. The leader of the rival
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Liberal-Democratic faction, Marquis of Aihucemas, or the Speaker
of the Lower House, Miguel Villanueva, were those named as most
likely to succeed. Two days later, Dato's lieutenant, Sanchez
Guerra, commented that Romanones regretted that the ordinary
budget had not been passed, but he did not care at all about the
extraordinary one. An unhappy Rivas noted: '.. .Romanones'
continuous deals with Lerroux only confirm the general feeling
of lack of authority. . . there is confusion, disorder. . . it would
be better for us to fall than carry on like this...'. The
following week Alba confided his pessimism to Rivas. The
Chancellor, urged by Rivas to make his move for the leadership
of the party, remarked: i prefer to see all the fools of the
party going for it first. .". (25)
Alba's excessive confidence was ill-founded. His party
in general, and he the Chancellor, in particular, had been badly
humiliated in 1916. He had been defeated by Cambó in their
personal duel. No legislation could be passed without the consent
of the Catalan minority. Thus in February 1917, only after
obtaining the agreement of the minorities, two economic laws were
introduced. One was for the protection of industries and included
the provision that in some cases the state should furnish 50% of
the initial capital. The other was the so-called Ley de
Au tori zaci ones which sought to enable the government to adapt the
budget to the needs of the various ministerial departments in the
present exceptional circumstances resulting from the war. In
early March, with a deficit of over 1000 million pesetas and
unable to resort to taxation, Alba had to appeal to the people
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and issue a loan. Covered twenty-two times over, the loan was a
success, but it also demonstrated that no economic regeneration
could be expected from the ruling system.
Carnbó's political leverage had grown dramatically in
one year. During the first months of 1917 he held frequent
meetings with the Reformist leader, Melquiades Alvarez,
representatives of the Basque Nationalist Party and even with his
traditional enemy, Alejandro Lerroux. The Catalan politician was
courted by leading Conservatives like Dato and Cierva. In
mid-April he was approached by Alba. The Chancellor recognized
that the existing administration had no future and proposed to
form a new government which would rely on the support of the
Monarch and would include both Alba and Carnbó, one in charge of
the Treasury and the other of Public Works. Canibó suggested that
he would be willing to enter into a National Coalition which
should be presided over by Antonio Maura. (26)
Yet by then Cambó's strategy was to go beyond the
regional character of his party and, at the helm of the
industrial and commercial middle classes of the country, to
establish an alliance of forces which would lead to power in
Madrid. (27) His plan was thus not to join in the petty squabbles
of the dynastic politicians but to form a new hegemonic power
bloc with which to break the Turno once and for all.
In April 1917 Carnbó felt he was very close to
fulfilling his objective. On 13 April he declared in El Liberal:
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the situation is becoming extremely serious and yet
this government is not taking positive measures to deal
with the general distress and the food shortages. . . This
administration behaves as if hostilities had never broken
out in Europe so that it can carry on with its normal
attitude of total passivity.. . The political system as a
whole has proved incapable of dealing with the present
situation. . .Never before has a government been granted so
much authority nor a country felt so great a need to be
governed. . . and still nothing is being done.. .people feel
politically orphaned...".
Cambó was thus drawing attention to the political
vacuum which he had done so much to create in the hope of then
being able to fill it.
3.-The Army:
In the long-term, the worst peril for the
constitutional system would be the state of unrest of army
of ficers which during this phase of increasing breach between
society and government began to acquire dangerous dimensions.
The armed forces had played a crucial role in the
consolidation of liberalism in Spain in the nineteenth century.
They defeated the Carlists or absolutists in the 1830s and the
victorious Generals controlled the political scene almost
constantly for the next forty years. This can be explained by two
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facts: firstly, the narrowly-based landed oligarchy which emerged
as the dominant force in the 1830s was heavily dependent on the
army to keep at bay the threat of both the Carlists and the
popular classes; and secondly, once a political clique held
power, it automatically gained control of the electoral machinery
and therefore fixed the election results in advance. This
practice was known as 'exclusivismo". Hence the only hope for a
change of government became revolt. As a consequence, political
factions normally had a General at their head and
pronunciainientos or military coups provided the only mechanism
for the rotation of parties in power. Queen Isabel II, following
her mother's fate, was sent into exile in 1868. General PavIa's
pronunciarniento put an end to the First Republic in January 1874
and General Martinez Campos restored the Bourbon Monarchy, in the
person of Alfonso XII, after another successful military coup in
December 1874.(l)
The governing elites which ruled Spain since 1875 did
not seize power through a revolutionary process or as
legitimately elected representatives. They had been placed in
power once more by the army. Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the
intelligent Andalusian politician and the strong figure of the
Restoration regime for the next twenty years, worked out a
political settlement in which the army was no longer needed as
an instrument of change. He created a political formula, known
as the Turno Paci'fico, by means of which a consensus was
established among the landowning and financial interests of the
country. Two dynastic parties, Liberals and Conservatives,
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representing the same ruling oligarchy agreed to alternate
peacefully in power without the need to resort to military
intervention. Electoral-rigging, economic backwardness and
political passivity ensured their supremacy in political society.
Yet Cánovas did not plan at any time to do without the active
collaboration of the army. (2) He was well aware of the artificial
character, despite all the external democratic features, of the
Restoration system. Hence the military remained very much an
integral part of the power bloc. The officers were the ultimate
guarantors of the existing order and the praetorian guard of the
ruling oligarchy. As the gradual modernization of economy and
society enlarged those groups previously excluded from political
power, the industrial bourgeoisie and the urban proletariat, the
financial and agrarian elites were obliged to rely increasingly
on physical repression to retain their hegemony.
Officers were rewarded with promotions, appointments,
seats in the Senate, aristocratic titles and representation in
both dynastic parties. Politics was left in the hands of
civilians but in exchange they were not to interfere in military
matters. The post of Minister of War was occupied by a General
between 1875 and 1917. Furthermore, the Law of the Constitution
of the Army of 29 November, 1878 underlined the important role
that the army played in the power bloc. Its second clause stated
that the armed forces, besides the normal tasks performed in a
constitutional state, had as their primary function the defence
of the nation from its internal enemies. The maintenance of
public order was left entirely in their hands. The Civil Guard,
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the force in charge of policing the countryside, was placed under
the control of the Ministry of War. During the history of the
Restoration era both parties quickly responded to any social or
political unrest with the suspension of constitutional guarantees
and the declaration of martial law which granted the army a
totally free hand. This militarization of public life revealed
the fragility of the constitutional system and facilitated the
intervention of the army in politics. (3)
Yet the army's control of its own internal affairs
meant that any attempt to undertake even minimal reform was
doomed. Its structural problem, hipertrofia or excess of officers
in relation to the number of servicemen went unchecked. This was
a problem decades old, a product of pronuncia.miento politics,
incorporation of defeated Carlist officers into the regular army,
and the colonial wars throughout the century. In 1900, there was
a ratio of one officer to fewer than four enlisted men. By 1910
Spain still had 16,000 officers for slightly more than 80,000
troops. The officer ratio was two to three times greater than
that in France or in Germany, with an army only one third the
size. It represented a cancer for the state which devoted about
40% of its expenditure to defence, but 70% of the defence budget
went on officers' salaries. Consequently despite the economic
burden, modernization and professionalization of the armed
services were neglected. (4) Drastic reform was needed but could
not come from the army itself, a staunch defender of the status
quo, nor from the politicians who felt compelled not to intervene
in military matters. General Cassola in 1887, Minister of War in
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the Sagasta cabinet, attempted to introduce a comprehensive
programme to professionalize the services. Under heavy attack
from his fellow officers and abandoned by Sagasta, Cassola was
forced to resign one year later and his projects were dropped.
This confirmed that the symbiotic relationship between army and
the dynastic politicians grew out of their common antagonism to
social and economic modernization. (5)
The turn of the century saw the aftermath of the
colonial disaster of 1898, the loss of the overseas Empire and
the subsequent return of thousands of troops to the peninsula.
It coincided with the mobilization of political forces against
the ruling system. There were terrorist outbursts and the birth
of nationalist politics in Catalonia and continuous insurrections
in the Andalusian countryside. The army was therefore pushed to
the forefront to defend the established order and increasingly
saw itself as the defender of a nation endangered by the divisive
effects of regionalism and class conflict. As their activities
in defence of the state multiplied the officers also became more
intolerant of any criticism. As the "guardians of the sacred
values of the Patria" they regarded any attack on themselves as
an attack on the nation. Additionally, they increasingly became
an institution cut off from the rest of society. They resented
the antimilitarist attitude adopted by most Spaniards after 1898.
There were tales of corruption, incompetence and hardships from
the Cuban campaigns of the l890s. Almost 200,000 soldiers had
died not in actual fighting but of disease and wounds due to the
lack of a proper medical corps. They blamed the politicians for
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the defeat and their unpopularity. Courted by the new Monarch,
Alfonso XIII, the army began to act as the praetorian guard of
the Monarchy rather than the oligarchy. (6)
A common response to antimilitarist articles was the
assault by angered officers on the newspapers' offices. In 1895
the victims were two Republican journals: El Globo and El
Resumen. The officers did not only escape unpunished but the
newspapers were closed down. (7) This trend increased after 1898.
On 5 May 1900 El Progreso of J6.tiva (Valencia) was attacked,
followed one year later by El Correo de Guipuzcoa. More serious
was the storming and beating of employees in the offices of the
satirical magazine Cu-Cut: and La Veu de Catalunya, journal of the
Lliga Regionalista, in 1905. A wave of popular anger spread
throughout Catalonia. The Liberal cabinet presided over by
Montero RIos resorted to the usual practice of suspending
constitutional guarantees. It soon found itself caught between
a political mobilization in Catalonia which gave birth to the
coalition of Catalan forces known as Solidaritat: Catalana and the
rebel officers supported by the entire military corps. There were
rumours that the officers were planning to attack the Cortes and
the Civil Guard made clear they would not fire against their
brothers in arms. The King took an active role. The Montero RIos
administration was dismissed and replaced by another Liberal
cabinet headed by Segismundo Moret more willing to placate the
army. On 20 March, 1906 it passed the Law of Jurisdictions to
satisfy the officers' demands. Henceforth any offence, however
trivial, against army, King or patria would be tried by military
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courts. This represented a significant limit of expression and
confirmed the privileged role of the military within the power
bloc. It was therefore not a watershed in the Restoration period
but a continuity of the rule established in 1878. The acceptance
of the new law showed the fear of the governing elites.The
capitulation of the dynastic politicians revealed their weakness:
unable to assert civilian supremacy by an appeal to popular
opinion and abandoned by the other source of constitutional
sovereignty, the King, they provided the army with an opportunity
to impose its demands on the state. (8)
A new crisis arose again in Barcelona when, in the
last week of July 1909, the population revolted against the
calling up of the reserves for service in Morocco. The so-called
Tragic Week was brutally repressed by the army. Over 104
civilians were reported killed and 1725 civilians were tried by
military courts. Five of them were executed. (9) The armed forces
proved once more to be the main bulwark of the regime against any
social or political challenge. The Moroccan adventure, however,
also marked a split within the services. The introduction of
promotion on merit in 1910 contributed to the alienation of those
officers based in the peninsula who envied the privileged
positions and extra incomes enjoyed by the favourites in the
Ministry of War and the King's Military Household, and the
recognition and promotions extended to those in elite units in
Morocco known as the Africanistas. (10)
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The First World War would be the decisive moment. It
brought about the final breach between the officers corps and the
ruling system it was supposed to defend. The inflation and
economic hardship caused by the conflict hurt army officers as
much as other classes. The hostilities in Europe also revealed
the Spanish army's incapacity to engage in any major modern
contest and encouraged the government to break traditional policy
and to intervene in military affairs. First, General Echague,
Minister of War in the Dato administration, and then General
Luque, holder of that office in the Romanones cabinet, tried to
introduce reforms to tackle the system of merit promotions and
the necessary cutbacks in the officialdom. Yet those initiatives
represented a departure from the agreement between army and
dynastic politicians which had so far guaranteed the continuity
and survival of the Turno Paci'fico.
Any reform struck at the security of bureaucratic
middle-ranking officers who now also suffered from inflation,
shortages and worsening living standards. (11) Thus any tampering
with the status quo was bound to anger the officers. In 1916
General Luque prepared a comprehensive military reform Bill which
attempted to increase the standing army to 180,000 soldiers,
financed by a substantial though hardly radical reduction of
officers. It also dealt with the sensitive question of merit
promotions. This reform Bill was a brilliant exercise in
compromise: Luque minimized the necessary cutbacks and accepted
that in the meantime the seniority principle would continue. But
provisions such as a promotions freeze and aptitude tests
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threatened officers below the rank of Colonel. (12)
It was a secret to nobody that the Spanish army was
in desperate need of military reform, but Luque's Bill did not
satisfy military opinion. All sort of criticisms began to be
launched against it: priority was given to the re-organization
of the higher commands by simply superannuating most of the
senior officers in order to make room for junior and doubtless
often less capable successors, not enough attention was paid to
the welfare of the troops and to the details of munitions,
armaments and instruction. A common reflection made was that it
was putting the cart before the horse. The final straw, however,
came with the introduction of tests of intellectual and physical
ability. A mistake was certainly made when these tests were first
applied only to the Infantry corps and in the particularly
restive city of Barcelona. The anger of the inhabitants of that
garrison was boundless.
The officers had been observing how the working
classes were obtaining pay rises and concessions by joining trade
unions and declaring strikes, measures barred to the armed forces
by their code of discipline. Thus deeply disturbed by the erosion
of their living standards, by the mounting economic hardships and
incensed by the government reforms, the officers began to absorb
some syndicalist principles. From the second half of 1916 they
set up Juntas Militares de Defensa, a kind of officers' trade
union. These Juntas were initially established in Barcelona but
soon spread across the peninsula. By January 1917, the idealist
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and arrogant Chairman of the Central Junla at Barcelona, Colonel
Benito Márquez, was boasting that the Juntas had become a reality
in all the garrisons of Spain with the exceptions of only Madrid
and Morocco. (13)
The language used and some of the objectives pursued
by the Juntas could be linked to the general "regenerationist"
dynamic of the era. There were harsh words against the ruling
Turno. The officers were also spurred by their hostility towards
both the privileged members of the Palace clique, mainly based
in the Military Household of the King, and the elite troops
serving in Morocco or Africanistas. Unlike their colleagues in
the peninsula where promotions were awarded in a bureaucratic
order corresponding to seniority and regardless of merits and
competitiveness, the Africanistas could advance relatively
quickly by showing ability on the battlefield, bypassing the
army's bureaucratic pyramid. Nevertheless, the story in Morocco
had been one characterized by nepotism and corruption with
thousands of medals and awards being given for the simplest of
reasons. Hence the Juntas' movement sought to reorganize the army
and to fight corruption and favouritism. Yet despite all the
regenerationist rhetoric, the main objective of most officers was
always the defence of the collective interests of the corps.
According to their beliefs, this would be achieved by ending the
favouritism and privileges enjoyed by the palace clique and the
Africanistas, by imposing a rigid promotion system based on
strict seniority and by organizing themselves in order to obtain
pay increases. (14)
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The Juntas de Defensa were initially not taken
seriously and even seem to have been welcomed by the Captain
General of Catalonia, General Felipe Alfau. The regulations of
the Juntas were presented to Alfau in early 1917. He supported
and encouraged his officers. The Minister of War, General Luque,
was well aware of what was going on and made no objection.
According to Colonel Márquez, neither General Alfau nor Luque
opposed the establishment of Juntas. In fact, these Generals
wanted to use them for their own personal ambitions. (15) It was
not until the Russian revolution in March 1917 when the Monarch
feared that their existence constituted a potential threat to the
regime, that Romanones ordered their dissolution. Alfonso XIII
drew a parallel between the soldiers's Soviets in Russia and the
Juntas de Defensa in Spain. The anti-oligarchical language of the
Spanish officers and their attacks upon the Palace Generals, made
the King believe he could become the target of the Juntas' anger.
He therefore forced his government to take measures. In early
April General Alfau was summoned to Madrid and told by Romanones
and Luque that the Juntas had to be dissolved. The following week
he communicated the authorities in the capital that he had done
so with total success.(l6) As events were to prove this was far
from true.
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4. The Romanones administration: the international challenge:
Until early 1916, although fierce fighting raged
around the continent, Spain never considered departing from its
initial strict neutrality. That position would be seriously
challenged during the R manones administration. No other Prime
Minister, during the years of conflict, became so much involved
in the international dispute. Labour militancy, military reforms
and economic plans were crucial issues during this period and yet
they were almost overshadowed by the foreign question. In fact,
the war seems to have dominated Romanones' business agenda. This
attitude led to a phase of active agitation and polarization of
the country around the neutrality issue. Furthermore, the two
warring blocs, in particular the Central Powers, turned their
attention to Spain such that it became a new theatre of
operations. The fall of the Romanones government in April 1917
did not put an end to German intervention in Spanish internal
affairs. On the contrary, it represented the culmination of a
successful campaign of infiltration and mobilization. In the
domestic field, however, nothing could be the same again after
April 1917. The ruling governing elites had lost their hegemony
and would never manage to win it back.
No Turno politician had welcomed the outbreak of
hostilities in Europe. A conflict of such magnitude was bound to
damage their artificial and fragile leading position in Spanish
political society. Hence most of them, regardless of their
respective sympathies for one or other European camp, longed for
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a quick end to the war so that they could return as soon as
possible to their normal political routine. As the conflict
dragged on, they realized the increasing threat that it could
spread to the peninsula. Thus they tried to bury their heads in
the sand, ignore what was taking place beyond the borders and
hope they had been forgotten.
Count Romanones was an exception. He was one of the
very few dynastic leaders who believed that Spain should abandon
its formal neutrality. As early as August 1914 he had stated his
views openly in the famous editorial "Fatal Neutralities".
According to him, the only way in which Spain could re-build her
Empire in Northern Africa and strengthen her economy was through
closer collaboration with France and Britain, the main naval and
colonial powers, and not through diplomatic isolationism.
Moreover, personal reasons also influenced his determination to
cement links with the Entente. He was one of the largest
share-holders in the mining industries of Morocco and of coal and
pyrite mines in Asturias and Southern Spain whose production went
to France to prop up the Allied war effort.
After the outburst of criticism that "Fatal
Neutralities" aroused, Romanones played down his pro-Allied
feelings. Throughout 1915 as he felt he was close to regaining
political power, he insisted that Spain should never abandon her
position of neutrality. Once he was Prime Minister he tried to
erase from everybody's memory his earlier pro-Allied views by
claiming that his personal sympathies should not interfere with
123
the interests of the state, but he never gave up his previous
convictions. The Count, during his troubled Premiership,
endeavoured to pursue an increasingly pro-Entente international
policy but disguised this fact from public opinion. He used
secret diplomatic channels as favourite means to deal with the
Western Powers. To his despair, his initiatives were received by
evasive Anglo-French responses. Romanones could not go beyond
certain limits. He could not contemplate the idea of breaking off
diplomatic relations with Germany. Hence the Entente was not
prepared to satisfy Spanish imperialist ambitions in exchange for
mere promises of platonic friendship. Romanones' approaches,
however, triggered off a vicious campaign against his government
orchestrated by the Central Powers with the help of their Spanish
friends.Germany had important interests in the peninsula. They
included investments, 70,000 nationals and over 40 vessels which
had sought shelter in Spanish ports at the outbreak of the war.
The presence of a pro-Allied Prime Minister in power was a
pending threat to all these interests. It was imperative
therefore to bring about his downfall. The result was to push
Romanones more and more towards the Allied camp. By early 1917
the situation was such that the continuity of an administration
headed by the Count was bound to lead inevitably to a diplomatic
rupture with the German Bloc.
when Romanones took office in December 1915 he quickly
realized something had to be done to dispel the impression which
undoubtedly prevailed that he intended to depart from neutrality.
He therefore appointed Miguel Villanueva, cacique of Logrono
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known for his Germanophile leanings and a leading personality in
the democratic faction of the Liberal party led by the Count's
rival, the dull Marquis of Alhucemas, foreign minister. It was
a smart attempt to kill two birds with one stone: to show
everybody he had abandoned his pro-Allied views and to win the
support of the other main Liberal clique. When Urzaiz was sacked
in February 1916 Villanueva became Chancellor and then after the
General Elections of April 1916 he was promoted to the
influential post of Speaker of the Lower House of the Cortes. The
Prime Minister then had the way clear to entrust his friend
Amalio Gimeno with foreign policy.
Romanones continued to stress in official circles his
total commitment to strict neutrality. On 16 March he spoke at
the CIrculo Liberal in Madrid, the elite policy making group
within the Liberal party. The Count told his audience: Spain
remains and will remain neutral because this is her firm will...
the present government like that presided over by Dato will
observe in its relations with the belligerent sides the strictest
neutrality...".(l) This idea was repeated to a packed Cortes
during the Crown Message on 10 May, 1916. One month later,
Romanones stood up again in Congress to point out that neutrality
was not the monopoly of one party but the faithful interpretation
of the unanimous opinion of the nation. The maverick Count even
suggested he had been the first to support it without any
reservations when Dato proclaimed it for the first time two years
earlier. What Romanones was clearly not prepared to do was to
allow a public debate on neutrality. Thus when the fierce
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Republican Marcelino Domingo tried to bring up the issue in
October, he was told that it was such a sensitive subject that
it could not be discussed in parliament at that time. Yet he
promised that the Deputies would be allowed to express their
views before the end of the year. Romanones" call for ulpatrioticu
silence was promptly backed by Data. It is no wonder that in late
December, noting that the issue had been ignored and that the
Cortes was about to be closed, Domingo and the other members of
the Republican-Socialist minority voiced their disappointment and
anger. (2>
Parliamentary passivity contrasted with feverish
diplomatic activity. The Prime Minister's intention was to
conduct foreign policy unseen by parliament. He relied mainly on
diplomatic activities in Madrid, Paris and London which could not
be scrutinized or commented upon by politicians or journalists.
A Germanophile and ultra-conservative, Polo de Bernabé, and a
neutral aristocrat, Merry del Val, retained their posts as
Ambassadors to Berlin and London respectively. But Leon y
Castillo, a former Ambassador at Paris with good connections
among French political elites, returned there and Fermin
CalbetOn, a close friend of Romanones and leading figure in the
Liberal party, was sent to the Vatican.
LeOn y Castillo and Polo de Bernabé defended two
opposite foreign policies. The former totally shared Romanones'
view that Spain should move towards the Western Bloc. In April
1916 he wrote: U1 am for a neu!rality leaning towards the
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Allies.. . it is inconceivable for us to continue with the kind of
neutrality that some want to impose upon us with threats of civil
war. . .Fatal neutralities was not only an editorial, but is
becoming a prophecy and if God does not protect us it could
become a catastrophe".(3) H wever, at the same time Polo de
Bernabé was affirming: "I am unhappy that Villanueva is no longer
at the Foreign Office. The kind of strict neutrality pursued by
him is exactly that which I personally identify with. . .'. (4)
Despite all his declarations of strict neutrality, the
Spanish Prime Minister had not abandoned those ideas expressed
in his editorial "Fatal Neutralities": the Great War in Europe
had presented Spain with a golden opportunity to re-construct her
Empire and her economy. Isolation in the international field
would be a terrible mistake. The nation had to back the Allied
cause and extract a price for it. Yet Romanones knew he had to
act with extreme caution so as not to arouse suspicions. Thus he
left Polo de Bernabé at Berlin and moved his man to Paris.
Romanones' instructions were clear: Spain's destiny was
inevitably linked to that of France and Britain. He informed León
y Castillo that he was there with the full confidence of the
government. His mission was to let the French authorities know
that Spain was ruled by a friendly and supportive government, and
then to obtain their consent for the modification of Tangier from
its existing international status to formal Spanish control.
According to Romanones, Tangier was his main concern. The city
was not only the key to the control of the Mediterranean but also
to the final pacification of the Spanish Protectorate in
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Morocco. (5
If the Count seriously believed that the French were
prepared to agree with his plans for Tangier, he was either naive
or had been misinformed. Leon y Castillo found in France a proud
and stubborn nation determined to fight to the end. The cruel and
bloody battles of Verdun and the Sornme were soon to reveal that
resolution. Moreover, France's image of Spain was of a state
marked by its Germanophilia. The fact that the government was
temporarily in friendly hands was meaningless as long as
important institutions such as the Church, Army and Court did not
make any effort to disguise their pro-German feelings. The
Spanish Ambassador at Paris was therefore not exactly met by a
welcoming party. He despaired that while Portugal had made an
intelligent move by throwing in her lot with the Allies, thereby
guaranteeing her interests in a future international order by
ensuring her presence at the Peace Conference, Spain whose
economic and political destiny was inevitably linked to that of
the Western Powers, even if they were beaten in the war,
continued to be disliked because of a neutrality which in fact
was playing into German hands. LeOn y Castillo was thus
pessimistic about the likelihood of France acquiescing to a
change in the status of Tangier. He suggested that time and money
would have to be invested in order to win over French public
opinion. (6)
LeOn y Castillo, encouraged by Romanones, promptly
raised the issue of Tangier with the French government. In fact,
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the account of his interview with the French Prime Minister
Briand was not without its comic aspect. The Spanish Ambassador
in opening the conversation said he was too old and broken a man
to be able to do much in the way of negotiations, to which Briand
replied that the brave attempt which he had just made to take
Tangier by storm was a most gratifying proof of youthful vigour.
Briand went on to say that he did not think that the present was
a very suitable moment to discuss the question of Tangier. If
France were suddenly to let it be known that she was prepared to
acquiesce in a Spanish occupation of Tangier, without any
corresponding concession on the part of the Spanish government,
such an announcement would be interpreted as a sign that she was
losing confidence in her ability to defeat Germany and was
endeavouring to conciliate the neutral powers.(7) Castillo
continued to approach leading French political figures such as
Clemenceau, Pichon, Barthou and Frencinet. Yet his correspondence
reveals the deadlock in which Spanish diplomacy found itself. A
policy of nominal friendship, but empty hands in practice, would
not obtain Tangier. The French were not prepared to discuss the
question unless Spain adopted a new position. An alternative
approach could be to see whether Britain, which with Spain and
France was the other major power ensuring the international
status of Tangier, was more willing to satisfy the Spanish
demands. (8)
Romanones thus attempted to win the co-operation of
Britain for his bid for Tangier. He failed as the British proved
to be almost as unresponsive as the French. During the first
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months of 1916 the Spanish Embassy at London was bombarded with
instructions to the Ambassador Merry del Val. He was to seek
support for Spanish claims over Tangier, to complain about the
hostile attitude ad pted by Mr. White, the British representative
in the city and to increase the commercial exchanges of coal and
steel between the two countries. In June he even wrote to Merry:
"We must be prepared for anything and aware of what they want
from us, even intervention". (9)
The British did not jump at the idea of a Romanones
administration. As long as Spain did not abandon her official
neutrality, a theoretically more friendly government could be
more a source of embarrassment than of anything else. Immediately
after the fall of Dato, this feeling was expressed by the British
Ambassador at Madrid:
"I am not at all sure that a more openly friendly
government may not be an embarrassment both for Spain and
for ourselves. Mr. Dato held the balance well, officially
and privately he was most friendly. Romanones may press for
a price and try to raise the question of Tangier. . .". (10)
The Foreign Minister, Edward Grey, agreed with Briand
that it was not an opportune moment to discuss Tangier. He
recognized that it was a natural aspiration for Spain but
insisted that no decision could be taken without French consent.
Grey was not totally unsympathetic towards Spanish demands
believing that in order to keep Spain friendly some concessions
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might have to be made. Nevertheless, he also stressed that Spain
should be asked something in return for that concession.
Otherwise nobody wanted Tangier to be given up and Gibraltar was
a sacrifice that Britain could not afford. Besides he did not
know what else they could offer. (11)
In late March, at the request of Merry del Val, Edward
Grey agreed to discuss the question of Tangier in Paris with the
French government. Grey wrote to Arthur Hardinge that he had
urged the need for keeping Spain happy, but recognized that it
was difficult for the French to relinquish Tangier. Briand said
that it was impossible at that moment to make such a concession
as it would have the appearance of yielding to blackmail and
would not be tolerated by French public opinion. Yet he did not
preclude it from being considered at a more favourable time. (12)
After meeting Geof fray, the French Ambassador at Madrid, Hardinge
concluded that the subject of an eventual transfer of Tangier to
Spain would be postponed until the end of the war. In the
meantime, with very little hesitation, the French reply was that
the cession of that city in the middle of the war would be
regarded in France as a sign of weakness and as intended to draw
Spain into the war on the side of the Allies. Furthermore, it
might offend the Sultan of Morocco, who, although for practical
purposes a vassal of France, required during such a difficult
period, rather delicate handling as Thrco-German emissaries were
endeavouring to promote a Muslim movement against France and her
Allies in Northern Africa. Moreover, it would be unwelcome to the
French element in Morocco, and there was no certainty that its
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effect would be to render in the long-term the Spaniards more
friendly in their attitude towards the European war. It appeared
possible to Hardinge that those difficulties might be overcome
by a secret understanding between France and Spain. In the event
of a successful termination of the war, including the recovery
by France of the two provinces lost to Germany in 1870, the
French government would be willing on the conclusion of peace to
transfer Tangier to the Spanish zone, it being understood that
until that event the Spanish government would maintain a
benevolent attitude towards the Allies.(l3)
In an attempt to win public support for a more
benevolent neutrality towards the Allied cause, Romanones sought
to enlist the aid of Antonio Maura. The veteran Conservative
statesman was still the most respected and influential politician
of the Spanish Right and his voice was bound to have a decisive
influence on those sectors of society identified with law and
order, who were in fact the core of the Gerrnanophile movement in
Spain. Some of his followers were among the most noisy supporters
of the Central Powers. Ultra-conservatives, Catholics and
Monarchists, these Mauristas loathed the idea of a victory for
Republican France and for the political principles which that
country represented. On 4 September 1916, Maura met Romanones and
the King in Santander to discuss the international question and
work together with them on preparation of the major speech he was
to deliver six days later at Berlanga. (14)
Maura's speech before a huge audience of his followers
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at Berlanga in September 1916 was the second of the three he
delivered during the war. The first one at the Royal Theatre at
Madrid in April 1915 had already revealed a veiled pro-Allied
tendency. At Berlanga, Maura came very close to the international
stance maintained by the Count. This was hardly surprising since
they had exchanged ideas a few days earlier. The speech was as
most of Maura's usually were: of great length, eloquent, verbose
and abounding in allusions to abstract general principles. He
dealt in the main with the war and foreign policy, making an
important public declaration which emphasized a certain leaning
on the part of Spain towards the Allied cause. Intervention in
the European war was rejected, but a rapprochement with the
Allies was defended as the logical conclusion drawn from history,
economy and geography. He defended his own part in the Carthagena
agreement of 1904 with France and Britain, signed while he was
Prime Minister, as dictated by the interests of Spain in Morocco
and the Mediterranean, and by her natural status as a Western
Power. Maura finally referred to Tangier as indispensable to
Spanish expansion in Morocco and bearing in mind the audience
which he was addressing, claimed that Spain had the right to
expect to be treated as a sister by the Entente. If,however, the
general policy of England and France sought to weaken the
influence and power of Spain, it would be the natural duty of
Spanish statesmen after the war to reconsider their position and
perhaps to look for support in a different political
combination. (15)
Maura's speech stunned part of his normal audience.
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The Ivfaurista journal La Acción went out of its way to stress that
Maura was still a staunch supporter of strict neutrality, but
others described it as a betrayal. Romanones himself declared he
was in total agreement with the ideas presented by the old
Conservative leader. Republican leaders like Melquiades Alvarez
and Alejandro Lerroux gave a grateful welcome to his views.
Lerroux even argued in his journal El Progreso that after two
years of war, Maura and he were in full agreement. (16)
Maura's tacit support for Romanones' foreign policy
failed to produce the expected effect upon the Western diplomats.
They were, if anything, dismissive and unimpressed.The British
Foreign Office wrote: "The Spanish government's attitude may now
have been modified by the speech of Maura, though it seems more
likely to be intended as a form of blackmail--a hint that Spain
might help us in return for Gibraltar or Tangier". (17) The French
adopted a similar approach. The ?ribassador in Madrid thought that
it would not affect the situation as Spain could only help the
Allied cause if she was to serve them in some concrete and
practical way, for instance, by the seizure of the interned
German ships. Moreover, he described Maura's speech as an attempt
to hedge and envelop in pompous and lengthy phrases, a statement
which contained nothing new, whilst France might be asked to pay
an inconveniently high price for words which had no real
value. (18)
A practical and immediate departure from the official
strict neutrality was something that Romanones, in a country
134
divided by philias, was unable to offer. The Liberal leader
claimed in his memoirs that there were substantial offers to
persuade him to join the Entente, especially during the meeting
he held with the French Foreign Minister at San Sebastién in
September 1916. However, Romanones maintained that when he
realized that the general mood in the country was against a
direct involvement in the conflict he refused to throw in his lot
with the Allies and instead merely sought to work for a
benevolent neutrality towards their cause. 19) In fact, he
withheld a good deal of the truth as he was prepared to go
further that he suggests.
There is no evidence that at any time France or
Britain exercised any kind of economic or political pressure to
force Spain to join them in the war. Surrounded by Allied
countries who controlled the sea routes and depending for her
economic survival on the trade with them, Spain would not have
been able to withstand their combined action. On the other hand,
the story was very different in the case of the Central Powers.
The relative passivity of the Western Powers contrasted with the
ruthless determination and forceful methods of Germany and her
friends to ensure that Spain never abandoned the position it had
adopted at the outbreak of the war.
Germany identified her cause with that of the people
of law and order. She could find her most ardent supporters in
the Army, aristocracy, Court and clergy. On 27 January, 1916
leading representatives of all those institutions turned up at
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the German Embassy in Madrid to celebrate the Kaiser's birthday
and express their sympathy for Germany at that critical time. (20)
Moreover, it was commonly believed in the ruling circles that the
Allies, France in particular, were in contact with all those
forces opposing the political status quo. Even Romanones was
worried when in the spring of 1916 Republicans and Catalanists
formed a Legion, several thousand strong, to fight in France.
From July 1916 the Legion's headquarters at the Rue Beauregard
were under surveillance and its contacts with French politicians
closely followed by members of the Spanish Embassy in France. (21)
Yet the German strategy in Spain began to change in 1916. Knowing
that the government of the country was in unfriendly hands,
Germany embarked on an active and ambitious campaign of
de-stabilization, infiltration and sabotage which went far beyond
the diplomatic activities permissible for ny country acting in
neutral territory. There were three objectives: to gain control
of public opinion, to damage the interests of the Allies and to
bring down any hostile administration.
Control of public opinion, in particular the press,
was an important German success. Both the Central Powers and the
Western Powers took advantage of the exorbitant rise in the price
of paper to come to the financial rescue of different newspapers
and thus managed to influence their editorials. In this practice
the former always held the lead while the latter only reacted in
1916 when the advantage enjoyed by the Central Powers had become
evident. A secret British Report in October 1917 noted the
poverty and weakness of Anglo-French propaganda in Spain in
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comparison with that of the Central Powers. It confirmed that the
substantial sums lavished by the latter on the Spanish press had
paid off as public opinion was to a large extent moulded by the
German Embassy. (22)
The primary objective of all the publications in
Spain, either friendly or controlled by German capital, was as
Gerald Wolters, agent of the North German Lloyd at Barcelona,
suggested: to ensure the strict maintenance of neutrality. To
that end Germany did not just seek to control that part of the
right-wing media closest to her ideological position, but also
invested heavily both in the Liberal press edited by rivals of
Count Romanones and in the pro-neutral Anarcho-Syndicalist
journals. It was obviously a covert operation in which these
newspapers received large amounts of money and in return defended
the maintenance of strict neutrality. Following German
instructions, they would oppose any departure from that position.
Whereas right-wing newspapers would accuse any interventionist
politician of treason to Spain, those on the left would stress
the fact that the working class would be the section of society
paying with their lives for the madness of entering into the
'imperialist war'. (23)
Virtually all the journals of the political right were
in friendly hands or sponsored by them: the most widely read
being the Monarchist ABC, the Maurista La Accio'n, the Carlist El
Correo Espaflol, the Catholic El Debate and El Universo, the
Conservative La Tribuna and La Nación. The last two were
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practically owned by German capital. The only important exception
was La Epoca, the official newspaper of the Conservative party.
The Allies had a firmer control over the media close to the
centre or the soft left which defended a foreign policy similar
to that of Romanones. Good examples were the Count's mouthpiece,
El Diario Universal, as well as El Liberal de Madrid, El Heraldo
de Madrid, La Correspondencia de Espafla and EL Imparcial.
Germany, however, had influence over the main journals of the
democratic faction of the Liberal party: the Marquis of
Aihucemas' La Mañana and El DIa, edited by Alcalá Zamora, future
President of the Second Republic. In theory, all the main
publications of the left backed the Allied cause. This was the
case with Araquistáin's Espafla, the Republican El Pals, and El
Parlarnentario, Lerroux's El Progreso and the PSOE's newspaper,
El Socialista. Nevertheless, German capital was behind the
neutralist editorials of Solidaridad Obrera, organ of the CNT,
and of the ultra-left Republican Espafla Nueva, edited by the
controversial Republican Deputy Rodrigo Soriano. (24)
Until the end of the war, the concerted and
well-organized campaign carried out by the Germanophile press
proved to be a formidable force. Any criticism of Germany--be it
of innocent lives lost in a submarine attack or atrocities
committed in the territories occupied by her--was rapidly
depicted as warmongering and an open invitation to intervention.
Even the sinking of Spanish vessels was justified. Ironically the
owners of those vessels, accused of smuggling contraband and
collaboration with one of the warring factions, were blamed for
138
their own misfortune. After all, Germany was only fighting for
her survival and she had to do so with all the methods available
to her. In June 1916, before the submarine campaign had begun in
earnest, one of the most vociferous Germanophile journals
published a series of articles under the headline "A Sensational
Document". It provided a complete list of Spanish companies
producing material for the Entente and of Spanish ships
contributing to their war effort by carrying cargo from one
Allied port to another. In fact, it was almost a final warning
to the Liberal government to put an end to contraband and
profiteering and an advance justification of a possible change
in the hitherto benevolent attitude adopted by Germany towards
the Spanish merchant fleet. Furthermore, the articles were used
as the proof that the main cause of the inflationary trend
affecting Spain was the fact that her transport and basic
products were being cynically used or exported abroad. (25)The
right-wing press disguised its Germanophilia with slogans of
patriotism and Espafiolismo. They were the defenders of the
ultimate interests of the nation seeking to prevent the country
from sliding into a disastrous war and fighting for strict
neutrality. Their effort was combined with that of the left which
continually accused those pro-Allied elements in Spain of being
behind the orgy of exports which was tearing the country apart.
By 1916 German influence in Spain was such that the
nation was regarded in the Western Chancelleries, if not as a
Germanophile country, at least as a doubtful friend. This was not
only a result of the image given by a bellicose Germanophile
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press, but also by the dramatic intensification of German
activities in the peninsula which went largely unpunished. There
were flagrant cases of complicity between German agents and
Spanish authorities, examples of infiltration in Anarchist groups
and subsequent organization of strike action so as to disrupt
industrial production and exports for the Allies, and finally
unrestrained and vicious submarine attacks off the Spanish
coasts.
In February 1916 the British Foreign Office received
a Secret Report warning of the potential danger presented by the
presence of between 70,000 and 80,000 German residents in Spain
and confirming that the recent wave of strikes in Barcelona had
been fomented by German agents for the purpose of stopping
exports from this area reaching France. (26) In May Mr. Vaughan,
Secretary of the British Embassy in Madrid, wrote that it had
been verified that German submarines were furnished with many
supplies in Spanish waters. This was taking place between
Castellón and Alicante, being the most dangerous zone in the
neighbourhood of Valencia where small vessels belonging to the
rich tobacco smuggler March were being used for the purpose.
Also, a consignment of one million cartridges had been seized at
Madrid railway station which suggested that many others had got
through. The belief was that its destination was Morocco to
support the Moorish revolt against the French. (27) In June a
serious incident occurred when, without previous notice, the
German submarine U-35, supposedly the author of several attacks
on Allied convoys in the Mediterranean, arrived at Cartagena. An
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embarrassed Romanones had to face an avalanche of protests coming
from Paris and London. The official version given by El Irnparcial
was that it had brought a personal letter of gratitude from the
Kaiser to King Alfonso XIII for the excellent treatment given to
those German officers who had surrendered to the Spanish
authorities in Guinea after the loss of the colony of Cameroon.
There were, however, suspicions that its real mission was to
establish links with the crews of German ships interned in
Spanish ports and to co-ordinate new actions with other
submarines near the coast of Bilbao. (28)
During the next months French complaints mounted about
submarine raids off the Spanish coasts and German money and arms
reaching the rebel Moors in Morocco. In July Leon y Castillo
wrote to Romanones: "What a pity!. The French just want a proof
of our friendship, and this is the spectacle we are providing".
Romanones was determined to show the Allies where his sympathies
lay. In early August he decided to protest against the German
treatment of civilians in occupied territories. On 27 August he
briefed LeOn y Castillo that the German government had been
informed that no more visits would be allowed and that its
submarines should stop using Spanish territorial waters.(29) On
1 September, the Spanish Prime Minister sent a note to the
M narch expressing his belief that the country should adopt a
more benevolent neutrality towards the Allies. Then on the eve
of his meeting with the French Foreign Minister, the Count told
Colonel Tillon, the French Military Attache, that it was not his
wish that neutrality should assume a position of equidistance
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between the belligerent nations, but should be one of sympathy
for France and England and that he was most desirous of giving
evidence of this.(30)
Romanones' pro-Allied initiatives confirmed the worst
suspicions of the Central Powers. Germany abandoned the carrot
and henceforth used the stick. After September 1916 the number
of submarine attacks, sabotage and spying activities shot up
dramatically. The result would be to divide the country into
those who were prepared to defend neutrality at any price and
thus were willing to justify any German action and those who
argued that such hostility should be answered by the immediate
rupture of diplomatic relations. The Prime Minister's attempts
to check Germany's manoeuvres were unsuccessful. The odds against
him were formidable. He was confronted by a very resourceful and
well organized intelligence network which was backed by a
powerful press lobby and could act at will with the complicity
of authorities that in particular cases like Guinea and Morocco
reached scandalous dimensions. After December the battle between
Romanones and Germany and her Spanish friends was to the death.
There could be only two possible outcomes: either a final breach
with the Central Powers or the end of his premiership. The fact
that the most ardent supporters of his foreign policy were
Republicans and Socialists persuaded the bulk of the dynastic
forces that his downfall was a price worth paying.
Like the other neutral nations Spain had seen her
trade affected by the hostilities. Both sides tried to hurt each
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other by imposing an economic blockade to disrupt the other's
supply lines. They drew up lists of products which they would not
allow to reach an enemy port. Thus neutral vessels, if caught
carrying forbidden cargo, could easily be accused of smuggling
contraband and have their goods seized. Allied naval supremacy,
from the very beginning of the conflict, meant that a desperate
Germany had to resort increasingly to the use of U-boats instead
of surface ships. In the first stages of the war, German
submarines limited their role for the most part to searching
neutral boats and destroying prohibited goods. As the war dragged
on, however, the U-boats began to sink any vessel navigating
towards an Allied port. Friends of Germany argued that
circumstances had imposed those methods upon her. Yet for those
on the receiving end the change of tactics made a serious impact,
especially in terms of loss of lives and destruction of material.
Spanish vessels had often been detained by French or British
warships and driven to an Allied port where they were fined if
contraband was found. Crews and boats were promptly released once
the fine was paid. (31) German submarine action had been
relatively moderate towards the Spanish merchant fleet. During
the first two years of the war only 8 Spanish ships had been
sunk. After September 1916 that policy was changed radically. In
just one week during that month three Spanish boats-- Olazábal,
Mayo and Luis Vives--were sent to the bottom of the sea. Germany
had decided to switch to bullying tactics. The idea was to show
Romanones and those contemplating a departure from strict
neutrality what they were risking.By April 1917 the toll had
risen to 31 ships or 80.000 tons of much needed naval
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transport. (32) A real battle of words was taking place in public
opinion. The barbarism of the Teutonic war machine was constantly
denounced in the Liberal or Republican journals which demanded
strong measures to put an end to the disaster. Yet for the
Germanophile press it was only the natural outcome of the
conflict. They argued that Germany was within her rights to treat
as enemies all those supplying the Allies with the means to
continue the war.
Relations between the Spanish authorities in the
African colonies of Morocco, Guinea and Western Sahara and the
neighbouring French administration had never been particularly
cordial. There had always been rivalry and probably also a
certain degree of jealousy towards the more competent and
successful French colonial system. The outbreak of the war in
Europe caused even further deterioration of the already troubled
relations. Admiration for the efficiency and discipline of the
German army and pleasure at the setbacks of France was not
strange to many Spanish officers, but it was almost the rule
among those in the colonies. Thus they were more than happy to
turn a blind eye to the activities of German agents.
An outrageous example of complicity took place in
Spanish Guinea. In early 1916, facing an all-out Allied
offensive, the German colonial army in the Cameroons retreated
towards Spanish Guinea. In February France and Britain expressed
their agreement with the internment of sixty German officers and
several thousand native troops in the Spanish colony. The
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intention was that the German officers would shortly be sent to
the peninsula to be held in Saragossa and the disarmed natives
returned to their country. (33) Time passed and the operation kept
being postponed. In October the French Ambassador Geoffray called
the attention of Amalio Gimeno, the Spanish Foreign Minister, to
the arrival at Fernando Poo, the capital of Spanish Guinea, of
cases containing ammunition and rifles which had found their way
to a camp of interned German officers. The German Commandant had
been heard to say that they would return in triumph to the
Cameroons in a few months. The French Ambassador requested the
German officers to be immediately transported to the peninsula
and the natives to the Cameroons. He also announced that French
authorities on the nearby coast had received orders to divert to
their ports all Spanish ships bound for Fernando P00 so that they
might be searched for guns. Gimeno promised two vessels to convey
and convoy the Germans to Spain. (34) The close degree of
cooperation between the theoretically imprisoned German officers
and the Spanish authorities soon became evident, particularly
those between the Germans, the Governor Angel Barrera and the
Commandant in Chief Manuel Giménez Pidal. Barrera had been aware
of the presence of weapons at the German camp and had done
nothing to prevent it. Moreover, German and Spanish of ticers not
only fraternized openly but they even interchanged duties as if
they belonged to the same arrrrj. On 28 October 1916 two French
cruisers, Surcouf and Astrea, arrived in the colony with guns
positioned and manned and did not leave before informing Barrera
that the Allies would not consent to the presence of armed
Germans near their former colony of the Cameroons. In December
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the British government communicated to the Spanish Ambassador in
London its dissatisfaction with the situation in Guinea. There
was no doubt about the good intentions of the Spanish government
but neither the Naval department nor Governor Barrera could be
trusted. (35) The news that the removal operation had begun did
not arrive until February 1917. The previous month a parade had
been held in honour of the Kaiser with the participation of
Spanish officers. Yet Governor Barrera retained his post until
March 1918. (36)
Morocco, divided between a Spanish and French
Protectorate since 1912, represented the clearest example of
rivalry and lack of collaboration between both administrations.
Both colonial powers had the tacit consent of the Sultan to
establish their zones of influence but they had run into the
opposition of armed natives. After 1909 the continental powers
had been engaged in guerrilla warfare, but co-operation had been
lacking. Instead, mistrust had been the general rule. Germany
took advantage of this situation to create trouble for France in
her North African possession.
In 1916 at the same time that Romanones was making his
bid for Tangier, the French had been complaining about German
agents in the Spanish zone being active in encouraging, arming
and financing a Moroccan rebellion. The German consulates at
Tetuán, Larache and Melilla had become bases for spy networks
from where German nationals like Bartels, Koppel and Richtels
provided the rebel leaders, Abd-el Malek and Raisuli, with money
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and weapons to continue their raids into French territory. (37)
It was impossible that the Spanish authorities did not know what
was going on under their very noses. The Liberal Prime Minister
despaired that the German manoeuvres were not only an abuse of
the hospitality enjoyed by her nationals but a clear attempt to
endanger both the pacification of Morocco and the relations
between France and Spain. In fact, the zeal of the Spanish
authorities in combating the German-Moorish links in the
peninsula contrasted with the passivity of the Colonial officers
in Morocco. The police were active in the peninsula in wrecking
the German initiative to make Mulay Haffid, new Sultan of
Morocco. Haffid, resident in Barcelona, was under the close
surveillance of the Spanish intelligence services and Romanones
pledged that if necessary he would be expelled from Spain. In
November, one million pesetas intended for Raisuli and half a
million for Abd-el Malek were intercepted and thereafter orders
were given for the arrest and expulsion of Koppel from the
Spanish Protectorate. (38) Yet smuggling weapons into the French
zone continued without interruption and German officers became
advisers to Abd-el Malek's troops. The malice or the weakness of
the Spanish authorities was then openly demonstrated when the
High Commissioner Jordana demanded that the rebel leader Raisuli
be appointed Grand Visir of Tetuán in February 1917. The French
Colonial Office was enraged. Nevertheless, Spanish operations in
Morocco were restrained by an imperative: to prevent a high
number of casualties in what was mostly regarded as an unpopular
colonial adventure. Thus the official explanation for appointing
such a controversial figure was that in order to pacify the
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Spanish zone the collaboration of influential native leaders was
needed. (39)
By late 1916 the extent and nature of German
operations in Spain were impressive. British secret reports
coincided with Romanones' memoirs in their description. Apart
from her powerful press lobby and her activities in the colonies
of Morocco, Guinea and to a lesser extent Western Sahara, Germany
had established spy networks in Bilbao, Barcelona, Valencia,
Málaga, Huelva and the Canary Islands. The objective was not only
to gather news from France but also to acquire information about
shipping routes and to infiltrate anarchist and revolutionary
groups. These could then be easily manipulated to disrupt
industrial production for the Allies.(40)
December 1916 represented a watershed in terms of the
polarization of the country over the neutrality issue. It also
brought about an open declaration of war between Romanones and
the Gerrnanophiles forces in the country. On 12 December the
Central Powers published an statement claiming that they were
ready to negotiate peace. Yet they made no important concessions
and the statement was marked by threats to resume the hostilities
in an even more lethal manner if the Western Powers did not
accept their overtures. Naturally, the Entente rejected the
German terms alleging that they had not chosen war but that it
had been imposed upon them. They were not prepared to stop until
the might of German military power had been crushed. The peace
initiative was followed up by the American President Wilson who
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on 18 December sent a note to both belligerents and neutrals in
an attempt to see if there was any possibility of finding common
ground to stop the carnage. But the gap was too great and nothing
came of it.
In Spain the irreconcilability of the two positions
was well documented. The pro-Allied press condemned the German
approach, applauded the words of the Allied leaders and even
accused Wilson of unwittingly acting as honourary agent of
Germany. By contrast, the Germanophile press praised the peace
initiatives and argued that the pro-Allied elements in Spain were
behaving like foreign agents, who were not only happy to see the
slaughter continue on the European battlefields, but wanted to
drag Spain into it as well. (41)
Different peace initiatives offered Spain the longed
for opportunity to play a mediating role in the conflict. No
other country and no other Head of State had worked so hard to
fulfil that role. Alfonso XIII had taken personal charge of
establishing a diplomatic centre in Madrid to deal with both
sides, gather information on missing citizens and soldiers, act
on behalf of the population in occupied territories, advocate the
repatriation of wounded or sick soldiers and to perform a large
variety of other altruistic services. Additionally, her position
of neutrality had enabled Spain to take charge of the interests
of some of the belligerent nations in hostile territories. Some
outstanding examples by late 1916 were the protection of German
interests in Portugal and Romania, those of Austria-Hungary in
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Italy and Portugal, of France in Germany, Turkey, Persia and
occupied Belgium, of Russia in Germany, Austria-Hungary and
occupied Belgium, of Britain in Austria-Hungary, etc.(42) The
enthusiasm of the Spanish Monarch for the peace initiatives was
reported in full by the British Ambassador:
"The King said that he hoped the Allies would wait for full
particulars respecting the German proposals, before they
summarily rejected all idea of negotiations. I think His
Majesty meant to suggest that what Germany would begin by
proposing might be materially modified in the course of
discussion; and although the Spanish government would
probably share the task of mediation with that of the
United States, it is one which the King would naturally
undertake with pride and interest, as likely to
considerably increase the prestige of his country in world
politics". (43)
A few days earlier the Monarch had told his Prime
Minister that this was a crucial moment which had to be
exploited. He was going to use his visit to Vienna to attend the
funeral for the late Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph to meet the
rulers of the Central Powers and then on his return journey
exchange impressions with the Allied leaders in Paris. From these
meetings Alfonso expected to emerge as the arbiter of peace in
Europe. (44)
At first Romanones toyed with the idea of the Spanish
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Monarch leading the initiative of mediating between both sides.
He tried to introduce the idea when he met the French Ambassador
and was taken aback when the latter responded that there could
be no question of the peace proposals being entertained. The
French diplomat was categorical:
"For forty years we have lived under the German menace; we
have never been able to take a step without being
threatened by the iron fist; successive Spanish governments
can testify to the brutal and insolent interference of
German diplomacy at almost every stage of Franco-Spanish
negotiations respecting our interests and spheres of
influence in Morocco. At last the cup has overflowed;
France has been attacked without provocation by her enemy
and her children have sacrificed themselves in thousands to
ensure that this brutal attack shall never be repeated. Any
compromise, any patched up peace, such as that which the
terms suggest, would provoke an outburst of universal
indignation". (45)
In the course of that conversation Romanones suggested
that the services of a mediator, who might perhaps succeed in
procuring rather more favourable conditions, could be a good
solution, but the French Ambassador told him emphatically that
his idea would not be accepted by the French government. Leon y
Castillo confirmed that impression a few days later. The Liberal
leader acted accordingly and refused to endorse Wilson's
initiative. Instead, on 28 December he published a statement
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protesting against the sinking of Spanish vessels and alleging
that the destructive activities of submarines went beyond the
norms of international law. He even clashed with the Monarch when
he opposed the latter's attendance at the funeral of the late
Austrian Emperor in Vienna and at his wearing an Austrian uniform
at the private service which subsequently took place in
Madrid. (46)
Romanones' behaviour convinced Germany that he was the
main enemy of her cause in Spain. Until then there had existed
a significant degree of hostility and suspicion towards him,
henceforth there was open war. In late December a vicious
campaign began against the Liberal leader. The signal had been
given by the Austrian Ambassador, the Prince of Furstenberg, who
in an interview on 26 December for La Nacio'n had hinted that
Count Romanones was behind contraband interests. A few days later
the French intercepted a radiogram in which the German
Ambassador, Prince Ratibor, requested Berlin for more funds to
support an anti-Romanones campaign. (47) For the following four
months, savagely hostile editorials were published in the
Gerrnanophile press. The objective was to overthrow the existing
Liberal cabinet. The Prime Minister was singled out as a
warmonger surreptitiously seeking to embroil the nation in the
European conflagration. Comparisons were drawn between the Count
and the interventionist Greek politician Venizelos. Spaniards
were warned in apocalyptic tones that under the current
Premiership a national disaster was bound to occur sooner or
later. All the German phile newspapers claimed that the post of
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Prime Minister was incompatible with the Count's private export
interests. They suggested that he was actually using his
privileged position to make profits by selling products abroad
and was therefore a smuggler of war contraband. Romanones was
accused of placing Franco- British interests above the national
interests of Spain. He was thus behind every malady affecting
Spain, from workers' disturbances and inflation to food shortages
and lack of transport. The press called on the government to
resign and cease growing rich on the European tragedy and the
miseries of the Spanish people. (48)
On 8 January, facing a divided party, social unrest
and under heavy pressure from a hostile Germanophile press, a
besieged and embattled Romanones decided to present his
resignation so as to make a come-back reinforced by the
confidence of the Monarch. His manoeuvre was in fact entirely
staged. Knowing that he was still backed by a majority of Liberal
Deputies and counting on the good-will of Eduardo Dato, the other
Turno leader, it represented a pre-emptive move aimed at
forestalling any possible challenge to his leadership. The King
himself confided to the British Ambassador that his departure had
been a necessary piece of theatre to strengthen Romanones' hand
against Germanophile forces and rivals in the Liberal party. (49)
The hostile press was not silenced. They were enraged
and quickly denounced the proceeding as further proof of the
duplicity and bankruptcy of the existing administration. La
Accián even argued that the Monarch was becoming an unwitting
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accomplice in these wicked manoeuvres.(50) Yet Romanones still
seemed to be in charge of the situation. The violence of the
press attacks had failed to disturb the Count and if anything had
strengthened his pro-Allied views.
Between the months of February and April 1917 the
polarization over the neutrality issue reached a climax. Spain
was very close to abandoning its official position and embracing
the Allied cause. Romanones had made up his mind and decided to
take the decisive step but was not able to get the necessary
backing from the main forces of the regime. On the contrary, the
fact that Republicans and Socialists advocated the same foreign
policy determined to a large extent his fall from office and the
return to strict neutrality.
On 9 January, 1917 in a desperate attempt to disrupt
the economy of the Allied states, the Central Powers announced
their intention of intensifying the submarine campaign from
February onwards. Henceforth any neutral vessel heading towards
any Allied port would be sunk. The German initiative provoked
anger among the neutral nations. In early February, the United
States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. Araquistáin
called the German initiative a declaration of war. (51) Romanones
wrote to Leon y Castillo that were public opinion not so divided
he would immediately adopt the American policy. For the present
he could not do so but had to wait for the right psychological
moment.(52 That attitude was clearly revealed in his speech in
the Cortes on 1 February and in the note the Spanish government
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sent to Germany five days later. "The decision of the Central
Powers to stop by all possible means all maritime traffic with
France, Britain, Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean entails
grave consequences for Spain. This government--noted the Liberal
Leader--intends that the life of this country cannot be disrupted
and shall not be disrupted. So this government is determined to
take such steps as may be appropriate to face the existing
circumstances". Romanones once more appealed to the patriotism
of the Chamber and pledged to work in close collaboration with
the Cortes.(53) This firm position was confirmed in the note
delivered to Germany and described by the French as strong and
dignified a protest as could be made by a neutral country. The
most important point was the rejection as a legitimate method of
warfare of the destructive course pursued by Germany and her
allies which jeopardized the economic life of Spain and
endangered the lives of her citizens. (54)
Despite all his promises, the Prime Minister did not
intend bringing up the issue in public debate. Instead he
continued to rely on diplomatic channels. Thus, in response to
the insistence of Catalan Republicans like Rodés and Domingo for
a discussion of the international question and Morocco, the Prime
Minister simply decided to shut parliament on 26 February. (55)
In fact, what nobody knew was that the Spanish Ambassador at
Paris had already established crucial contacts with the French
government. León y Castillo met the French Foreign Minister,
Jules Cambon, at the Quai d'Orsay and intimated that his country
was willing to go to great lengths to grant direct assistance to
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the Allies. In reply to a request for a more precise statement,
Castillo said that Spain might place all her natural resources
at their command. This was far from impressive since the Allied
governments were already in a position to draw materials,
manufactured goods as well as agrarian produce from Spain, by
virtue of the many purchases, contracts and orders that had been
arranged. Cambon asked what Spain expected to obtain in return
and was told that she desired Tangier, Gibraltar and a free hand
in Portugal. Castillo emphasized that Spain did not want to annex
Portugal but just to link both peninsular countries by some sort
of Treaty or Alliance. The French Foreign Minister insisted that
Spain should intervene militarily even if only on a small scale,
but the Spanish diplomat responded that this was impossible for
the present due to the divisions in his country. Yet Spain would
break off diplomatic relations with Germany, open her ports to
the Allies, smash German espionage and contribute to the
production of war material. Canibon then stated that he was in
favour of granting the Spanish demands although he could not say
anything about Gibraltar. (56)
For the following two months the destiny of Spain hung
by a thread. Romanones was totally convinced that the only means
to consolidate the status of the country among the great powers
and to head off the increasingly troubled domestic situation was
to depart from strict neutrality. German bullying tactics and the
Americans' tough response seemed to bear out his view.
International events acquired a frenetic speed. Both Castillo and
Calbetón advised the Count to follow the American lead and break
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of f diplomatic relations with Germany. Calbetón even suggested
that the continuity of neutrality was a stain on national honour
and dignity. (57) Yet the Count was still waiting for the right
moment to act. On 12 February the King's brother claimed that
behind the back of the Monarch and of all good Spaniards,
Romanones had sealed a secret treaty with the French so that
Spain would soon enter into the war on the side of the
Allies.(58) On 16 February, an individual who turned out to be
a German sailor, was arrested in Cartagena with two suitcases
full of explosives. The Count wrote that there was enough
dynamite to blow up all the fleets of the world and all the
Spanish factories. He commented that it was not surprising that
the Allies doubted the reliability of Spain when he could not
control what was going on in many Spanish cities. (59)
In March events in Russia proved decisive in
intensifying the "war of words" in the peninsula. The Tsar was
overthrown and a Provisional Government installed. The end of
Autocracy in Russia and its replacement by a modern democratic
Republic filled the pro-Allied forces in Spain with joy. Tsarism
had been an embarrassment for the Western Powers, but now the new
Russian regime, added to the entry of the United States into the
war in early April, radically transformed a conflict of
imperialist aims into a worldwide ideological struggle. Socialist
and Republican journals insisted that the Revolution had not been
the reaction of people weary of war, but rather directed against
a despotic and tyrannical political order whose leaders were
seeking a compromise peace with their Imperial counterparts in
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Germany and Austria. These journals became the most outspoken
supporters of a diplomatic rupture with Germany and in some cases
even advocated open intervention. (60)
The speed with which the Western Powers abandoned the
Tsar to his fate and recognized the new regime in Russia sent
waves of panic through the Spanish ruling circles. More than ever
they were determined to stay out of the European nightmare.
Nothing could be gained by joining a side which, it seemed to
them,was closely identified with Republicanism. Yet Romanones,
regardless of the radical changes in Russia, had already decided
to depart from strict neutrality. The psychological moment he was
waiting for arrived on 6 April when a German submarine sank the
steamer San Fulgencio. The numbers of outrageous German attacks
on the Spanish merchant fleet had increased dramatically since
February. The glaring difference was that in this case, the San
Fulgencio was outside the forbidden waters and heading towards
Spain with a much needed cargo of British coal.
There is enough documentary evidence to show that the
events which took place during the two weeks following the San
Fulgencio disaster could have changed the history of contemporary
Spain. During that period the Prime Minister kept in close
contact with Western diplomats so as to negotiate terms for a
possible departure from neutrality. Simultaneously the debate
between the pro-German and the pro-Allied press reached its peak.
In the end, Romanones lost the battle. His position was opposed
by the other Monarchist leaders. Furthermore, the Allies,
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particularly Britain, turned out to be lukewarm towards the
Count's move. Unlike France and the United States, Britain
considered the price for the Spanish rupture with Germany to be
too high. Furthermore, there was hardly any reason to meet
Spain's demands if she was forced by German brutality to embrace
the Allied cause in any event.
The Prime Minister's correspondence with Leon y
Castillo reveals how the international question had reached a
crucial turning point in Spain. The latest German sinking, the
entry of the United States and some Latin American Republics into
the war, the internal situation in the peninsula were some of the
factors that led to the Count's final resolution to throw in his
lot with the Entente without wasting any more time. Yet he knew
he was playing a deadly game in which the strength of the forces
he was fighting was immense. On 14 April he wrote to LeOn y
Cast jib:
"The crucial moment has arrived, the sinking of the San
Fulgencio has been the final straw. The route I will take
is already determined in the direction that you know and is
a logical conclusion of the conversations of last
September.. . The note to Germany will be the first and
fundamental step.. .But I am not overconfident.. .opinion
does not follow me even within my own party. . .1 do not know
how I am going to play my cards yet. . . the struggle between
the Germanophiles and myself is to the death". (61)
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At the same time, intense diplomatic activity had been
taking place behind the scenes. This had been primarily directed
at procuring concessions from France. On 8 March the Permanent
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs disclosed to the
British War Cabinet information from Paris to the effect that
Spain was making approaches with a view to joining the
Allies. (62) In early April Mr. Vaughan, Secretary at the British
Embassy in Madrid, relayed that the French Ambassador, M.
Geof fray, had held a long conversation with Count Romanones and
discussed the position created by the entry of the United States
and some Latin American countries into the war. The Spanish Prime
Minister agreed that if Spain maintained her present position she
would certainly sink to the level of an insignificant power such
as the Netherlands. Romanones had said that the moment had come
when Spain could no longer remain neutral and that in the next
day or so he would make a public declaration of policy to the
effect that she must come into the war on the side of the Allies.
If his advice was disregarded Rornanones said he would resign. The
Count was still confident he had the full confidence of the
Monarch, but added that his position was very difficult owing to
the King's Austrian connections. They met again in the afternoon
and Romanones asked the French Ambassador if he could use his
influence with the pro-Allied press to persuade public opinion
towards his position. Regarding Tangier, Geof fray declared that
France had no authority to dispose of the city but agreed to use
her influence with the interested parties to secure it for Spain.
Vaughan gathered from the French diplomat that the French
military authorities were very keen on Spain taking a positive
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course of action. An important gain would be the use of Spanish
ports for Allied warships. Another consideration was that France
would be relieved of considerable anxiety with regard to German
intrigues in Morocco and thus might be able to release some of
her troops there. Finally, another important point was that the
French believed that if Spain broke off diplomatic relations with
Germany the effect on morale would be enormous and would cause
any South American states still wavering to do likewise. (63)
The United States, a newcomer to the subtleties of
European diplomacy, was the only power to adopt an uncompromising
position. Now that the Americans had decided to intervene in the
war they thought the other neutrals should make their position
clear, especially a country like Spain whose attitude could have
an important impact on Latin America. The American Ambassador,
Willard, thus attempted to force the issue. (64) Yet the United
States was an exception. The other Allied powers, led by Britain,
had concluded that it was inadvisable to bring direct pressure
on the Spanish government.
The British line was not entirely motivated by pure
altruism, but was the result of long and deep consideration of
the advantages and disadvantages of possible Spanish intervention
in the war. In January 1917, Jocelyn Grant, the Military Attache
in the British Embassy at Madrid, completed a long and thorough
investigation into the state of the Spanish army. He had
established contacts throughout 1916 with artillery officers and
members of the General Staff. He concluded that it was pitiful.
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Grant observed that transportation appeared to be lacking,
equipment was very poor, there was an acute shortage of rifles
and ammunition despite recent purchases in the United States, and
there were hardly any modern aeroplanes or heavy artillery. It
was therefore difficult to believe that the Spanish army would
ever be in a condition to threaten anybody except possibly the
Portuguese. (65)
Two months later in a joint note concerning Spain's
value as an ally, the General Staff and the Admiralty agreed with
Grant on the poor shape of the Spanish army which was compared
with that of Romania. Yet it was stressed that Spain enjoyed some
important advantages. She possessed some of the largest mineral
resources in Europe. Furthermore, Spanish intervention could
represent for the Entente an increase of half a million active
troops and four million in the reserve They had very little
combat experience and lacked competent senior officers.
Nevertheless, Spain was not in direct contact with enemy
territory; consequently there was no danger of her being overrun
and troops could be safely trained before engaging in combat. (66)
The British Foreign Office was more negative in its conclusions.
The entrance of Spain into the war on the side of the Allies was
regarded as a distinctly mixed blessing. They saw the
disadvantages of her cooperation as outweighing the advantages.
There were indeed some important ideological and economic
contributions that Spain could offer. The decision of such an
intensely Catholic country in the world would necessarily
influence the feelings of Catholics throughout Europe and
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America. Germany would lose her strong commercial position in
Spain which would mean important opportunities for British
enterprise. Of more direct assistance in the prosecution of the
war was the fact that the peninsula would no longer be used as
a possible base of supplies for the enemy and the interned German
ships in Spanish ports would be freed to carry Allied trade. Yet
the Foreign Office believed that the conditions which Spain was
likely to impose in return for her assistance meant the
disadvantages of her collaboration outweighed the advantages. The
Spanish demands amounted to her demands for Tangier, Gibraltar
and a free hand in Portugal. With regard to Tangier it was
claimed that Spain was quite incapable of governing or developing
the city efficiently. She was deemed unable to hold her own
territory there and her rule spelt corruption and incompetence.
Moreover, British diplomats feared that if France was to agree
to Tangier now being Spanish, there would be created a perpetual
future danger of France picking a quarrel with Spain in order to
seize Tangier and even Spanish Morocco. This would nullify all
the elaborate precautions taken in 1904 to exclude France from
the Northern coast of Morocco. As regards a possible exchange of
Gibraltar for Ceuta, the British Foreign Office felt that the
Spanish city would be worthless if certain surrounding hills
which were at present included in the international zone of
Tangier were not included in the deal. It would require the
assent of France for them to be included in a British Ceuta.
However, while the war in Europe lasted, there was a chance of
procuring French agreement without having to pay an exorbitant
price. Later on that would probably be impossible. An
163
interdepartmental committee, under the Chairmanship of Lord
Curzon, with naval, military and diplomatic representatives, had
been appointed in early April 1917 to report on the subject.
Until that committee reached a conclusion any discussion on
Gibraltar should be postponed. Finally, concerning Portugal, the
solution of linking that country to Spain by some sort of treaty
was not considered detrimental to British interests for
Portuguese misgovernment was a persistent source of anxiety.
Nevertheless, it was also noted that however exasperating the
Portuguese administration might be, there was no avoiding the
fact that Portugal was Britain's oldest ally and therefore it
would be a gross breach of faith to promise Spain a free hand in
that country. Nor could the Allies, who were fighting for the
rights of small nations, stand by and let conditions be imposed
on Portugal, without themselves being pilloried in the eyes of
the world. The Foreign Office was also disturbed that Spain might
use the opportunity to refer to the assurances given by the
former Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, to Alfonso XIII when
visiting England in July 1913 that Britain would not oppose
Spanish intervention in the neighbouring country. Such a
revelation at that stage of the war could be disastrous.After
considering all the pros and cons, the final conclusion reached
by the Foreign Office was that on balance the advantage lay in
Spain remaining neutral.(67)
The final instructions to Vaughan were that the War
Cabinet approved of Spain moving towards the Allied camp, but no
territorial promises should be made and in particular the subject
164
of Gibraltar should not be mentioned. They encouraged the British
Secretary to come up with any suggestions. 68) He wrote back
insisting that if the "Tangier bait" was judiciously handled it
might prove effective and if this was not sufficient an offer
could be made to extend Spanish Guinea northwards to include the
coast opposite Fernando P00 and to restore the Caroline Islands.
Vaughan stressed that the note which the Spanish government was
about to send to Germany would be crucial. lie described the
Spanish Prime Minister as a desperate and isolated politician who
admitted that the continuous sinking of Spanish vessels and the
prevention of external trade had put him in an impossible
position, leaving him with the only alternative of breaking off
diplomatic relations with Germany. Yet he found himself the
target of a vicious and unbearable Germanophile campaign and was
continually asking the French inbassador for help to win the
battle for public opinion as alone he could not trust the
attitude of the army or the evolution of domestic politics. (69)
The Count had reason to be worried. His foreign policy
had been receiving overwhelming support from unwanted quarters.
Apart from Republican leaders, the Socialist leader Pablo
Iglesias in a plea, as unexpected as it was passionate, had
demanded in an editorial in his newspaper that the duty of the
government was to break off diplomatic relations with
Germany. (70) This could only contribute to the general paranoia
among the ruling elites who felt that the Allies had played an
important role in the events in Russia. The Catholic El Debate
even noted that the current British Ambassador at Madrid had been
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in Portugal at the time of the revolution there which brought
about the downfall of the Braganza dynasty. (71) The Germanophile
press hammered on continually that there was an interventionist
plot led by those who were trafficking with the wealth of the
country against the will of the people who wanted neutrality and
peace above all. War would only mean famine, ruin and
dislocation. The pro-German newspapers even suggested that France
and Britain were to blame for the sinking of Spanish vessels.
German children were starving due to the Anglo-French blockade
and Germany had therefore been forced to respond in kind. Some
alleged that it had not been proved that the San Fulgencio had
been sunk by a German submarine and others that Germany was
entitled to sink it since it was transporting British coal. All
of them pledged to tight to the death the ulcontraband party" in
Spain which in order to satisfy its economic ambitions was
seeking to drag the country into the European nightmare. They
were largely successful in giving an impression of patriotism and
impartiality as they claimed that they stood for the best for the
country; namely, peace and neutrality in the European conflict.
In contrast, the belligerent editorials in the pro-Allied press
appeared to many to be part of a foreign sponsored campaign which
could well cost the lives of thousands of Spaniards.(72)
In addition to losing the war for public opinion,
Romanones' strategy suffered a serious set-back when nearly all
the main dynastic leaders spoke against the departure from strict
neutrality. In his own party, the other Liberal leader, the
Marquis of Alhucemas, and the Speaker of the lower chamber,
166
Miguel Villanueva, declared that the continuity of neutrality was
essential for the life of the country. The Conservative leaders
Dato and Maura also expressed similar ideas. The only exception
was JoaquIn Sanchez de Toca, a former Speaker of the Upper House
and several times Conservative Minister, who argued that it was
not Spain but Germany who had broken neutrality. The two final
shattering blows arrived firstly with the publication of a series
of editorials in the officers' newspaper La Correspondencia
Militar, which in a clear allusion to the United States, warned
against joining forces with those who in 1898 took advantage of
the weakness of Spain to steal its last colonies; and finally
when the Monarch himself in a speech to the troops in Leganés
(Madrid) confirmed that the intention of Spain was to remain
neutral. (73)
A depressed Romanones confessed on 18 April to the
Ambassador at Vienna: N Public opinion is every day more hostile
to any protest against Germany's behaviour. . . behaviour that it
even tries to justify. . . this feeling is shared by many members
of my party...". (74) In the Liberal leader's private papers there
is a draft version of the note which should have been delivered
to Germany. The Count wrote that in September 1916 he had briefed
the Monarch on his intentions to move towards the Allied camp.
Then there is a complete list of the most infamous outrages
committed by Germany, ranging from espionage to attacks on the
merchant fleet. Romanones concluded that Germany should be
notified without delay that the next sinking would mean the
rupture of diplomatic relations. German interests in Spain would
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then be taken over in order to compensate for the country's
losses. An active policy would be adopted against German agents
abusing Spanish hospitality and relations with the Allies should
be strengthened. (75) The Prime Minister's plan seems to have been
to send a forceful message to Germany demanding an explanation
for the sinking of Spanish ships. If as expected she refused to
modify her submarine blockade, he would resign and make his
policy a question of confidence and so his return to power would
mean an immediate rupture of relations. In fact, there was never
a note. On 19 April the King entrusted the Marquis of Alhucemas
with the formation of a new Liberal cabinet. The same day another
Spanish vessel, Tom, heading towards Spanish jurisdictional
waters, had been sunk. The Germanophile press had finally
collected the big prize, the head of the Prime Minister. To add
insult to injury, one of them pictured the Count in a cartoon
with his heart pierced by a sword named neutral press. (76)
Romanones' interventionist policy had brought about
his downfall. In April 1917 he met the opposition of the
Restoration's ruling elites. Court, upper classes, Church and
King had always been ideologically closer to the Central Powers
than to the Allies. The revolution in Russia confirmed their
belief that the country could not take the risk of intervening
in a major conflict. They concluded that with a restless working
class, a reformist Catalan bourgeoisie and an unhappy officer
class, it was madness even to consider entry into a war for
which, after all, Spain was neither militarily nor economically
prepared. Romanones, as the leading Turno politician committed
168
to more active intervention, was forced to resign. Henceforth
strict neutrality would be maintained to the end regardless of
the price in terms of lives and national honour.
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5.- The hot summer of 1917:
The year 1917 proved to be a watershed in Europe. The
Revolution in Russia in March and the entry of the United States
into the war one month later transformed a conflict between two
imperialist blocs into an all-out ideological clash. Such events
heralded the arrival of a new era: one of political renovation
and mass democracy. The American President, Woodrow Wilson, was
regarded by many across national boundaries as the best hope for
the foundation of a new democratic world order. The proclamation
of his fourteen points in January 1918 seemed to justify those
hopes. Freedom of navigation and trade, the abolition of secret
diplomacy, self-determination for national minorities and the
foundation of a League of Nations to guarantee peace were some
of the ideas put forward by the new American diplomacy. However,
running parallel to the political offensive initiated by Wilson
lay the reality of social distress and economic hardship which
could hardly be resolved by his altruistic principles.
The year 1917 was a pivotal year. Mounting domestic
tensions in Europe triggered a tide of violence which cut the
continent off for ever from the old world of pre-July 1914.
Mutinies among French troops after the failure of the bloody
Nivelle offensive, the increase of labour militancy in Britain,
anti-war demonstrations and creation of workers' councils in
Germany, food riots and the erection of barricades in Northern
Italy and the triumph of the Bolshevik bid for power in Russia
revealed to the different governing elites how their hegemony had
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been effectively eroded. Henceforth, they would have to face the
political awakening of the masses and their demands for social
and economic reform. Furthermore, the consolidation of bolshevism
in Russia and the appeal of Lenin's ideas among the dispossessed
and despairing masses triggered off a period of political
militancy and class struggle which surpassed in intensity that
initiated in 1789.
Spain did not escape that fate. The crisis which was
to rock the foundations of the Spanish regime represented the
regional version of the general crisis which was engulfing the
other European states. The Romanones cabinet was to a large
extent responsible for unleashing the chain of events which led
to the hot summer of 1917. Nevertheless, it only accelerated a
process which was inevitable. A backward and oligarchical system
which relied on patronage, political passivity and electoral
falsification had guaranteed for forty years the undisputed
supremacy of a group of professional politicians representing the
interests of the financial and landowning oligarchies. That
political order of notables could not adapt itself to a changing
world characterized by popular mobilization, economic
transformation and social expectations. In 1917 the industrial
bourgeoisie, army and labour movement rebelled against the status
quo. They had in common their rejection of the Canovite
settlement, yet they lacked co-ordination and common purpose in
terms of strategy and objectives. Thus they managed mortally to
wound the status quo but not destroy it. The ruling elites had
lost their hegemony in society but were still able to exploit the
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divisions between the opposing forces and find solutions to
guarantee their survival. However, this demanded a high price.
The Turno formula which had been the backbone of the Restoration
Monarchy had to be abandoned and the monopoly of political power
hitherto enjoyed by dynastic politicians was definitely lost.
They remained in government but only by relying more openly on
the military and widening the ruling oligarchy to incorporate the
industrial bourgeoisie. The constitutional regime survived the
onslaughts of 1917 but what emerged was a patched up and ailing
political system. The old political class had largely lost their
room for manoeuvre and were soon to discover to what extent they
had mortgaged their future to the goodwill of those with whom
they had made a pact.
5.1.- The disintegration of the Liberal party:
The dynastic parties of the Restoration period were
characterized by internal factionalism. Their artificial
foundations and lack of a coherent programme prevented the
development of proper party organization or discipline. Each
party was led by several notables who through kickbacks,
patronage, nepotism and administrative graft had managed to
muster a sizeable number of loyal deputies. The leader was
generally the one with the greatest following and influence. In
the event of an unresolved dispute, it was commonly accepted that
the politician appointed by the Monarch to form a government
would be the leader of the party. The Liberal party had always
been prone to rivalries and squabbles. Until his death in 1903
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it had been led by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta. A pragmatic man and
skilful orator, he had agreed in 1876 that his party would
alternate in power with the other dynastic group, the
Conservatives led by Antonio Cánovas. Under these two statesmen,
the so-called Turno PacItico was consolidated and enjoyed its
most successful period. Sagasta was Prime Minister five times.
A master in the art of electoral manipulation, under his
leadership corruption and amiguismo flourished. He avoided any
serious challenge to his position by permitting cronies to loot
the state. Not without reason was he nicknamed the "old
shepherd". Finding a successor to his post proved to be a
difficult matter. Several bigwigs representing different factions
claimed the inheritance and no-one seemed to have the upper hand
until Alfonso XIII threw his weight behind José Canalejas, the
young and promising star of the Liberal-Democratic faction in
1910. Canalejas' assassination two years later paved the way for
a new era of party in-fighting. The shrewd Count Romanones
emerged temporarily successful after the leader of Canalejas'
faction, Garcia Prieto, Marquis of Aihucemas, reluctantly
accepted the Count's leadership.
Manuel Garcia Prieto had been rewarded with the title
of Marquis of Alhucemas for his role as Foreign Minister in 1912
in the conclusion of the Treaty with France which divided Morocco
into two Protectorates. He was an amiable and kind man, whose
political methods seemed honourable by comparison with Romanones'
manoeuvres. As son-in-law of the historical Liberal leader,
M ntero RIos, and member of the board of several leading banks,
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he had risen rapidly to the top of the party. Yet he was a weak
politician, easily dominated by other party notables and not the
strong person to lead the country through a difficult period. His
weakness would prove fatal for the constitutional order in 1923.
On 19 April, 1917 the Marquis was entrusted by the
Monarch with the task of creating a new Liberal cabinet. Four of
Romanones' Ministers, including Santiago Alba who continued at
the head of the Treasury, remained in office. Aihucemas' plan was
to diffuse the tension that had characterized the last months of
the Count's time in office. Consequently he immediately published
a statement pledging to maintain the same strict neutrality as
was upheld by his predecessors in office while adhering
faithfully to all the Treaties to which Spain was a party. He
also undertook to return the country to normality by restoring
the constitutional guarantees which had been suspended by
Romanones in March as a result of the UGT-CNT manifesto and to
adopt urgent measures to deal with the Crisis de
Subsist enci as. (1) On 22 April constitutional guarantees were duly
restored, the Socialist Casa del Pueblo was opened and a few days
later the useless Junta de Subsistencias was abolished. It was
too little too late. The Marquis of Aihucemas failed miserably
to halt the irreversible crisis of the state. The new government
had hardly got onto its feet when a tide of unresolved
ideological and socio-economic problems swept it away. Aihucemas
would preside over the disintegration of his party and the
polarization of politics. His administration would last only
fifty three days.
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The international question became a thorn in the flesh
of the new government. Until early June 1917 the neutrality
debate remained a crucial issue. Romanones' pro-Allied position
had been the main cause of his downfall. HIS replacement by
Alhucemas had been greeted with enthusiasm or anger by the
pro-German and pro-Entente press respectively. The French media
described it as a victory for Prince Ratibor and his campaign. (2)
The Allied Chancelleries regarded the new administration as
pro-German. Several facts supported that impression: the
Alhucemas cabinet refused to ratify an agreement with Britain for
the export of coal; several interventionist meetings were banned;
submarine activities in Spanish waters increased; German
conditions for the return of Spanish ships blockaded in British
ports were accepted. Moreover, the diplomatic note sent to
Germany in protest at the sinking of the San Fulgencio and other
Spanish vessels was deemed extremely mild. According to Western
diplomats, the Spanish note seemed a dignified and firm response
as far as the last two paragraphs. The government expressed its
inescapable duty to protest against the overbearing attitude of
Germany and her methods of aggression against a weaker state. Yet
towards the end the note changed dramatically in tone. Instead
of the ultimatum that Romanones would have delivered, Aihucemas
stated his belief that Germany would welcome the neutrality of
Spain and would in future refrain from attacking any more Spanish
vessels. (3) Germany was not slow to respond: even as the note was
en route to Berlin, the Spanish steamer Triana was torpedoed near
the coast of Alicante. The impunity and the boldness of submarine
outrages peaked in early May when in a single day two French, one
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Greek and three Norwegian ships were sunk in Spanish territorial
waters in the Cantabrian sea. The French authorities warned the
Spanish government that unless decisive measures were rapidly
taken to safeguard naval traffic in its waters, France would take
over that responsibility. On May 25 it was announced that two
Spanish warships had been sent to the Cantabrian coast. (4)
It is hardly surprising that the Allies considered the
Aihucemas cabinet as a German success, especially when it was
closely compared with the direction followed by its predecessor.
It would be wrong however to describe it as a pro-German
government. Aihucemas was careful enough not to include Miguel
Villanueva and Niceto Alcalá Zamora in his administration.
Villanueva, Speaker of the lower chamber of parliament and former
Foreign Minister, and Alcalá Zamora, a former minister and editor
of the German-financed El DIa, constituted the two outstanding
characters in the Liberal party who held the most openly
Germanophile views. Indeed, only one Minister chosen by
Alhucemas, Julio Burrell, in charge of Education under Romanones
and now at the Interior Minitry under Alhucemas, came into that
category. It is perhaps more accurate to suggest that the
international issue was the excuse sought by different notables
to get rid of Romanones and his chicanery. Thus the position of
the new cabinet represented a return to a more balanced
neutrality that, taking into account the Gerrnanoph.ile campaign
against Romanones and his pro-Allied line, might easily be
regarded as a triumph for the German cause in Spain.
176
Yet Romanones was not a man to leave quietly. His
resignation message was as shocking as it was unexpected. At four
o'clock on the day of his fall, the Count handed a statement to
the press in which he explained the causes of his departure from
office:
"It is my absolute belief that the defence of Spanish lives
and interests cannot be fulfilled with efficiency within
the limitations of our present international policy. . . it
imposes upon me the duty as leader and patriot to write
this document and submit my unconditional resignation...
I have always believed that the only international policy
which could enhance the position of Spain in the world was
the one initiated in 1902.. . The outbreak of the war
interrupted that policy, but it cannot and must not be
changed.. . The evolution of events has confirmed my
belief.. . a few weeks ago in the Cortes when discussing the
German submarine campaign I declared that the life of our
country would not be interrupted, now I declare that it is
in serious danger of being interrupted...
another consideration. . . Spain aspires to the leadership
of the moral confederation of all the nations of our
blood. . . This cannot be accomplished in this decisive moment
if Spain and her sisters appear divorced...
I cannot honestly be in charge of the government of this
country without matching my convictions by my actions. . .1
loyally recognized that a great part of public opinion,
including members of my own party, do not share my ideas...
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It is therefore impossible for one who deeply feels
his position as a liberal and bears the
responsibilities of government in a democracy, to rule
against public opinion. I do nob share that opinion
but faced by its opposition I surrender. ..'I.(5)
Romanones' message was an exercise in subtlety. Despite
all his attempts to disguise it, he confirmed that
notwithstanding all his professions of neutrality he had never
believed in it. He revealed the factional dissent that had
existed in his own party. This was hardly a surprise. The fact
that four Ministers had remained in government confirmed the
impression that the cabinet had been split by the Count's
decision to send an ultimatum to Germany. Four had been loyal to
their Prime Minister and resigned with him, four had opposed him
and had stayed in office with Aihucemas. Yet to all those who
could read between the lines the note constituted clear evidence
that Rornanones had not resigned but had been dismissed by the
Crown. Luis Araquistáin correctly pointed out that no one who
knew the political mechanisms of the Restoration system could
believe that Romanones had resigned due to the hostility of
public opinion. There was no real democracy in Spain. Elections
did not return governments, rather governments made elections.
The Monarch was the pivot of the whole process as it was he who
appointed a Prime Minister who then enjoyed total autonomy to rig
the ballot. Government crises were not produced by movements of
opinion, rather they originated at the top and were resolved
inevitably with the active involvement of the Crown. It was,
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moreover, entirely normal for a Prime Minister to remain in
office without a clear majority in the Cortes and with hostile
factions in his own party as long as he possessed the confidence
of the King. Araquistáin concluded that public opinion did not
count or otherwise the unpopular Moroccan adventure would have
been ended a long time ago. Moreover, it was ridiculous to
describe the Gerrnanophile press and the Court clique as public
opinion. Consequently Romanones had been forced to stand down by
the only person with the power to make him, Alfonso XIII. (6) The
British Military Attache, Jocelyn Grant, shared that view. On 5
May, after meeting the King he wrote that he was convinced that
the Spanish Monarch, under the influence of an almost entirely
Austrophile Court and the information provided by Colonel Kalle,
the German Military Attache, had decided to withdraw his
confidence from Romanones when the latter declared in favour of
sending an ultimatum. (7)
The statement had a poisonous effect on an already
polarized society. The pro-Allied press fully endorsed Romanones'
position on foreign policy. Espafla and El Socialista denounced
the activities of German agents who had managed to bring down the
former Liberal Cabinet with the support of reactionary
politicians and the Monarch. They warned the King that, by
becoming the last bulwark against the country taking a pro-Allied
line, he was preventing the triumph of democracy in Spain and
risking his throne. (8) The Gerrrzanophile newspapers were furious.
The most important Catholic journal, El Debate, compared
Romanones' resignation message to leaving a bomb under the
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armchair of one's heir. It argued that the Count had no right to
publish a memorandum which might provoke diplomatic
complications, neither had he any right to compromise the Monarch
who had favoured him in the past with his confidence. He had
committed a political disloyalty in confessing that during his
premiership he was conspiring against that neutrality of which,
on coming to power, he had declared himself to be the staunchest
defender. The Austrian-financed La Nación called it a monument
of perfidy. The Carlist El Correo Espaflol described it as a
legacy of suicide. Even the neutralist newspaper of the
Conservative party, La Epoca, called it a crushing legacy for his
successor and an invitation to civil war.
In the spring of 1917 the debate around the
international question reached its peak momentarily overtaking
the Crisis de Subsistencias as the main issue on the agenda and
acquiring a frightening dimension. In this context, the manifesto
issued by the Reformist Party was very significant. This group
represented the moderate wing of Republicanism whose constituency
was the progressive middle class and the intelligentsia.
Reformism, under the leadership of the veteran Asturian
politician Melquiades Alvarez, had accepted the Monarchist regime
and in turn had expected to work from within so as to transform
it into a genuinely modern democracy. The outbreak of the
European war placed them in the pro-Allied camp but, unlike
Lerroux's Radicals, their arguments were always marked by extreme
caution. For the first time, in April 1917 the Reformist party
went out of its way to demand the rupture of diplomatic relations
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with Germany. In the Reformist manifesto Romanones' resignation
message was praised and called a clear vision of the future. It
also noted that at such a critical moment in which Spain was on
the verge of separation from her sister nations of the Latin
world and her economic life under attack, the maintenance of
neutrality meant the most shameful surrender of dignity and
honour. The Great War had become a struggle of ideas: liberty
defended by the Western Powers and autocracy by the Central
Powers. It would be preferable for Spain to be on the side of a
vanquished France and England than with a victorious Germany and
Austria. (9) The Gerrnanophile reply appeared in the right-wing ABC
two days later. The conservative newspaper said that millions of
Spaniards would a thousand times prefer a civil war rather than
passively and selfishly collaborate in the ruin of Spain. The
Maurista La Accio'n equated Lerrouxisino, Roinanonismo and
Reformism. They were all one and the same, part of a
foreign-orchestrated campaign whose objective was to drag Spain
into the conflict. It exhorted Spaniards to be prepared to
counteract this wicked manoeuvre. (10)
The debate around the neutrality issue also raged
inside the labour movement. The old Socialist leader Pablo
Iglesias made clear his views and those of his party in El
Socialista on 28 April: the question could no longer be
postponed, the moment had arrived to break off diplomatic
relations with Germany. Garcia Cortés, former editor of the paper
and member of the Junta de Subsistencias was still permitted to
voice the opinion of the minority of the PSOE which was opposed
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to workers taking sides in a capitalist war. Yet in the same
pages Luis Araquistáin responded that Socialism should be in the
vanguard of the struggle for democracy. Thus there could not be
peace without first crushing German militarism. (11)
At the same time, the CNT organ, Solidaridad Obrera,
was arguing that intervention would play into the hands of those
interests represented in Spain by ship-owners, profiteers and,
with a clear allusion to Lerroux, a few sham Republican
politicians. (12) The Anarcho-Syndicalists were extremely careful
not to write anything which might offend the Socialists and
damage their unity pact. So the Catalan and most important branch
of the CNT, the Con federación General del Trabajo (CRT), decided
to send an obscure militant, José Burrobio, to Madrid with the
task of informing the Socialists of the risks which they were
incurring for the labour alliance by pressing ahead with their
interventionist stance. His trip was a waste of time. When on 17
May he met the National Committee of the UGT he was told by Largo
Caballero that Socialists, regardless of the CNT's objections,
would continue to express their opinions. (13) The international
question therefore became a growing obstacle for the successful
continuity of the alliance between the two workers'
organizations. In the second half of May, they were adopting
opposing positions. On the one hand, the National Committee of
the CNT published an article in which, while stressing its belief
that labour unity should be preserved above anything else,
criticized the Socialists for abandoning internationalism. On the
other hand, the UGT-PSOE confirmed its commitment to the
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pro-Allied camp. The PSOE's Madrid branch rejected Garcia Cortés'
motion condemning capitalism rather than Germany as the cause of
the war and calling for an end to the alliance with the
Republicans. Instead they endorsed a proposal demanding rupture
with Germany and support for the existing commitments with the
Republicans. In a meeting of the UGT's National Committee, Pablo
Iglesias went even further. He suggested that the trade union
should follow the party's lead and stage a vote to debate the
neutrality issue. The veteran leader added that Socialists should
offer their total support to any administration prepared to break
off diplomatic relations with the Central Powers, although this
should not jeopardize their right to oppose the government over
domestic policy. It was finally agreed to summon an extraordinary
congress to discuss the international issue on 1 July. (14) In
fact, the evolution of events was to preclude that congress
taking place and was to shift the focus of attention away from
the international question to the domestic situation. The
Socialist leadership was determined to go ahead with its
pro-Allied campaign and seemed to value its alliance with the
Republican parties more than that with its Anarcho-Syndicalist
counterparts. Iglesias and the others had never had much
enthusiasm for joining forces with the CNT and had only agreed
to do so as a result of pressure from below and on the condition
that they played a leading role. Thus it did not appear to
greatly concern them that, if as a consequence of their
pro-Allied stance, the labour pact was being endangered. It would
have been thus in the hands of the CNT's National Committee to
take a final decision. In 1917 both the CRT and the CNT was still
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controlled by Syndicalists like Salvador SeguI whose main stress
was on the strengthening of the organization and on trade union
activity and were prepared to collaborate with the Socialists.
Yet their position was beginning to be undermined by a more
purist and combative anarchist sector that profoundly rejected
any links with the reformists of the tJGT. It is thus difficult
to conclude that, had the more pragmatic Syndicalist leaders been
prepared to follow the Socialist lead, if only for the sake of
workers' unity, they would have managed to overcome the
opposition of the more radical Anarchists.
In the spring of 1917 the divide between the two Spains
was at its widest. In the middle, a bewildered Aihucemas
continued to behave as if nothing was happening. In the space of
one month two mass gatherings took place in Madrid's bull-ring.
The first one on 29 April was addressed by Antonio Maura and
mainly rallied Gerrnanophile members of the Maurista movement and
people of conservative leanings. The response came on 27 May when
the most outstanding Republican and pro-Allied elements spoke to
their followers. Symbolically enough, the second gathering was
financed by Count Romanones.(15) Although representing opposite
ideologies, both groups could claim to possess a real mass
following either on the right or the left of the political
spectrum. Moreover, they had something in common: their hostility
towards and rejection of the existing status quo.
Maura's speech was once more misinterpreted by his
followers. Indeed it could be viewed as an endorsement of the
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official neutrality, but as had been the case with his two
previous speeches he refused to take an openly anti-Entente line
as many Mauristas would have liked. He declared that no
politician would dare to drag the country into the European war.
Overlooking the many German outrages against the Spanish merchant
fleet, he even claimed that Spain had received no offence from
Germany. Yet Maura insisted once more that Spain's cultural and
economic affinities inevitably linked her destiny with that of
the Western Powers and, referring to the contentious issues of
Gibraltar and Tangier, he suggested that Britain and France had
not behaved decently with Spain in the past and that now was the
ideal time to correct that and consolidate the friendship between
France, Britain and Spain. (16)
Maura's speech was badly received by the French press
who described it as a monument of spite and rancour and the
opinion of the leader of a party whose pro-German sympathies had
long been known. (17) Yet the veteran Conservative leader had
something different in mind. He believed that he had made not an
anti-Allied speech but a reminder of Spanish claims and a hint
to the Allies of the price they would have to pay if they
expected Spain to throw in her lot on their side. However, the
principal target of his message was neither the Allies nor his
own followers, but the Crown. Maura's address was a clear bid for
office after eight years of political ostracism. It was a
balancing act in which he tried to present himself in a moment
of extreme national polarization as the apostle of national
salvation. He was presenting himself as the best solution left
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in a monarchist camp plagued by petty squabbles and personal
rivalries. The gravity of the international conflict and the
bankruptcy of the two ruling dynastic parties were leaving the
nation defenceless.
Maura's scheme backfired. He hardly pleased anyone. The
Germanophile press underlined the commitment of the old statesman
to neutrality. Nevertheless, those who examined his words
carefully soon found flagrant contradictions within it. La Epoca
asked how it was possible to maintain neutrality and at the same
time move closer to the Western camp. La Correspondencia de
Espafla welcomed the pro-Allied words of the Caudillo of a mostly
Germanophile party but wondered why the Allies should give away
Gibraltar and Tangier for nothing. Espafla and El Liberal
coincided in calling the speech a TM decoy" in which Maura had
sought not to side with anybody but with all and had failed
because nobody was with him. (18)
One month later, all the heavy-weights of Republicanism
rallied their followers at the same bull-ring. The most popular
were the Radical and Reformist leaders Alejandro Lerroux and
Melquiades Alvarez, the famous philosopher and novelist Miguel
de Unamuno, the editor of the Republican El Pals Roberto
Castrovido and the Galician Republican journalist Alvaro de
Albornoz. The Socialists declined to take part but expressed
their support. It was a clearly emotive gathering with white
banners on which the names of all the Spanish vessels sunk by
Germany appeared painted in red. Above all it was a spectacle in
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which Republicanism and the Allied cause were inextricably
linked. All the orators declared that neutrality was not a valid
position due to German conduct. Those defending neutrality were
accused of opposing progress and attempting to keep the country
feeble, backward and decrepit. Only by joining forces with the
democracies could Spain become a democracy herself and take an
active part in the construction of a new world order. The key
moment of the event took place when Melquiades Alvarez virtually
gave the Monarchy a final ultimatum: either Alfonso XIII made
sure he did not obstruct a more pro-Allied line or the regime
would undergo the same fate as those in Greece and Russia. The
meeting was closed with the reading of three conclusions:
firstly, Spain could no longer remain isolated and indifferent
in the face of the international strife; secondly, for the sake
of her own interests, Spain's international policy must incline
to the side of the Allies; and thirdly, in view of the outrages
committed by Germany against her neutrality, Spain must break off
diplomatic relations with that country and accept the
consequences of a position which Spain was obliged to take in
order to defend her dignity. (19)
The pro-Allied gathering seemed to identify the cause
of the Allies with that of Republicans and Socialists in Spain.
Of course, the outstanding exception was Count Romanones whose
mouthpiece El Diario Universal called the event an example of
mobilization and citizenship. The occasion was not wasted by the
pro-German press which accused the Western Powers of encouraging
revolution. There were even hints that the British mbassador
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Hardinge's mission in Spain was to organize an insurrection
against the regime as his counterpart at Petrograd Buchanan had
done a few months earlier. (20) A Conservative and Monarchist like
Hardinge was appalled. Since the outbreak of the war he had been
embarrassed by the fact that the forces against the regime were
also the most supportive and friendly towards the Entente. After
the pro-Allied gathering he feared that Republicans were using
the debate on Spanish neutrality as a pretext for an attack on
the throne. In early June he wrote:
"It would be very unfortunate if the sympathies of our
friends on the extreme left should succeed in identifying
the Allied governments and their cause with the domestic
aims of Republicanism. . . We are in danger of losing the good
will of many influential classes and politicians now well
disposed to us if the Germans can succeed in persuading
them that our victory will imply the triumph here as in
Russia of those forces of Socialism and anarchy. . . to
counteract that effect I have published a letter in La
Epoca...".(21)
In that article, named "A Diplomatist friendly to the
Allies", Hardinge did his best to dispel any idea that the Allies
were behind subversion and insurrection in Spain. His message was
crystal clear. The British diplomat pointed out that of the
eleven countries fighting as Allies seven were monarchies. So it
was wrong to identify the Allied cause with that of
Republicanism. It was nonsense to present the British Monarch and
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his government as fanatical Republicans. Moreover, it would not
be to the Allies' advantage to promote a revolution in Spain
which might well end up in a civil war. The chief service that
Spain rendered to the Western Powers was the sale of her
products, especially minerals. A revolutionary strike and the
ensuing closing of the mines at Peflarroya or RIo Tinto would
therefore be the last thing that the Entente would wish to
happen. The conclusion was that they wanted an orderly and
prosperous Spain and not one torn apart by internal strife. (22)
One month later and in line with the intention of presenting a
moderate image in Spain the British suspended their financial aid
to the left-wing magazine Espafia. The magazine would be rescued
by the French who did not share the political scruples of their
allies.
The international problem probably gave Alhucemas more
than one sleepless night. The hostility between German and Allied
supporters was getting out of hand. After the Republican
gathering, the Prime Minister decided to ban any future public
demonstration in which the war was to be discussed. Yet the
German submarines continued their criminal activities. In late
May two more Spanish vessels, Patricio and Erega, were sunk near
Spanish waters. There were clashes outside the German consulate
in Saragossa. The fatal blow to the government, however, came
from a different quarter: the military barracks.
A few weeks before the fall of the Romanones
administration, the Minister of War, General Luque, had ordered
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the Captain General of Barcelona, General Echague, to take
measures to ensure the dissolution of the Juntas de Defensa.
Echague subsequently reported that he had successfully completed
his task. In fact, the officers' trade unions, although
officially dissolved, continued their activities clandestinely
and probably with the knowledge of a sympathetic Echague. The
Spanish ruling class in general and King Alfonso in particular
were terrified by the outcome of the Russian Revolution. The
state of shock in which the Monarch found himself in the spring
of 1917 was perfectly revealed in his conversations with foreign
diplomats. Over and over Alfonso warned the British and French
Ambassadors of the dangers looming in the future if the
revolution in Russia was not nipped in the bud. He was
particularly devastated by the fact that the Tsar had been
deserted by the nobility and the imperial army. (23) Observing the
increasing polarization and radicalization of the country, the
last thing that Alfonso could permit was the existence of
military trade unions whose leaders talked about ending royal
favouritism and cleansing the army. The image of the Russian
Soviets was also present in his mind. So in this state of
frenzied panic the King put pressure on his new Minister of War,
General Aguilera, to make sure that once and for all the Juntas
were disbanded. Romanones confirmed Alfonso's concern in his
memoirs: NHis Majesty had a real obsession with the Juntas and,
badly advised, believed that with energetic measures such as
arrests and court martials the problem could be solved. A docile
Aguilera, lacking political expertise, was prepared to carry out
his orders to the last detail. (24)
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They could hardly have suspected the degree of
organization and solidarity that the Juntas had attained.
Confronting them head on was to prove a mistake. Such would be
the impact of the officers' rebellion on a discontented and
troubled society, that the international issue which had
dominated the agenda for the last year, overshadowed by the
domestic situation, was now left aside and would not re-emerge
with intensity until the summer of 1918. The seeds of
polarization planted during the Romanones cabinet finally
germinated. The crisis of hegemony of a moribund and discredited
political system could no longer be concealed. The thoroughly
eroded Canovite edifice began to crumble.
On 25 May Colonel Benito Mé.rquez and the other leaders
of the Central Junta at Barcelona were summoned by General Alfau
and ordered to disband the movement in twenty-four hours. When
the following day they refused, an unhappy Alfau was left with
no alternative but to arrest them for insubordination.
Immediately a new Provisional Junta was set up in Barcelona and
officers in all the peninsular garrisons, in a symbolic act of
solidarity with the leading Junteros at Barcelona, presented
themselves to their Commanders for imprisonment. A hesitant Alfau
was recalled to Madrid and replaced as Captain General of
Catalonia by the more energetic General José Marina. Yet the fuse
of rebellion had been ignited and its fire could not be
extinguished. (25) The ruthless determination and immense strength
of the Junteros were formidable. The local Juntas at Valladolid
and Saragossa cabled Barcelona enquiring whether they should
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detain the train carrying Marina to his destination. Then when
Marina arrived in Barcelona on 30 May he found himself totally
isolated in a hostile atmosphere where no-one was prepared to
obey his orders. According to Márquez these were to shoot the
leaders of the rebellion. (26) An increasingly worried King had
simultaneously sent his friend and confidant the Commandant of
Artillery Foronda to Barcelona on a conciliatory mission to calm
the situation. The press in Madrid still had hardly any idea of
what was occurring in the Catalan capital.
The first day of June 1917 was later hailed by army
officers as a glorious page in modern history and regarded by
Márquez as the moment which could have seen the beginning of a
new Spain. (27) Events were to prove that it represented in the
long-term a decisive step towards the military dictatorship which
seized power in September 1923. On 1 June the Junteros delivered
a devastating blow to the authority of the government when they
circulated two manifestos. The first was a long and tedious
exposition of the aims of the Juntas. They argued in
regenerationist rhetoric that the military problem was just a
part of the greater problem affecting the nation. They accused
the ruling oligarchy of having only served the interests of the
big caciques and of leading Spain with its misgovernment to moral
decline and economic ruin. They insisted they were not moved by
political leanings or objectives. According to the Junteros, in
the army there were followers of nearly all the political parties
and equally there were neutralists and interventionists,
Francophiles and Germanophiles. Yet as a united body representing
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the corps, the Juntas de Defensa were above parties and divisions
and their aim was simply to work for the regeneration of the
country. (28) The desire for change, renovation and the cleansing
of politics was shared by most Spaniards. Thus the manifesto was
bound to be welcomed in all political quarters but those of the
governing elites. There was however a latent danger. The army was
indicating its rejection of politics and once more taking over
the role of defender of the 'sacred values' of the nation.
Nevertheless, it was still too early to tell in June 1917 which
side the army would take, that of reform arid democratization or
that of regeneration from above and authoritarianism.
More shocking was the second manifesto. In all but name
it was an ultimatum. The language was extremely respectful and
marked throughout by allusions to patriotism and to the
sacrifices undergone by the army. Yet, according to the
statement, discontent in the armed corps could no longer be
contained. That discontent sprang from three sources: firstly,
moral reasons due to internal dissatisfaction and poor military
organization; secondly, professional motives produced by the lack
of material and equipment; and thirdly, economic hardship caused
by the officers' low pay. Additionally, there existed much
favouritism and injustice in the selection and promotion
procedure. The officers had therefore been forced to create the
Juntas de Defensa to seek redress for all their grievances. The
response of the authorities had been to meet the fairness of
their demands with the arrest of their leaders. Before resorting
to other methods, the Juntas gave the government a twelve hour
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deadline to release those in prison who should then be allowed
to return to their posts, to give guarantees of no future
reprisals and to recognize the existence of the Juntas by the
approval of their statutes. They promised that they did not have
political objectives but there were blatant threats that unless
that their conditions were promptly met the cabinet would be
faced by a military insurrection. (29)
The ultimatum of 1 June amounted to a full-scale coup,
a pronuncialniento. In fact, the proof that this was no bluff is
that there was a coup organized for the following day. Thi e
Regional Juntas had received instructions from the Central Junta
at Barcelona to take over the Military Governorships and main
army headquarters of their regions on 2 June at 3 p.m. Command
would then be offered to the two most Senior Generals, and, if
no General accepted, two Senior Colonels would be left in
charge. (30) There was a rumour that Lerroux, always keen on
fishing in troubled waters, was organizing a force to storm the
prison and release the Junteros. Moreover, the Captain General
Marina had already realized that the Juntas, despite all their
regenerationist language, were not an anti-Monarchist movement,
let alone revolutionary, but just a product of military
discontent. If well treated and their demands satisfied, then
their potential threat could be diffused. So in an abrupt
about-face the Captain General of Catalonia became their
spokesman and had little difficulty in convincing a bewildered
Alhucemas to decree the release of the leading Junteros.
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The officers' victory had been complete. Confronted
with the threat of a pronunciatniento, the political elites backed
down. The authority of the Liberal cabinet and of the political
system had been shattered. There was a clumsy attempt to cover
up. The news spread by the government indicated total normality.
Nothing had taken place in Barcelona. It was all reduced to a
purely military matter which had been successfully resolved by
General Marina with the release of certain officers in that
garrison.(3l) It was all useless. La Correspondencia Milibar,
which had become the Juntas' mouthpiece, could not be silenced.
Whereas Alhucemas, the Minister of Interior, Julio Burrell, and
the Minister of War, General Aguilera, continued to insist that
nothing extraordinary was happening, editorials in that newspaper
boasted about the glorious feat achieved by the officers and
described it as a death warrant for the still existing NEmpire
of Oligarchy and Caciquismo H .(32) The dimension of the
government's shameful defeat was common knowledge on 5 June when
La Epoca published the ultimatum of 1 June.
The ball was rolling and could not be halted. The
Junteros leaders and their trade unions were functioning although
the cabinet still claimed that they did not exist. Their
confidence was such that Colonel Márquez after being released
from prison had declared that they did not owe their freedom to
anybody but themselves. (33) When they insisted on their statutes
being recognized and Marina agreed without consultation, it was
a staggering blow to the remaining prestige of the
administration. Aihucemas had been prepared to negotiate and
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gradually accept parts of the statutes, but not to be told by a
General in Barcelona what he should do. Marina's position was
backed by the King who had already realized that the Juntas far
from being a threat could be manipulated. In fact, this was not
the first time that Alfonso XIII had chosen to side with his
officers rather than with his politicians. The conflict of 1905,
which started with the vandalizing of two Catalanist newspapers
by members of the garrison at Barcelona and ended with the
passing of the infamous Law of Jurisdictions, had already fully
revealed the inclinations of the Monarch. He had been brought up
as a Soldier King and had always found himself more comfortable
among officers than among politicians. Events in Russia also
helped persuade him that the future of the Crown largely rested
on the support of the army. Thus on 9 June the Marquis of
Aihucemas presented the resignation of his government.
The crisis of the government represented the beginning
of the supremacy of the army in decision making. It was a
practice which would continue until its logical conclusion in
September 1923 with the proclamation of a military dictatorship.
In the short term it brought about the end of a united Liberal
party.
After twenty-four hours of consultation with all the
main dynastic personalities, the King decided to call back
Alhucemas and ask him to remain in power. Nevertheless, the
Marquis confirmed his resignation. Romanones described the
dilernrria that the government had to face. On the one hand, to
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fight against the army would be rash, but, alternatively, to
submit to its demands was an unequivocal sign of weakness and
subordination. (34) The Count neglected to add that he had sent
a letter to Aihucernas stating his resolution to veto any
government that acted to endanger the sovereignty of civil
authority. (35) It is difficult to predict what the Marquis would
have done, but probably he would have attempted to negotiate with
the officers. Before the fall of his government he had already
approved the first article of their statutes and had nothing to
lose by adopting a gradual approach. The damage to his authority
had already been done and the best solution would have been to
promise the officers recognition of their statutes but gain some
time in the bargaining process so as to save face. But Aihucemas
had been deprived of that option when it was rejected by Count
Romanones, still leader of the Liberal party.
Many Liberals were infuriated by Romanones' behaviour.
The very same Romanones, who was so meticulous about the
preservation of civil authority and thus provoked the fall of the
Alhucemas administration, did not waste time informing the new
Prime Minister, the Conservative Data, of his total support
although the latter had pledged to recognize the Juntas'
statutes. (36) To add insult to injury, La Correspondencia Militar
argued that the officers were not to blame for the fall of the
government. They had nothing in particular against the Alhucemas
cabinet and if anyone had caused its collapse it was Romanones,
who one day had become the staunchest defender of the
constitution to justify his lack of support for the cabinet, and
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the next had forgotten all about it and decided to back Dato. (37)
Romanones' move looked to many Liberals like a stab in
the back. They felt that an end should be put to the Count's
chicanery. The internal differences within the Liberal party were
no surprise to anyone. Romanones had always known that not being
in charge of a Liberal government was a risk to his leadership.
In 1913 he had plotted with the King and leading Conservative
figures to avoid being replaced by a rival Liberal
administration. The Counts' scheme in 1913 had brought about the
end of the leadership of Maura and the constitution of a cabinet
headed by Eduardo Dato which led to the split of the Conservative
party between Mauristas and Idóneos. In that way, the Turno could
be re-created with him still in control of his party and Dato
heading the other dynastic formation. Romanones' move in June
1917 seemed a replay of that carried out in 1913. Yet passions
were now running high. The Count had concealed from many of his
colleagues his pro-Allied policies and placed Spain on the brink
of entering the war. Since April 1917 he had been continually
creating trouble for the government. His resignation statement
and his contribution to the interventionist gathering had not
been forgotten. Therefore more than a few Liberals regarded
Rornanones' stance during the June crisis as almost an act of
treason.
Realizing that internal dissent kept growing and that
a challenge to his position was about to take place, the
resourceful Count tried a risky manoeuvre. He voluntarily
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resigned the leadership. Yet far from quitting the post, his real
object was to test whether he still retained the esteem and
allegiance of the majority of his party and to force those who
were working to undermine his authority to call off their
offensive or to show their hand before they were sufficiently
prepared. Thus on 23 June a beleaguered Romanones wrote to the
two Presidents of both chambers of Parliament and senior members
of the Liberal party, Miguel Villanueva and Alejandro Groizard,
announcing his decision to give up the leadership of the Liberal
party. He stressed in that letter that it had been an honour to
preside over the party, but the time for renovation had arrived.
In order to avoid splits or divisions he was willing to sacrifice
his post and recommended the establishment of a Directorate to
take over. (38)
The last thing that the Count had in mind was to pack
up and go. His move had been a pre-emptive strike before losing
more ground and support. Hidden within the unselfish and generous
language of his letter was the suggestion that he was prepared
to continue in his job if that was the decision of the party.
Thus he was not withdrawing his candidacy for the post of Liberal
leader, he was just forcing the hand of his rivals. And indeed,
they did not waste time. Villanueva and Groizard quickly rejected
the idea of a Directorate and began to lobby the party to accept
the Marquis of Aihucemas as leader. On 27 June Romanones'
counter-attack began in earnest when after receiving a letter
signed by Groizard and Villanueva asking for his endorsement of
Aihucemas' bid for leadership, he refused to give it. The excuse
199
put forward by the Count was extremely weak and could barely
disguise his real motive--his intention to cling to power at any
price. In fact, Romanones simply alleged that having observed
that many of his former friends and collaborators, without any
kind of explanation, had rushed to join the Alhucemas camp and
thus backed the initiative of Villanueva and Groizard, he could
not surrender his position until the "secret" discrepancies with
his former supporters had been resolved. (39)
With this attitude Romanones contributed decisively to
the split in the party. During the following days the spectacle
presented by the Liberal notables and fully covered by the
national press was pitiful. It was a grotesque show in which they
exchanged insults and blamed each other for the chaotic
situation. An undisputed mastery in the art of factionalism and
squabbling was displayed. Romanones was accused of being behind
contraband interests and on the pay-roll of foreign powers.
Aihucemas was described as a mediocrity in politics who was
trying to use his former leader as scapegoat for the blatant
mistakes of his administration. (40) The majority of the Liberal
barons such as Villanueva, Alcalá Zamora and Santiago Alba showed
remarkable zeal in the way in which they threw themselves into
the contest in favour of Alhucemas. It was evident to them, as
faction leaders, that the weak Marquis would be much easier to
manipulate than the maverick Count.
In early July two rival Liberal Assemblies took place.
One was organized by those still loyal to the leadership of
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Rornanones and rallied 63 Senators and 55 Deputies. The other
backed Aihucemas and was supported by 99 Senators and 135
Deputies. The Liberal party was dead.(4l) The crisis of that
political group revealed the bankruptcy and decline of the whole
system. The country was divided by the international question,
tormented by the Crisis de Subsistencias and faced with the
unresolved Catalan, labour and military issues. At the same time,
the artificiality and hollowness of the Turno was being revealed
in full by the disintegration of the Liberal party. Spain was
desperately searching for solutions and the party responded with
a sad display of mean rivalries and old-fashioned disputes.It was
a pathetic struggle between discredited politicians squabbling
over influence and patronage. Now both dynastic parties had
suffered internal schisms. The Turno PacIfico was doomed.
5.2.- The offensive against the regime:
The military rebellion of 1 June, 1917 had marked a
decisive moment in the history of the constitutional Monarchy.
This was the moment when all the forces of revolution and
reaction in the country exploded. (1) The latent tensions in
Restoration society could no longer be contained and came to the
surface. The First World War, by bringing about socio-economic
changes, political mobilization and ideological awareness, had
thus accelerated the process of disintegration of the outdated
Canovite settlement.
On the one hand, there were the Crown and the governing
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classes. The first fighting to preserve both authority and
throne; the second struggling to maintain the monopoly of power
for the agrarian-based ruling oligarchy. On the other hand, there
was the challenge put forward by all those left out of the Turno
PacIfico who sought to change the political alignment. The most
important were the following: the Mauristas as the main group on
the right of the political spectrum representing the Catholic and
Conservative middle classes; the Catalan Lliga Regionalisia or
the party of the industrial bourgeoisie; Republican groups who
stood for the commercial and progressive middle classes and the
petty bourgeoisie; and the working classes forming part of either
the Socialist IJGT-PSOE or the Anarcho-Syndicalist CNT. Finally,
there was the army organized into Juntas de Detensa. It was
evident to everybody that the stance taken by the military would
be crucial. A coalition of political forces counting on the
neutrality, if not the active support, of the officers would
certainly produce the collapse of the ruling order. Therefore the
energies of both government and opposition were from the very
beginning largely devoted to wooing the officers to their cause.
The success of the military disobedience effectively
initiated the subordination of the political life of the nation
to the requirements of the officers. In June 1917 Mrquez and his
colleagues became the de facto rulers of the country. (2) Yet
their anti-oligarchical language, lack of political connections
and insistence that they had no ambitions to govern raised the
hopes of all those opposed to the ruling system. They saw it as
the signal to step up their activities. Anarchy and indiscipline
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appeared to be the order of the day. The regime seemed on the
point of collapse. The number of strikes rose dramatically:
building workers in Bilbao and Saragossa, dockers and miners in
Cartagena, bakers in San Sebastian, metal workers in Vitoria. The
example of the officers was soon imitated by others. The
corporatist revolt spread to the bureaucracy and the civil
service where Juntas began to be set up overnight. They were
followed by similar organizations of Non-Commissioned officers
who announced their solidarity with their officers but stressed
their determination to seek redress for their economic grievances
and to obtain the fulfilment of past promises of promotion.
Otherwise they warned that discipline could be broken and chiefs
and officers would be held responsible. (3) The moderate liberal
newspaper El Heraldo de Madrid described the situation in
apocalyptical terms as final evidence that the revolution had
begun in Spain and warned that the governing elites were still
feigning blindness and deafness but the revolution was
unstoppable. (4)
Political groups did not waste the opportunity to cash
in on the existing political vacuum. Antonio Maura declared that
the importance of the manifesto issued by the Juntas on 1 June
was understood by eveiy citizen but the "blind and deaf men" who
ruled the country with the misguided support of the Monarch. (5)
Republicans and Socialists believed that the long-expected
revolution was around the corner. On 5 June they agreed to
establish a provisional government formed by Alejandro Lerroux
f or the Radicals, Melquiades Alvarez for the Reformists, Pablo
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Iglesias for the Socialist Party and Largo Caballero for the UGT.
The acting chairman was Melquiades Alvarez who had no difficulty
in convincing the others that their objective ought to be the
summoning of a Constituent Cortes which would accomplish a
peaceful political revolution. The masses should be restrained
and only called out to take part in a general strike should the
army try to forestall their plans through a coup. (6) Misgivings
about the possible attitude of the army were clearly expressed
by the Madrid branch of the PSOE. On 8 June it issued a note
blaming the regime for the present situation and warning the
government to defend the prerogatives of civil power. (7) Yet in
general, confidence was very high. Pablo Iglesias wrote that the
army had shown by its defiance that it no longer supported the
regime and therefore that the struggle of others was
justified. (8) On 9 June the Regionalist leader, Francesc Cambó
and his loyal lieutenant, the Deputy for Vich Raimón de Abadal,
wrote to the government demanding in the name of constitutional
legality the immediate opening of the Cortés. The same day Cainbó
declared in La Veu de Catalunya that the Juntas' demands were
just and that it was sad for a country when only those prepared
to use force could obtain redress for their grievances. The
Catalan leader also hinted that he was prepared to work within
the framework of a Federal Republic.
The confirmation of the crisis of authority of the
regime came with the resignation of Aihucemas on 9 June. Two days
later the King decided to entrust the Conservative leader,
Eduardo Dato, with the task of forming a new government. This
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solution was not well received. In theory, Alfonso XIII was just
abiding by the constitution. Yet these were not normal times.
Amidst social unrest, military revolt and the spread of
discontent to civilian sectors, the King had opted for the
continuity of the Turno fiction as if nothing was happening.
There was a clear desire everywhere for the political renovation
of the country and the Head of State responded by closing his
eyes to the blinding reality. Furthermore, the return of Dato
with nearly the same cabinet which had proved its incompetence
two years earlier was bound to be regarded as a blatant challenge
to public opinion.
The Monarch's decision was viewed by the left as an
indication that the regime was beyond any possibility of reform.
Revolution was not only desirable but inevitable. The left-wing
press agreed on their assessment of the crisis. El Liberal and
El Pals noted that the King could change politicians but not the
underlying reality. El Socialista pointed out that the crisis of
the regime was a fact. The moment had arrived for Republicans and
Socialists to bring down the Monarchy. In similar terms Espafia
suggested that the King had failed to respond to the warning
given to him in the bull-ring and therefore the throne was about
to follow the same fate as those in Greece and Russia. Even the
normally austere Melquiades Alvarez declared: Nwe are seeing the
success of a military rebellion. . . such a gap exists between
society and state that the healthy elements of society welcome
the stance of the Juntas. This is the natural product of the
existing oligarchical regime. . . If Spain wants to be saved, people
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and army have to co-operate in bringing about a revolution whose
main objective must be the creation of a new regime whose
legitimacy must rest on the will of the nation...". (9)
The journals of the Right, with the obvious exception
of La Epoca, mouthpiece of the Conservative party, were critical
of the Monarch's solution. Both El Imparcial and ABC expressed
their disbelief that at such a critical moment the King had not
sought to assemble new men and instead had relied on a figure of
the past like Dato. The Catholic El Debate spoke of royal
blindness and warned that Spain might well be watching the last
chapter of a decrepit political order. The Mauristas were
outraged. It was rumoured that Maura was so confident of his
return to power that he had already drawn up his list of
Ministers. On learning that Dato and not he had been appointed
Prime Minister, the veteran statesman declared that he wanted to
be freed from all future responsibilities. The country was asking
for a complete change and the Crown had unfortunately responded
by giving a vote of confidence to the "causes of the evil".(lO)
The royal decision was a bombshell in Maurista circles. During
the first days of June La Acción had been recommending prudence
and patience, but once Dato took over, the Maurista newspaper
agreed with the others that the King, by backing the farce of the
Turno, had taken a step which amounted to suicide. Demonstrations
of Mauristas took place outside of the Palace. The Monarch was
insulted at the Maurista circle in Madrid where one of the most
exasperated militants, Francisco Salcedo Bermejillo, destroyed
a portrait of the King. The anti-monarchist reaction among
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Mauristas was such that in an editorial El Socialista wondered
whether Maura and his followers were prepared now to abandon the
Monarchy. (11)
The moment of political vacuum and social mobilization
seemed to pave the way to a successful conclusion of the existing
political status quo. Francesc Cambó and his colleagues at the
Lliga Regionalista emerged amidst the reigning chaos as the
leading force to bring about that goal and co-ordinate the
disparate interests of the pro-renovation forces so as to create
a political alternative to the Turno. The party of the Catalan
industrial bourgeoisie was anything but revolutionary. The
objective was to channel and direct the overwhelming discontent
to form a powerful coalition with which to wrest political power
from the ruling agrarian and financial oligarchy. It did not
necessarily seek the destruction of the Monarchy, but rather a
substantial realignment of politics. In fact, Cambó orchestrated
an offensive whose ultimate end was to carry out a political
revolution in order to pre-empt a deeper social revolt. He
regarded the blind maintenance of the discredited Canovite
political framework as the gravest danger for a peaceful
transition to a modern democratic order. The Catalan leader would
even claim that to become a revolutionary was the most
conservative thing to do. In fact, his plans were not that
different from Maura's idea of a Revolution from aboveH or
Melquiades Alvarez's calls for the democratization of the
regime. (12)
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The Catalanist offensive which rapidly won the support
of Republicans and Socialists began with the publication on 14
June in Barcelona of a manifesto to the country signed by all the
Lliga's Deputies and Senators. In that document they argued that
Spain was not ruled by real political parties. Elections were a
fiction. The results were made in Madrid by those appointed by
the Monarch. The Regionalists added that the situation had
changed. Hitherto political crises had always been resolved at
the Royal Palace but the impact of the army's indiscipline had
put an end to the continuity of that sham. The government, faced
with an ultimatum, had backed down and conceded defeat. In any
democratic country a pronunciamiento of that kind would have been
received with revulsion and hostility. In Spain, on the contrary,
the Juntas had found sympathy since their inception. This was
because they represented sincerity in the midst of so many
fictions and deceits. After this general analysis, the
Catalanists concluded that the nation was going through a key
moment in history. The solution to the crisis had to be based on
total constitutional reform following federalist lines. They
called on public opinion to abandon passivity so that real
political parties with mass support could satisfy the demands of
the electorate.
Cambó then undertook an intensive campaign of
mobilization travelling to the capital and meeting the leaders
of nearly all the political groups. When the Minister of Interior
refused to open the Cortes, his lieutenant Abadal called for a
gathering of all the Catalan Senators and Deputies at the City
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Hall in Barcelona on 5 July to discuss what urgent measures
should be adopted to solve the chaotic situation of the country.
Republicans and Socialists threw their support behind the Lliga's
move. They had confirmed on 16 June their determination to
collaborate in the overthrowing of the ruling order.
Notwithstanding all their revolutionary language, they were
reformists who abhorred violent solutions and lacked any real
plan to put in practice. Thus Cambó's initiative was accepted
enthusiastically as it presented them with the possibility of
continuing their activity against the regime in co-operation with
others, without the need to resort to more forceful methods.
The meeting of 5 July represented an outstanding
victory for the Lliga, now the undisputed group in charge of the
pro-renovation forces. The outcome both showed the supremacy of
the Catalanists and constituted an open challenge to the
authority of the government. The success was total as fifty-nine
out of sixty parliamentarians attended the gathering, although
thirteen Monarchists soon withdrew. Three motions were presented.
One proposed by the Monarchists was abandoned. Another put
forward by Francesc Macis, the colourful retired Colonel of the
army close to separatist positions, was also dropped. The third,
subscribed by Regionalists, Liberals, Republicans and Reforrnists
was voted by unanimity. In fact, it was merely an endorsement of
the tactful approach devised by the Lliga. The motion underlined
the desire felt in Catalonia for Home Rule which could be
extended to other regions and concluded by demanding the
immediate opening of parliament in the form of a Constituent
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Assembly which would deal with the organization of the state arid
with military and socio-economic questions. In the event of
another refusal from the government, all Spanish parliamentarians
were summ ned to attend an Assembly in Barcel na on 19 July. (13)
The Lliga had achieved what it desired. The federalist principle
had been accepted and the form of the regime was left for a
Constituent Assembly to decide. Cambó wrote in his memoirs: "The
others were a bunch of fools, lacking organization or ideas. From
the first moment, I had them eating out of the palm of my
hand". ( 14) Yet to be certain of victory, Cambó knew he needed the
participation of Mauristas and Juntas. Without them, his
initiative could easily be interpreted as revolutionary or
separatist.
Despite all their efforts, Carnbó and his partners
failed to win the backing of the Juntas. The insurrection of the
officers had stirred all those seeking to challenge the political
status quo. They were obviously taken in by the regenerationist
language with which the Junteros adorned their declarations.
Events were to show that appreciation was mistaken. The Juntas'
movement was above all an outburst in defence of the corporative
interests of the army. Economic and structural demands had
priority, the rest was merely rhetoric. The army certainly did
not feel any particular affection for the governing elites. On
the contrary, they believed they had been let down by the ruling
politicians. Suffering from low pay and an unfair system of
promotion, they saw themselves as the upoor relation" of the
Power Bloc. Thus they sought to improve their situation.
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Nevertheless, they were never a movement directed against the
Monarchy. Theirs had been a revolution without
revolutionaries. (15) The Spanish army had always interpreted its
mission in society as the last bulwark in defence of the sacred
values of the nation. Values which were constantly threatened by
those endeavouring to break up the country or to disrupt public
order. Hence Catalanists and Leftists had been the army's
historical enemies. It was therefore unthinkable that, even
despite all their organized protest, officers would be prepared
to join forces with them to overthrow the regime. Only a blunt
and clumsy response by the government would force them to adopt
that position. An editorial on 9 June in El Ejército Espafiol was
eloquent on the point. It warned both Republicans and Socialists
not to use flattery in an attempt to win over the army for their
political aims. The spread of the corporatist movement to the
Non-Commissioned officers and fear that ordinary soldiers could
get involved as well confirmed the anti-revolutionary stance of
the officers. Pamphlets such as those entitled Soldados and
signed by the Catalan Republican Marcelino Domingo calling on the
troops to follow the example of their officers and set up their
own Juntas only served to enforce the anti-Republicanism of the
army. (16)
There was however in the summer of 1917 a strong
possibility that bourgeoisie, proletariat and army might join
forces. This possibility was to a large extent dependent upon the
response of Antonio Maura. He could have become the link between
the deputies and the armed services. As a deeply conservative and
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catholic politician and staunch critic of the political system,
Maura could have been the guarantee that the Assembly movement
was neither threatening the unity of the country nor endangering
law and order. In fact, Maura and the Maurista movement saw
themselves in the summer of 1917 in the privileged position of
determining the destiny of the country. Their political group
could have tipped the balance towards one side or another.Yet
even when many Mauristas were eager to join others in the task
of overthrowing Dato and the despised Turno, the opposition of
their leader was to be total. Gabriel Maura wrote that if at this
crucial moment his father had adopted a different line, a
considerable part of the Right would have been prepared to
abandon the Monarchy. Indeed, it does not seem an exaggeration
to contend that the degree of rejection of the ruling order had
reached such levels in 1917 that even the traditionally
Monarchist Catholic middle classes would have been prepared to
support any moderate solution to get rid of the artificial
Canovite formula. (17) Maura's agreement was sought both by the
Juntas and the Assembly but his response to all the approaches
was characterized not only by absolute refusal but even by
contempt. In fact, notwithstanding all his passionate attacks on
the turno, the old Conservative leader was a devout Monarchist
who rejected any position which might endanger the Throne. He
regarded himself as a visionary, a type of national saviour and
not as a revolutionary leader who might assist others to put in
practice any illegal manoeuvre. In 1917 he presented himself as
a Monarchist bulwark against the threats of military rebellion
and civil revolution. He kept waiting for a signal that never
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came from the King. His passivity not only benefited the
government but also contributed to destroy Maurisrno as a
renovating force. (18)
The Juntas did not welcome the Dato administration. It
represented the continuity of that oligarchy which they had so
criticised. Lacking political contacts and certain of their
strength they looked for someone to represent their interests in
the political arena. In their eyes nobody could fill that role
better than Antonio Maura, a decent right-wing politician with
charisma and real mass following who since 1913 had become one
of the leading voices calling for the dignification of political
methods and the end of oligarchical rule. As early as 6 June
1917, two Captains of Los Cazadores de Estella wrote to Maura
suggesting that he was the man that the nation needed at that
critical moment. They offered him their total support and
maintained that the garrison in Barcelona was not breaking
discipline, but acting with real patriotism seeking to save
Spain. (19) Thereafter Gustavo Peyrá, the Catalan Maurista well
known for his hatred of the Lliga, became the mediator between
the Juntas de Defensa and Maura. Peyrá, a leading exponent of
right-wing Maurismo, kept his chief informed about the officers'
resolutions and tried continually to persuade him to seize power
with their aid. On 20 June Peyrá informed him that he had
established contact with Márquez and another leading Juntero who
had expressed their discontent with Dato and guaranteed the unity
and determination of the officers to back a new administration
headed by Maura. Two days later Gabriel Maura communicated to his
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father, then resting in the suirner resort of Solozarno, that he
had met Peyr who had confirmed that the Juntas were almost
exercising a dictatorship in the country and were pressing the
Crown for a Maura solution. If 'The Chief' had finally taken a
decision he should inform him as soon as possible by sending him
a note or a letter to the Hotel Roma in Madrid under the
code-name of Pepe. (20)
Maura was a liberal above all. He believed in the
constitutional order and the supremacy of civil government. The
last thing he had in mind was to become the representative of a
military lobby. Thus he wrote to Peyrá making crystal-clear his
opposition to any initiative unless this was offered to him
through the legally established channels. He added that his own
philosophy barred him from adopting their proposed strategy to
gain power. Maura was still hoping for a last minute call from
the Palace but he was not prepared to apply pressure himself or
let others do so. (21) Peyrá kept insisting that the Juntas,
although disillusioned by Maura's attitude, still appreciated his
patriotic stand and believed he was the right politician to lead
the destinies of the country. He tried to convince Maura by
suggesting that, in the hands of the Turno politicians, the
country was on the verge of disaster. Peyrá argued that the
officers were neither rebels nor anti-monarchists, they just
loathed Dato and the oligarchy as much as the Mauristas did. They
did not want to get involved in politics but as good patriots
they wanted Spain to be ruled by a honest politician like Maura.
Peyr also warned that if a military dictatorship had not been
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established yet it was only due to the lack of a General with
enough prestige to take over. (22) All was in vain. Maura informed
his son Gabriel that he refused to have any contact or even
discussion with the Junteros. He described the Juntas as 'a
monstrous freak of ancient depravity'. ("engendro monstruoso de
afleja depravación") and mentioned that he had declined to receive
a messenger from the Central Junta at Barcelona who had been left
waiting under heavy rain. (23)
At the same time, there was immense pressure from other
leading Mauristas to convince their leader to throw in his lot
with the Assembly. His refusal would be decisive in paralysing
many of his followers who regarded Carnbó's initiative as the
practical example of the very same revolution from above preached
by Maura.
Maura's sons, Miguel and Gabriel, kept their father
well informed of the events in the country. They drew a picture
of unrest, chaos and disintegration. Spain was being torn apart
and her future was in the hands of a clumsy Dato. Miguel, in
particular, insisted that his father should join others like
Carnbá who were working for solutions to end the intolerable
situation. (24) With the organization of the Assembly in July,
Maura was besieged by an impressive number of requests for advice
as well as arguments in favour of Cambó's alternative as the only
valid and peaceful solution for the renovation of politics. On
4 July the Maurista Centre at ChamberI in Madrid wrote to their
leader. They believed that power could no longer remain in such
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incompetent hands as Dato's. They wanted to know Maura's
position. They also indicated that it Maurisrno found itself
without guidance at such a crucial stage, the energy and strength
of the movement would inevitably fade away. Alfonso Nadal, an
influential Catalanist, wrote twice on behalf of Cambó to Maura
advocating the attendance of Mauristas at the gathering of
Deputies at Barcelona. On 6 July, Nadal sent a copy of previous
correspondence between himself and Cambó in which the latter
argued that Catalan public opinion was united behind the Assembly
as it represented the most significant attempt to modernize
political life. On 11 July he referred to a past meeting with the
leading Maurista Angel Ossorio in which both had fully agreed
that for important reasons the Mauri.stas should take part in the
Assembly. For instance, there was the danger that revolutionary
elements could take advantage of the current military
indiscipline or that Republicans could give the Assembly a more
Leftist character. Thus the Mauristas agreed with Carnbó that all
the 'healthy' members of the Right should be present to balance
that threat. Ossorio himself wrote to Maura confessing that he
was filled with pessimism and arguing that the Mauristas should
collaborate with the Catalan leader in providing an appropriate
leadership for the Assembly. On 10 and 11 July Cambó sent Gabriel
Maura a copy of the conclusions reached on 5 July and invited him
to be in Barcelona with the other Deputies. Cambó begged him to
re-consider the significance of the moment and stressed that the
presence of Mauristas would prove that his initiative was neither
exclusive nor seditious.(25)
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Maura's response was similar to that given to the
Juntas. He refused to associate either himself or any of his
followers with any subversive scheme. On 6 July he told his son
Gabriel that he was neither prepared to join an initiative which
was not openly sanctioned by the Crown nor to cooperate with
those political forces that in 1909 had subscribed to the Naura
no! campaign. He described the Assembly as a "depressing symptom,
a Zoco Profesional (' Professional Flea rnarkeet') which now tries
to constitute itself into a Cortes and from which only hypocrisy
and shame can be expected". ( 26) Thus the veteran leader showed
his commitment to old-fashioned legalism. He believed that the
best policy to adopt was one of caution and prudence.
Consequently his plan was to remain seated on the fence waiting
for the final disintegration of the Turno in expectation that the
King, faced with a revolutionary avalanche, would then have to
resort to his services. In the meantime he endeavoured to cool
the ardent impetuosity of his followers. Ironically Maura did not
realize that by this attitude he was undermining the strength of
his movement while doing a great service to the existing
governing elites.
Maura's advice was therefore for calm and passivity.
On 7 July in his reply to the Ivfaurista Centre at ChamberI he
suggested that the current events were merely proof of what he
had been preaching for years. He claimed that nothing had
occurred that would make him change his mind about abandoning his
passivity. A few days later he wrote to Ossorio recognizing that
public opinion had sufficient motives to want to put an end to
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the disastrous status quo. However, he was not going to support
any subversive strategy and would not advise anyone to do so. The
same argument was repeated continually to all those seeking his
advice. Maura continued to point out that he was not surprised
that those who wanted to change the ruling system and found the
legal paths closed might turn to alternative routes. But his
position was clear. His record and political philosophy vetoed
his attendance at the gathering of Deputies at Barcelona.
Simultaneously Gabriel Maura informed Carnbó's lieutenant Abadal
that in spite of the fact that they held many common views he had
to decline the invitation to take part in the Assembly as he
could not join something deemed illegal by the government.(27)
Maura's opposition to the Assembly helped to isolate
this initiative from the Juntas and clearly played into the hands
of those seeking the maintenance of the status quo. On 10 July
Peyrá confirmed that where Cambó, Lerroux and Marcelino Domingo
were, the officers would not be. (28) Five days later, a satisfied
La Epoca published a statement in which the Junteros confirmed
their refusal to intervene in politics and their determination
to obey the orders of the government. Yet Dato could not ignore
that he was walking a tight-rope.
On taking office, the Conservative administration had
to contemplate the prospect of the existing order falling apart.
It was not clear whether Dato was the right man for the job of
saving the regime from collapse. Unlike Maura, known for his
forceful style and personal charisma, Dato was regarded as a grey
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and dull politician, a compromiser and a Court lackey and
therefore not the ideal person to take tough decisions at a
difficult moment. Yet he was to prove more resourceful than
others gave him credit for. He tried to maintain his usual
easy-going image and allowed his Minister of Interior and
right-hand man, José Sanchez Guerra, to personify the ugly face
of the government. The Dato-Sánchez Guerra partnership could not
ignore the threat posed by a possible collaboration of
bourgeoisie, proletariat and army. The government's main
objective would therefore be to prevent at any price the sealing
of that alliance. The strategy was very simple. All sorts of
methods and measures, no matter how despicable they might be,
would be undertaken in order to set the different groups against
each other. On the one hand, a variety of concessions would be
granted to appease the Juntas and win them over as the main
bulwark of the established order. On the other, any behaviour,
from coercion to deceit, was to be admissible as long as it led
to the isolation and discredit of the parliamentarian forces. (29)
After the requisite promises to maintain strict
neutrality and devote special attention to national defence and
economic matters, Dato's first real acts in power sought to
please the Juntas. Thus he rapidly approved their statutes and
thereafter carried through some reprisals demanded by the
officers. Among others, two former Ministers of War and Generals
close to the Monarch's entourage such as His Majesty's Master of
Horse, the Marquis of Viana, were sent to the reserve. However
the Juntas continued with their anti-oligarchical language. On
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25 June they issued a manifesto in which the ruling oligarchy was
blamed for all the evils of the country. The military re-affirmed
their apolitical character but they also confirmed their
determination to regenerate the nation. (30) The following day El
Liberal published an interview with General Alfau, the former
Captain General of Catalonia, which constituted a serious blow
to the prestige of the Crown. Alfau revealed that the order given
to him to dissolve the Juntas had been signed by the Minister of
War General Aguilera without the previous approval or knowledge
of the cabinet. Hence he was hinting that the decision had been
taken as a result of pressure brought to bear on Aguilera by the
King. Alfau declared that he was entirely in favour of the Juntas
as they were working with the objective of destroying the centres
of corruption and would not stop until the health of the nation
had been restored.
The Prime Minister did not delay his response. That
same day he ordered the suspension of constitutional guarantees
and introduced tight censorship banning the publication of news
regarding fundamental issues such as Juntas, movements of troops,
strikes, exports, neutrality or international events. The country
was thus not to be informed of anything which might be
embarrassing for the government. On 2 July a Royal Decree
increased the defence budget to provide salary increases of 25
cents daily for the troops in the peninsula and 15 cents for
those in Africa. The King's Military Household was re-organized
with the introduction of a limit of four years tenure for any
officer and the dismissal of some of its members.(31) The
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government was going out of its way to win the favour of the
Junteros. The extremes to which Dato was prepared to go reached
scandalous levels. It was made public on 10 July that, behind the
back of his Minister of War, General Fernando Primo de Rivera,
the Prime Minister had sent a letter via the Civil Governor of
Barcelona, Leopoldo Matos, to the Central Junta. Dato enquired
about their demands and promised to meet them through Royal
Decrees, asked for the names of the Generals who should go to the
reserve and, if they were not happy with Primo de Rivera whether
they would be willing to accept a civilian as Minister of War.
The officers replied that they had already made clear many times
what objectives they had and which Generals should be sent to the
reserve. They also stated that they did not mind who was Minister
of War as long as that person fulfilled his duty. As soon as news
of the manoeuvre became public a wave of contempt and derision
ensued. Dato denied everything but it was confirmed by the
Juntas. General Primo de Rivera wrote to the Prime Minister
expressing his discomfort and his readiness to resign. A
scapegoat had to be found and Governor Matos accepted the role.
He travelled to Madrid and explained to the Minister that it had
all been his own initiative. Primo de Rivera did not resign and
the affair was rapidly covered up. (32) Dato tried to put a brave
face on what was a staggering surrender of the prerogatives of
a civil government and a shameful exercise in flattery and
appeasement of the army. He was aware that an impressive grouping
of political forces were mounting an offensive to overthrow the
political system. If he were to succeed in crushing that
challenge he needed to be able to rely on the repressive forces
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of the state. He was prepared to pay the price even if this meant
damaging the prestige of the government. His scheme paid off. The
officers turned down by Maura, who obviously did not share Dato's
disregard for civil authority, pledged on 15 July to back the
administration.
The introduction of censorship and the suspension of
constitutional guarantees initiated the government's move to face
any revolutionary threat. The government justified those measures
arguing that they were necessary steps to prevent agitators from
attacking the fundamental pillars of the state and portraying
Spain abroad as a country disrupted by chaos and anarchy. (33) The
Minister of Interior issued instructions to the Civil Governors
prompting them to be aware of any subversive movement. Lists
should be drawn up of the leading suspicious characters in every
province so that Governors could act with energy and arrest them
when the moment to strike arrived. (34) It became evident, after
the meeting of Catalan parliamentarians on 5 July, that the main
danger came from that quarter. Two days later a delegation from
Barcelona formed by the Republican Giner de los RIos, the Carlist
Marquis of Minarao and the Regionalist Abadal travelled to Madrid
and presented the conclusions of that meeting. Dato responded the
following morning accusing the Catalan representatives of
organizing a seditious movement. He declared that only the
government with the backing of the Crown was entitled to summon,
suspend or dissolve the Cortes. He concluded his statement by
appealing to the wisdom and patriotism of the parliamentarians
to renounce their plans failing which the government was prepared
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to act with composure but with resolution. (35)
Dato's approach was typical of his style of compromise.
He tried to be firm and conciliatory at the same time. His
accusation that the parliamentarians demands were illegal and
seditious was certainly accurate. However he had treated in a
very different way the also illegal, and probably more violent,
revolt of the officers. Dato's stance seemed a confirmation of
Cambó's words that in Spain only those who were backed by force
could find redress for their grievances.
Government and parliamentarians were engaged in a test
of wills with neither side prepared to back down. On 12 July the
latter published an article protesting at the response of the
government to their demands. They pointed out that it was
ironical that those who were appealing to public opinion and
constitutional formalities were at the same time imposing
unprecedented censorship to prevent opinion from being freely
expressed. By such behaviour the government had made a fiction
of the constitution and the Cortes. Dato again answered in his
traditional style. He suggested that the parliamentarians were
abandoning the courtesy and moderation that should regulate the
relations between men of honour and stressed the government's
determination not to allow gatherings which could disrupt public
order. Once more he appealed to their patriotism and advised them
to call off the Assembly. (36)
The general atmosphere between the meeting of 5 July
223
and the gathering of Deputies in Barcelona two weeks later was
frantic. Different witnesses noted that no other event in living
history had raised such high hopes and expectations. El Heraldo
de Madrid confessed that despite its traditional opposition to
the Catalanist moves, this time they had devised an initiative
which should be followed by the rest of Spain. (37) Francesc Cambó
was the soul of the entire enterprise. In a moment marked by
meetings, visits, speeches and trips he seemed to be in charge
of everything. (38) On 10 July he wrote to Colonel Márquez, the
Chairman of the Central Junta at Barcelona, in an attempt to
dispel the ghost of separatism. He emphatically denied that
Catalonia was seeking independence. That would be a terrible
mistake which would only lead to the region becoming a French
department. In fact, the Catalan leader claimed that Catalonia,
the only region in the country to get rid of the electoral sham
orchestrated by the ruling oligarchy, had the mission to lead
Spain in this critical moment. Thus they shared the same
objective pursued by the army, namely the construction of a
greater Spain. (39) His appeal went unheard. Márquez later
recognized that the officers had made a mistake by not throwing
their support behind the Assembly. Traditional prejudices from
an institution dominated by Andalusian and Castillian officers
made them believe it was an anti-monarchist and separatist
initiative. (40)
Carnbó was more successful in winning over the
proletariat. The Socialists were delighted and Pablo Iglesias was
offered a post in the future provisional government which would
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be formed to organize free general elections for a Constituent
Cortes. The National Committee of the party voted favourably. (41)
However, the reception was much colder in Anarcho-Syndicalist
quarters. The CNT rightly considered Cambó's initiative to be a
manoeuvre to stave off a revolution from below, on 17 July, they
reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the others. Yet the
programme published in Solidari dad Obrera which included demands
such as the abolition of diplomacy and customs barriers and power
for the Trade Unions to veto any law passed by parliament,
revealed how far they were ideologically from the ideas of the
other political forces. (42)
The government was not prepared to let Canibó and his
partners proceed with their scheme unhindered. The governmental
reaction fluctuated between panic and defiance. Defiance would
become more dominant when it was confirmed that neither the
Mauristas nor the army were to join the opposition. Any method
was permissible to discredit the Assembly. A campaign of
misinformation, harassment and threats was carried out without
interruption. Censorship was rigorously applied. Catalanist and
Republican newspapers such as El Progreso, La Veu de Catalunya,
La Lucha and La Publicidad were banned. Republicans and
Regionalists in turn resorted to changing the names of the
journals and the town of publication, issuing clandestine
editions and distributing leaflets and pamphlets in the streets.
Incendiary pamphlets, purporting to emanate from the reformists,
were falsified by the government and handed out by agents
provocateurs in order to frighten the Catalan middle classes. By
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contrast Republican and Regionalist pamphlets stressed the
seriousness of the movement and insisted on people behaving with
calm, discipline and composure so as to persuade the bourgeoisie
that the movement was responsible. Cambó even argued that the
authorities should fulfil their duty to crush a movement which
was seditious. However, history would not forgive them if they
were instead putting down an initiative which was backed by
public opinion and sought the regeneration of Spain. (43)
The government managed to erect a cordon sanitaire
between Catalonia and the rest of the peninsula. The Catalan
initiative was isolated and portrayed as a separatist plot. Cambó
was described as its architect and traditional enemies of the
Monarchy like Lerroux and Iglesias as his accomplices. Sometimes
the opposite view was promulgated. The revolutionaries had gained
the upper hand and the Catalanists were collaborating in exchange
for the independence of their region. Other practices employed
by the government were the bribery of Deputies, the threat to
suspend the Cortes on 17 July and thereby remove the political
immunity of its members, the close surveillance of leading
Republican and Catalanist politicians and the reinforcement of
the local garrisons with fresh troops. On the eve of the crucial
date the national press was forced to report that the Assembly
was a farce. Everything was under control and the situation was
limited to a mere police matter.(44) The cabinet was divided
between those who, like Sanchez Guerra, advocated the use of
tough measures and others, such as the Minister of Justice, the
Catholic and moderate Andalusian Manuel Burgos y Mazo, who
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believed that the best tactic was to let it pass off as of little
consequence. It was ruinoured that Dato had threatened to send all
the Deputies to Fernando P00 and told General Marina that no
bullet should be spared when the order to fire was given. (45)
In the meantime the Monarch had not remained silent.
The Russian and Greek examples and the revolutionary atmosphere
would not allow him to be at ease. After his U-turn during the
Juntas affair, he began to speak in public about the patriotism
of the officers. They were soon received and flattered by the
King. (46) The most senior officer, General Weyler, was sent on
a tour around the peninsula to inform the Junteros of the
readiness of Alfonso XIII to support them and meet all their
demands. (47) The King often sent his aides-de camp to the Gran
Pefla of Madrid, the officers' social club in the capital, to
ascertain the moods and impressions of the army. On 28 June he
asked them not to take steps against the new Minister of War,
Fernando Primo de Rivera, who had not been particularly welcomed
by them and due to his old age was dubbed "the mummy ". (48)
Ensuring the loyalty of the army was essential for the security
of the Throne yet the danger was not entirely deflected as long
as the political offensive remained in earnest. The King was
aware of the crisis of legitimacy of the ruling political system.
Thus he intended to find solutions behind the back of his own
government. In public he continued to back Dato but the
Sovereign's confidence in his ministers had a limit, and this was
the salvation of the dynasty. If necessary they could be
sacrificed should the survival of the Monarchy require it. Thus
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Alfonso's plan was to approach the moderate elements in the
opposition and offer concessions in order to detach them from
their more revolutionary partners.
On 28 June the King met Azcárate, the aged Republican
President of the Institute of Social Reforms who with Melquiades
Alvarez led the Reformist party. He tried to win his agreement
to making the Reformists desist from their revolutionary
intentions. Alfonso XIII even suggested he was willing to pass
by Royal Decree some of the fundamental demands of the trade
unions. But Azcárate was of little help. He did not have enough
influence or power to change the line adopted by his party. The
Reformists were now bound with the other Republican groups. "It
was too late for that and for everything". The King was
devastated. Talking to his friend, the engineer Domingo de
Orueta, he claimed that he had seriously thought about abdicating
the Throne but the Royal family, in particular the Queen Mother,
had compelled him to renounce the idea which was firmly rooted
in his mind. (49)
The King's second choice was to approach the Catalan
Regionalists. There he proved to be more successful. what emerged
from the secret conversations between Monarch and Catalanists has
to be regarded as crucial if the events of 1917 are examined
carefully. In fact, the King shared some common concerns with
Cambó. Both were deeply worried that the situation could get out
of control and were therefore anxious to have room to manoeuvre.
On 12 July Alfonso XIII met Alfonso Nadal, one of Carnbó's trusted
228
lieutenants. The Monarch disclosed that he was sure that the
Mauristas would not attend the gathering at Barcelona. He also
revealed that he was prepared to grant the Catalanists some
concessions including two or three portfolios in a new coalition
government if the latter gave up the idea of convoking the
Assembly. The King confessed that he was not pleased with the way
in which Dato was conducting affairs. He complained he was not
being fully briefed about what was going on. He described the
political situation as a fetid pond and recognized that should
the Assembly take place it would probably be better if the Right
was well represented, otherwise the Left could control the
agenda. (50) A few days later, probably at the request of the
King, a meeting was arranged between several officers, Cambó and
two priests. Mrquez later wrote how he met Canthó for lunch at
the Convento Pornpeya in Barcelona. They were accompanied by two
other officers, the Captains Herrero and Villar, and two priests,
Fathers Planas and Ruperto, who represented the Monarch. Father
Ruperto is described by Márquez as a mysterious character who
lived in luxury in a room with two telephones. Ruperto announced
that all sorts of concessions could be made as long as the
Assembly never took place. Cambó responded that a cancellation
was not feasible at this late stage. Then Ruperto arrived at a
plan that could please everyone. The Assembly would be held not
at the Town Hall but at a secret location. There the Deputies
should be able to pass their resolutions while the Civil Governor
was trying to find them. By using censorship the government could
later claim that the meeting had never taken place while the
parliamentarians could argue the opposite.(51) It is extremely
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suspicious that the actual course of the Assembly seemed to
follow that scheme. It appeared to bear out the allegations of
the Socialist Andrés Saborit that every single detail of that
meeting had been worked out in advance by Cambó and the
Monarch. (52) The government was apparently at no time aware of
what was being plotted behind its back. The Conservative cabinet
would never have agreed to resign and give way to a Coalition
government in which the Catalanists were well represented.
On the morning of 19 July Barcelona was a city occupied
by a hostile army. There were 30,000 soldiers patrolling the
streets and four warships in the harbour. Catalanist and
Republican manifestos had been published calling for restraint
and warning the people not to follow any provocative slogans
which would be spread by agent provocateurs. Shops were to remain
closed between 3 and 6 p.m.(53) The whole affair started in a
ludicrous and absurd manner and was to end in the same way.. Yet
it is impossible to deny the far-reaching consequences and
transcendence of the event. Indeed some of the vicissitudes were
worthy of a thriller. It began with several taxi chases during
which the Deputies were tailed by the police. Once the followers
had been lost they secretly met to discuss the agenda of the day
at the home of Bertrand i Musitu, one of the Lliga's leading
politicians. Then the parliamentarians convened for lunch at the
Casino del Parque whose restaurant had been hired under the
pretext of being tor a wedding party and from there they walked
to the Palacio del Gobernador del Parque de la Ciudadela. There
was a total of fifty-five Deputies and thirteen Senators,
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forty-six of them from Catalonia. The Assembly was presided over
by the Radical Giner de los RIos and the Regionalist Abadal. The
ceremony was symbolically initiated by shouts of Viva Catalunya!
from the Spanish Deputies to which their Catalan counterparts
responded with Viva Espafla!. A proposition previously discussed
and accepted by all the groups was passed. That motion described
the government as an affront to parliament, a provocation to
Spain and Catalonia and an obstacle to the renovation of the
country. It noted that unless the crisis initiated with the
military revolt of 1 June led to a thorough reform of the
political life of the country that initiative would become a mere
display of indiscipline. It concluded by demanding the summoning
of a Constituent Cortes after General Elections organized by a
national government representing the will of the nation. Three
sub-committees were created: one to study constitutional reform
and municipal autonomy, the second to deal with the issues of
national defence, education and administration of justice and the
last to examine socio-economic problems. At that moment, the
Assembly was broken up by the appearance of the police commanded
by Governor Matos. When the president of the Assembly Abadal
answered that he would not order the dissolution of the gathering
and would yield only to force, Matos symbolically arrested them
by placing his hand on the shoulder of every parliamentarian.
They were released from custody outside the building. (54)
The whole affair appeared to have closely followed the
script worked out by Father Ruperto, the enigmatic priest who,
according to Márquez, spoke on behalf of the King. To confirm
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that view, a few hours later, a buoyant Sanchez Guerra informed
the journalists in Madrid that the Assembly did not have time to
pass any resolution. The timely intervention of the Governor had
prevented the adoption and transmission of any resolutions and
had broken up the gathering before it had time to transact any
business.(55) A cheerful and confident Dato told the British
Ambassador that the Catalan movement had been suppressed and in
a fashion which would render it ridiculous. The Prime Minister
added that no arrest was intended as it might arouse public
sympathy for the Assembly or make the parliamentarians heroes.
The aim of the government had been achieved and that was to
prevent the reformers from meeting in order that they would
become objects not so much of sympathy as of ridicule. According
to the Conservative leader: "The bubble of the Barcelona
revolution had been pricked as soon as its leaders saw the
government was in earnest. . .now the plan is to dissolve the
present Cortes in August and organize elections in September to
give a good working majority to my party". (56)He was soon to
regret his words.
Gustavo Peyrá was one of the few who believed that the
government had gained the upper hand. He wrote to his chief Maura
suggesting that if anybody could claim victory this was the
government. Peyrá observed that the Assembly had been a charade.
Governor Matos had been aware of the conclusions of the Assembly
hours before the parliamentarians gathered. The Catalan Maurista
also pointed out that the officers were tired of all the recent
events: first, the disclosure of Matos' deal with the Juntas and
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the ensuing denial of the government and then the uhide and seek"
game of the Assembly. (57) The Maurista newspaper La Accio'n,
probably using Peyrá's account, declared that what others had
regarded as an historical day had actually been an "hysterical
day". That journal begged that no more ridiculous actions like
those should ever take place. Everything had developed according
to a script with Regionalists and Republicans eager to see the
event cancelled and Dato now able to claim that he was a national
hero. La Acción warned that while the Deputies were easily
overcome by a simple touch on the shoulder, something else was
going to be needed to overcome the nation. (58)
The government was soon to lose the battle for public
opinion. If its objective had been to discredit the Assembly and
disrupt its activities, it actually achieved the opposite effect.
The prestige of the cabinet sank even lower and the position of
the parliamentarians gained widespread support. It is possible,
as the Socialist Saborit claims, that Cambó had arranged the
affair with the Monarch through Father Ruperto so that events did
not get out of control.(59) That plan would not necessarily
conflict with the objectives of the Lliga. The Regionalists
wanted a Constituent Assembly to change the political structure
of the country peacefully, not a storming of the Bastille. (60)
Yet the transcendence and importance of the Assembly cannot be
denied. It constituted the most important attempt in the history
of the Restoration Monarchy to carry out a political
modernization and genuine democratization of the system. A
variety of forces embracing the industrial bourgeoisie, the
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commercial and professional middle classes, the petty bourgeoisie
and the urban proletariat momentarily came together to try to p t
an end to the monopoly of power enjoyed by the financial and
landowning oligarchy. (61) It was designed to reflect the new
socio-economic reality brought about by the Great War. Such an
initiative was welcomed due to the general conviction that the
movement was a protest against the oligarchy and nepotism which
had long held sway in high places. It was an overt proof that the
old system compounded of private dishonesty and public
make-believe was intolerable.
Until early August Cambó's initiative was gaining daily
in strength while the government's strategy backfired. Dato and
Sanchez Guerra overplayed their hand. They kept denying that the
parliamentarians had time to pass any resolutions but the press
was preparing to praise the Assembly as the beginning of the
awakening of Spain. As soon as the Deputies returned to their
places of origin and despite the tight censorship the truth began
to come out. For instance, the maverick Deputy for Almadén which
had attended the Assembly, Cánovas Cervantes, was also editor of
the newspaper La Tribuna. In a front page article on 21 July that
journal accused the government of lying. All the national press,
with the exception of La Epoca and ABC, described the version put
forward by the government as final proof of the bankruptcy,
falseness, chicanery and lack of morality of a group of
professional politicians who had to resort to deceit and
misinformation to hide the real facts. Even La Acción changed its
line dramatically and in tune with the other newspapers called
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Sanchez Guerra a liar. The Maurista newspaper argued that the
government was desperately trying to cling to power by using and
abusing the censorship. Enough was enough. How low was "Dato el
equilibrado" prepared to sink?. Spain had had enough of
deceits. (62) On 26 July virtually all the national press decided
to boycott the official news and signed a document calling for
the end of the arbitrary censorship and the abuse of governmental
prerogatives. A few days later, a no longer cheerful Sanchez
Guerra met a delegation of the press and announced that he was
prepared to lift censorship. Yet the administration could not
take the risk of allowing total and unrestricted freedom of
expression. Thus in what can be regarded as an exercise in
cynicism and effrontery, the Minister of Interior added: "Now you
gentlemen will be your own censors while I limit myself to the
role of supervising your judgement". Unsurprisingly, the
experiment did not work and strict censorship was re-imposed in
early August.(63)
Simultaneously, the parliamentarians had continued
their campaign. On 21 July the Regionalists published a statement
in which they confirmed that the Assembly did take place despite
all the government's provocations and called on other Spanish
Deputies to join an initiative which was designed to build a new
Spain. This was followed by a meeting of all the political groups
on 27 July. They declared themselves pleased with the welcome
that the Assembly had in the country. Deputies distributed
themselves between the three sub-corninittees--Socio-economic,
constitutional and administrative--appointed by the Assembly and
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announced their determination to report with their conclusions
at a new meeting to be held in Oviedo on 16 August.(64)
More threatening for the survival of the government was
the impact that the Assembly had on Mauristas and Juntas. Many
leading Mauristas considered that the parliamentarians' programme
coincided with their own ideas and, believing they should take
part in the next meeting at Oviedo, increased their pressure on
Maura.
As early as 21 July Cesar Silió, a veteran Catalan
Maurista, provided 'The Chief' with information that contradicted
that offered by Peyrá. He alleged that the version of the
Assembly given by the government was "fantastic". Important
conclusions had been passed and practically all Catalonia
supported the initiative.(65) A few days later Gabriel Maura
concurred with that view. He added that even the officers were
for a Constituent Cortes and a national government. In fact, the
only factor that damaged the image of the Assembly was the people
who had taken part. (66) More resolute were the positions adopted
by Maura's other son Miguel and by Angel Ossorio. Miguel stated
his conviction that the Assembly had been a total success and a
defeat for the government. He agreed with Cambó that the country
was in favour of this kind of peaceful revolution which was
indeed necessary to avoid a social insurrection. Miguel bitterly
commented:
"It is difficult and even dangerous not to attend a second
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meeting of the Assembly. It is going to appear as if,
having attacked the Turno for years, we Mauristas are going
to make possible its survival with our abstention". (67)
On 7 August, Ossorio expressed a similar view. He wrote
to Maura arguing that the latter's abstentionism had given a
major boost to the Turno. Ossorio insisted that their presence
was needed as their collaboration in the sub-committees would
represent the end of the system. He also pointed out:
"This is the moment to choose between on the one hand, the
Assembly and those fighting against the existing state of
affairs and on the other, the Turno, the King and the
oligarchies. It is besides incongruous that after preaching
the urgency of change, we are fearful at the moment of
truth. . . The assembly is thus the best means to end the
status quo. There are only two other solutions: a Maura
administration or a revolution. The first is not
forthcoming and the second is becoming each day more
desirable. ( 68)
Maura was still reluctant to act. He continued
preaching calm and caution. He recognized that the
Parliamentarians had passed conclusions which were also pursued
by the Mauristas, but he was utterly opposed to political schemes
which counted on the active support of anti-monarchist elements
and could thus endanger the survival of the Crown. He still
scornfully described the Assembly as the 'Parlamento Codorni?i'.
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It is not clear whether Maura meant that the Assembly was a
parallel parliament when he gave it the name of the famous
sparkling wine produced in Barcelona or if he was being more
subtle and implied that the Assembly was all "bubbles TM . (68) After
the events of 19 July it was doubtful whether Maura's
old-fashioned legalism could contain for long the calls for
action from some of his more restless supporters. The situation
had reached such a climax that it was difficult to believe that
the Catholic middle classes would continue to reject an
initiative which in the safe hands of the Catalan industrial
bourgeoisie could free Spain from the despised and obsolete grip
of the landowning oligarchy. In reply to Ossorio an increasingly
lonely Maura stated that he would never lose his faith in
Monarchy and legality. It was therefore impossible for him to
collaborate in a movement which could lead to the ousting of the
Monarch and which besides included many political groups which
had been fighting him for years under the slogan Maura No!. Yet
he realized that his position was becoming isolated even within
his own movement. So he was prepared to give up and go. "If the
Assembly succeeds and then puts in practice some of the ideas
preached by me for so many years I have no objection to getting
out of the way".(69)
The government was receiving equally menacing signals
from the officers' quarters. There were rumours that Colonel
Márquez was losing prestige among his fellow Junteros. The others
had not been pleased at the knowledge that he had secret meetings
with Cambó. (70) Nevertheless, the anti-oligarchical rhetoric of
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the Juntas continued in earnest. In early August Father Planas
was sent to Santander where the Monarch was on holiday to deliver
a document in which the officers stated their position. Once more
they underlined that they were behind Crown and country. They
described the Turno parties as a collection of ambitious,
incompetent intriguers who had brought the country to the verge
of irreversible ruin. They encouraged the King to head the
revolution desired by Spain. New men and new methods based on
morality, equity and justice were needed. They supported the idea
of a Constituent Cortes after General Elections had been held
under a National Government. They even had a list of possible men
who could form part of that cabinet. The post of Prime Minister
was left blank for the King to select. General Marvá, a military
man who according to Saborit was liked by the working classes,
was suggested as possible Minister of Interior as guarantee of
the purity of the suffrage; a relatively obscure General Borbón
was to be in charge of War; Cambó was to take over Public Works;
Santiago Alba, the Foreign Office; Urzaiz, the ostracized former
Chancellor under the Romanones cabinet, was to return to his
former post; Melquiades Alvarez, was to go to Justice, and two
intellectuals, Ramón y Cajal and Torres Quevedo, were to be in
charge of Education and Labour respectively. (71)
The Data cabinet panicked. The Juntas, despite all
their assurances of backing the ruling order, had not abandoned
their attacks on the Turno. Furthermore, they were becoming more
and more involved in politics. The programme endorsed by them was
extremely close to that of the Assembly. Both rejected the
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existing status quo and demanded the formation of a National
Government to sunimon a Constituent Cortes. The list of possible
ministers included only two dynastic politicians. One of them,
Santiago Alba, was on the Left of the Turno, and the other,
Urzaiz, had been fired from his post and since become one of the
most outstanding critics. Francesc Carnbó and Melquiades Alvarez,
two leading personalities behind the Assembly initiative, were
incorporated in the government. The others were either officers
or else had no political connections. On 1 August the Socialist
journal published sensational news. Rornanones' approach to the
PSOE to form a coalition government had been rebuffed. The
desperation of the dynastic leaders had reached a fantastic
level.
The government was running out of time and could not
permit the celebration of a second meeting of the
parliamentarians to be held in Oviedo on 16 August. The prospect
of a political gathering in which the bourgeoisie, middle classes
and proletariat could offer a political settlement which
basically satisfied the desires of Mauristas and officers was
becoming a nightmare for Dato and his friends. The last ditch
stand would be a frontal attack on the weakest point of the
opposition: the proletariat. The plan was to provoke the labour
movement into an ill-timed strike so as to scare the bourgeoisie
and use the army to quell the disturbances. Dato took a risky
gamble which was to pay off.
A transport strike which began on 19 July in Valencia
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coinciding with the Assembly in Barcelona would provide the
administration with the lever by which the formidable alliance
organized against it could be cracked. The struggle between
railworkers and La CornpanIa del Norte had been going on since the
summer of 1916. In July of that year the former had obtained an
important victory, but all tended to indicate that the company
was biding its time and waiting for the right moment to extract
its revenge. In April 1917 El Socialista began to accuse the
company of not fulfilling the terms of the settlement and seeking
to provoke a new clash with its employees.(72) The transport
strike of July 1917 gave the company its opportunity to settle
old scores. In the polarized atmosphere of the summer of 1917 the
dispute soon degenerated into a violent confrontation. It
achieved paralysis of 70% of transport in Valencia and dockers
joined in solidarity. On 21 July the Captain General of that
region, General Tovar, declared a state of war. A few days later
the situation had been normalized but at the price of two dead,
several wounded and many arrests. General Tovar, eager to soothe
matters, released all the prisoners and was willing to negotiate
with the workers but La Compafila del Norte refused to re-hire
thirty-six workers of the local branch of the Railways Union
sacked during the conflict. The government had found an issue
which could lead to its showdown with the labour movement. Soon
the conflict began to get out of control. On 2 August the
National Railway Trade Union announced that unless those
employees laid off were allowed to return to their posts all its
militants would strike on 10 August. The company did not back
down and the trade union had to fulfil its threat. Furthermore,
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this was the poorly timed moment in which the leaders of the UGT
and the PSOE decided to link that offensive to the General Strike
which had been planned since March.
The General Strike initiated on 13 August was a
disaster right from the start. Stoppage was only a success in the
industrial centres of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Vizcaya,
Guipuzcoa and Asturias. It had little if any impact on Central,
Western and Southern Spain with the exception of mining concerns
like RIo Pinto, Cartagena, Peñarroya and Linares-La Carolina.
Some railway companies even continued operating although the
strike was a total success in all the mining areas. The
revolution thus remained a purely urban revolt confined to Madrid
and a few industrial spots in the North and the East and was
barely noticed in the rest of the country. There was hardly any
response in the two Castilles and Extremadura, with the exception
of Santander, and in Andalusia it was basically limited to parts
of Granada, Huelva, C6rdoba and Seville. It failed to establish
any links with the countryside and therefore facilitated the task
of the authorities in putting it down. The Catholic trade unions
published a manifesto condemning the movement and expressing
their readiness to continue working and young monarchists
volunteered their assistance to run the public services and act
as honourary policemen. The final key factor that sealed the fate
of the General Strike was the fact that the army remained united
and loyal to the government and did not leave any crack through
which the revolutionaries could bring the regime down. So the
events of March in Petrograd would not be repeated in Spain. A
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State of War was quickly declared and the army placed in charge
of public order.
The workers managed during the first day to bring
Madrid to a standstill. Bricklayers, bakers and printers
responded as one man to the calls to strike. Pickets made sure
that shops and bars remained closed. The following days pitched
battles ensued when strikers tried to halt transport in the
capital. Trams were heavily protected by troops. Workers threw
stones and were answered by volleys of bullets. Machine guns were
used against demonstrators in the proletarian districts of Cuatro
Caminos, Ventas and La Guindalera. It was a merciless slaughter
which left dozens of casualties even though women and children
often acted as shields for the workers. On the night of 14 August
the police arrested the Strike Committee in the house of a
Socialist couple, José Ortega and Juana Sanabria, at 12, Calle
del Desengaflo (Disillusion street) A second Strike Committee was
also captured the following day. The movement was deprived of
leadership. By 16 August the revolt was over in the capital.
Nevertheless, a mutiny in the Cárcel Modelo, the local prison,
was crushed bloodily. Suspiciously enough, seven leading
militants were among the casualties. Witnesses would say later
that they had been executed once the mutiny had been put down.
Catalonia with thirty-seven dead registered the highest number
of casualties. There the strike had been effectively organized
by the Anarcho-Syndicalists. Stoppage was total in the capital
and in neighbouring towns. Unlike the UGT, the CNT militants were
willing to use more violent tactics. Thus barricades were soon
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put up and snipers harassed the activities of the soldiers. The
latter responded with appalling ferocity. Some quarters of
Barcelona were only taken after days of street fighting and
shootings and in places like Sabadell the workers' headquarters
were reduced to rubble by artillery fire. On 16 August the
journalist and Republican Deputy Marcelino Domingo was arrested.
By then the CNT leadership had also been captured or was in
hiding. Another place with a high level of casualties was Bilbao.
With moderate Socialists like the journalist and efficient orator
Indalecio Prieto in charge there, the workers conducted an
essentially non-violent protest. Yet they were met by fierce
brutality with soldiers firing upon the population at random. In
the mines of RIO Tinto ten workers were gunned down by the
troops. There were also violent clashes in the province of
Alicante. In Yecla three people, including a Socialist
councillor, were killed. In other provinces like Valencia,
Guipüzcoa and Saragossa the toll was lower. By 18 August the
government could boast that the revolution had been crushed. The
moment of panic was over. It was time for speeches, medals and
rewards. The leaders of the revolutionary movement had been
captured, were in hiding or had fled abroad. The miners in
Asturias were able to hold out on their own for seventeen more
days. It was useless and they had finally to surrender. The
working class leaders had to conclude that they could not match
the repressive might of the state. The official figures released
by the authorities confirmed a total of 71 dead, two hundred
wounded and 2000 arrested. The reality was probably two or three
times those numbers.(73)
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An analysis of the failure of the revolutionary
movement of August 1917 reveals some important facts: firstly,
the initiative during the events belonged all the time to the
government which by means of provocation and deceit managed to
outmanoeuvre the labour movement; secondly, the internal
contradictions of the basically moderate Socialist organization
which was pushed by circumstances to lead a revolution became
glaring; and thirdly, the final decision to go ahead with the
revolutionary strike was encouraged by the overconfidence of the
Socialist leadership which believed that both bourgeoisie and
army would be behind their initiative
The Dato cabinet used and abused a social conflict to
break the always uneasy alliance between bourgeoisie and
proletariat and to win the Juntas for the cause of law and order.
There had existed a pending threat of a General Strike since
March 1917, but the Socialist leadership only very reluctantly,
and after exhausting all the alternatives, decided to play that
card in August. In fact, whereas the government tried from a very
early stage to spread the feeling of paranoia and fear,the
Socialists were more than willing to follow the leadership of
Republicans and Regionalists.
In June a Provisional Committee had been set up by
Republicans and Socialists. In the event of launching a General
Strike to overthrow the regime, plans had been made to divide the
leadership geographically. A sick Pablo Iglesias, seconded by
some leading Socialists--Julián Besteiro, Francisco Largo
245
Caballero, Andrés Saborit and Manuel Cordero--was to be in charge
of Madrid, Castille and Vizcaya. The Reformist Melquiades Alvarez
backed by the leaders of the Asturian Socialist miners, Teodomiro
Menéndez and Manuel LLaneza and the Anarcho-Syndicalists
Eleuterio Quintanilla and José Maria Martinez was to lead the
movement in Asturias and León; and finally the Radical Alejandro
Lerroux supported by the CNT leadership was to organize matters
in Catalonia, Valencia and Andalusia. (74) Those plans had rapidly
been put on ice when Cambó came up with his initiative. Most
Republicans and Socialists were delighted to back the peaceful
political revolution envisaged by the Catalan leader. At the same
time, the government was busy spreading rumours that a railway
strike and a revolution were imminent and giving orders to the
local authorities to take opportune measures such as the
surveillance and arrest of the leading suspicious elements.(75)
By the time of the Assembly, all the revolutionary
initiatives had been postponed. A Strike Committee had been
formed by Largo Caballero and Daniel Anguiano for the UGT and
Julián Besteiro, Andrés Saborit and the only leading woman in the
Socialist movement, Virginia Gonzalez for the PSOE. (76) Its
mission was limited to the mobilization of the working class but
only if the Assembly was repressed and the parliamentarians
arrested. Thus the outbreak of the transport strike in Valencia
came as a total and unwelcome surprise to them. They certainly
had nothing to do with it.
The origins of that affair remains highly
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controversial. There are two hypotheses. First, it was instigated
by agents provocateurs under the instructions of the government.
Blame is placed on the Secretary of the Railworkers Trade Union,
Ramón Cordoncillo, who was a relative of the Conservative Deputy
and Editor of the Juntas' mouthpiece, La Correspondencia Milibar,
Julio Amado. It has been suggested that he provoked the Valencia
railway workers into taking precipitate action. Certainly, his
role during the August events was more than suspicious. He was
accused of not following instructions and permitting several
railways to continue operating. Cordoncillo was later expelled
from the Socialist ranks. The second explanation seems more
likely. Felix Azzati, a local leading Republican with Jacobin
leanings, feeling overconfident that the regime was about to fall
influenced the railway workers to make their move. When Azzati
arrived in Barcelona he was reprimanded by Pablo Iglesias and
Melquiades Alvarez. (77) Whether agents provocateurs or local
Republicans were behind the July transport strike in Valencia has
not been proved. Nevertheless, the importance of that dispute
cannot be questioned. It was the first step towards the General
Strike in August and its inconvenient start. (78)
If the role of the government in July remains obscure,
there is hardly any doubt that it provoked the revolutionary
events of August. (79) The Socialists were outmanoeuvred and
outwitted by a besieged and discredited cabinet. Daniel Anguiano,
member of the Strike Committee and President of the Railways'
Trade Union, would declare one year later:
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Who could benefit from a General Strike then?. . .We did not
want it.. .We were prepared to accept all kinds of
compromises.. . We intended to avoid it until the last moment
• . .but Dato wanted to discredit the labour movement and to
justify the repression of a General Strike which he himself
was provoking so as to consolidate his position in power,
obtain the decree of dissolution of Cortes and maintain the
fiction of the Turno. ..". (80)
Largo Caballero, the influential Trade Unionist leader
and also member of the Strike Committee, added:
"The General Strike did not take place because we wanted it
but because of the attitude of the government towards the
railworker,s. Our strategy was to avoid a conflict. .. .We had
kept all the administrations informed of our plans and
resolutions since May 1916...". (81)
There is sufficient documentary evidence to show that
the Socialist leaders tried to halt the tide of events until the
last minute but they would discover that the intransigence of the
Compafiva del Norte was not only upheld but inspired by the
government. The tragedy was that the inability of the Socialists
to control the situation allowed the government to regain the
initiative which it had lost in July and set an agenda that ended
in a bloodbath. Unlike the Bolsheviks in Russia, who, at almost
the same time, realizing that the opportune moment to launch
their offensive had not yet arrived, managed to hold back the
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masses, the Spanish Socialists let themselves be dragged forward
by the course of events. Lenin's party would re-emerge three
months later stronger than ever. By contrast, In Spain the Dato
administration, presented with the chance to nip the insurrection
in the bud before it was too late, did not hesitate. With its
total control of censorship the government could spread all sorts
of rumours and fantasies and even claim to be the saviour of
public order. (82)
Initially a compromise seemed to be within reach.
Viscount Eza, the aged landowner in charge of Public Works,
seemed to be working for a conciliation. When he met for first
the time a workers' delegation presided over by Daniel Anguiano,
Eza had declared that he would not allow the company to carry out
reprisals or dismissals. That was the critical moment at which
the Minister of Interior Sanchez Guerra stepped in, backed the
intransigence of the company, made any agreement impossible and
thereby let the dispute slide towards its inevitable final clash.
The railworkers, pressed by the UGT, were prepared to postpone
the strike scheduled for 10 August to allow time to find a
compromise. La CompafiIa del Norte agreed to meet the trade union
representatives but refused to discuss the question of the
re-employment of the sacked workers which was in fact the basic
cause of the dispute. Furthermore, the government accused the
workers of breaking off the dialogue by postponing the strike but
not cancelling it altogether. That essentially amounted to an
ultimatum: the government demanded that the Railworkers Trade
Union surrender unconditionally or otherwise fulfil its threat
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and launch the strike on the scheduled date of 10 August. As late
as 9 August the Trade Union had expressed its willingness to
accept the dismissal of its militants if the company was prepared
to give an explanation. The workers could not concede more.It was
all in vain. Guerra and Dato had made up their minds. They were
prepared to "take on the strike". Two days before the launching
of the strike had become inevitable, the Minister of Interior was
already giving instructions as if he knew for certain it was to
take place. (83)
Until it was banned on 12 August El Socialista
repeatedly argued that the Railworkers were being pushed against
their will to strike. La Tribuna commented on the situation on
10 August as follows:
"We regret a government which is provoking with its
attitude a serious social conflict. This is the same
government that when faced by the powerful (a clear
allusion to the Juntas) showed its weakness. The workers
have fled from the strike and the government has thrown
them into it".
The railworkers could not back down and decided to go
ahead with the strike. It was a difficult choice that was finally
taken by a majority vote of just one. The decision forced the
hand of the PSOE and UGT National Executives. For solidarity they
decided to bring forward the date of the General Strike so it
w uld coincide with that of the railworkers. Surprisingly the
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opposition came from Pablo Iglesias himself who from his sickbed
argued that the Socialists should carry out a solidarity action
but not a revolutionary strike. Yet for once his advice went
unheard. The Socialists believed that if the railworkers went
ahead on their own, their organization so painfully built up
would be destroyed and the whole Socialist labour movement would
suffer the consequences. (84)
Their decision played into the hands of the government.
Once the strike began it was easy for Sanchez Guerra, in control
of the media, to describe the Socialist leaders as blood-thirsty
revolutionaries or even at the moment of their arrest to present
them in a ridiculous fashion. The Minister of the Interior spread
the news that some had been found under beds and others in a
wardrobe. Thousands of pesetas and much foreign currency had been
discovered among their belongings. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Yet any means were admissible for Dato and Guerra to
discredit their enemies.(85)
At such a historical moment the Socialists failed to
become the hegemonic force among all those fighting against the
regime. They were caught in the middle of two parallel
offensives. On the one hand, the UGT had had an alliance with the
CNT since July 1916, and on the other, they were collaborating
with Republicans and Regionalists in the Assembly. The former
alliance definitely had a more radical and revolutionary
character than the latter. The Socialist leaders vacillated as
they felt more comfortable supporting the parliamentarians than
251
co-operating with the Anarcho-Syndicalists. Nevertheless, they
could not forget that the pact with the CNT was a response to
pressures from below. Thus a breach with the CNT as a result of
the extreme moderation of the Socialists could cause a
significant loss of militants flooding to the more revolutionary
rival organization.
The Socialists believed that their duty was to help the
bourgeoisie carry out its revolution. According to the
Socialists, a backward country like Spain did not have the
necessary conditions for a Socialist take-over. Hence they were
to limit themselves to backing the middle classes' objective to
set up a modern democratic republic with an advanced programme
of social reforms to satisfy the workers. Consoled by a Marxian
vision of inevitable historical stages, they were resigned to the
fact that for some time the prominent role had to be played by
the capitalist bourgeoisie. (86) As late as 2 August, a jubilant
Pablo Iglesias was writing in El Socialista that all the
important social forces in the country---bourgeoisie, middle
classes, intelligentsia and proletariat---concurred in demanding
the overthrow of the regime and the establishment of a democratic
republic. (87)
During the summer of 1917 differences between the two
workers' organizations became evident. Whereas the CNT envisioned
an heroical insurrection in which the proletariat with the aid
of bombs and pistols would topple the regime in one or two days
of street fighting, the UGT was planning a massive, solidly
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organized strike movement and working beyond purely trade union
level conducting negotiations with the other parties. (88)
Suspicion and mistrust between Socialists and
Anarcho-Syndicalists were never totally overcome. The former kept
advising restraint and the latter favouring action. Angel
Pestafla, the Leonese watchmaker and leading member of the Catalan
branch of the CNT, noted how since March 1917 his organization
had been working feverishly for an uprising spending every last
peseta in acquiring weapons, while the Socialists did not want
to hear anything about it. Then in July Pablo Iglesias infuriated
the Syndicalists when during his visit to Barcelona to attend the
Assembly he tried to cool down their revolutionary intentions.
Iglesias even told them: "For you, manual workers, it is easy to
defend violent methods, but for us, intellectuals, it is
different". The old PSOE leader could not have been very
successful as another "manual worker", Largo Caballero, was sent
to Barcelona four days later on a mission to persuade the CNT to
call off any hasty move. According to Pestafla, Largo defended
with dignity the Socialist position, but his face could not hide
his fear. Largo had met clandestinely a group of fully armed
Syndicalists at Valvidriera, in the mountains outside the Catalan
capital. The Socialist Councillor used to bureaucratic tasks and
to meeting people in his office had to put up for several hours
with revolutionaries who did not cease brandishing their weapons
and shouting anti-UGT slogans.(89) For the UGT-PSOE leadership
in Madrid the Lliga was an important partner in the political
revolution to topple the system. For the Catalan CNT, however,
the Lliga, representing the interests of the industrial
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bourgeoisie, was the enemy. It was thus not surprising that they
were more than reluctant to collaborate with the Regionalists and
to subordinate their activities to someone like Lerroux whom they
quite rightly regarded as a demagogue without any ideological
convictions.
The unresolved transport dispute was a devastating
shock for the Socialists. They were no longer merely seconding
the other political forces but had been suddenly pushed by
circumstances into leading the offensive. It was to be a baptism
of fire as a leading force in opposition. (90) It was a role for
which they were not prepared. They were moderate, prudent and
reformist politicians and trade unionists transformed overnight
into revolutionaries. The ideological contradictions of the
Spanish Marxists were to cost dear all the revolutionary hopes
of their nation. They felt caught in the vanguard of an
insurrectionary process which was not of their own making and
were afraid to assume the role of protagonists. In the end they
chose the worst of both worlds. Trapped between the moderation
of their parliamentarian partners and the impulsiveness of
Syndicalists and some Republicans, they backed an intermediate
solution. They realized that a sudden ill-timed General Strike
could lead to an abrupt end of all the revolutionary illusions
and yet they did not halt that process. They tried to please both
radicals and moderates. They accepted leadership of the
revolution but at the same time attempted to make it as peaceful
as possible and to limit its goals to the political programme
voted by the parliamentarians.
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Once more the man in charge of drawing up the
manifesto-programme for the General Strike was the revisionist
Julián Besteiro. The document was remarkable for its moderation.
It was an appeal to both workers and the nation. It was simply
a political statement with no mention of any social demands. The
proletariat had endured months of harassment and injustices with
fortitude but the dogmatic position of the administration in the
railways dispute pushed the workers to an unwanted strike. It was
clearly stressed that it was not only the labour movement but
also the Juntas and Assembly that had demanded the political
transformation of the regime as the only solution to regenerate
the country. Apart from its anti-monarchist tone, the objectives
sought by the Socialists were exactly the same as those of the
Assembly--namely, the creation of a provisional government to
celebrate fair and clean elections for a Constituent Cortes. The
manifesto was accompanied by a series of instructions in which
workers were told to avoid clashes with the authorities and to
greet soldiers as fellow working men. (91)
Thus the Spanish Marxists went out of their way to make
sure the bourgeoisie did not become alarmed by their action. In
fact, the final goal was to facilitate a conquest of power by the
liberal bourgeoisie. (92) Social and economic reforms were
therefore ignored and the programme of the bourgeoisie accepted.
It was a political and, as far as the Socialists could control
it, a peaceful movement. There was obviously no way in which they
could supervise the propaganda and the activities of the
Anarcho-Syndicalists and some Republicans whose violent rhetoric
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often clashed with the Socialist plans. (93)
A peaceful strike, but political, we do not deny that. We
could not leave the workers' organizations abandoned and
defenceless with each one pursuing different goals. . . We
were therefore forced to lead them in a General Strike...
when we declared the strike our objectives were those
of the Assembly of parliamentarians. . .and it never had the
violent character of the Juntas when an ultimatum of 12
hours was given....
our ideal was to change the regime, but our desire was
to make it possible through peaceful means. . .". ( 94)
the manifesto and the instructions given by the Strike
Committee were all peaceful. . .advising the workers not to
resort to violence. . . in the meantime the Minister of the
Interior was lying to the public and turning the army
against the people...
• . . What did the proletariat ask in August?.. . Just what the
Juntas had demanded on 1 June but in a more peaceful way:
a Constituent Cortes and a government to represent the will
of the count.ry...".(95)
v .1 carried weapons and ammunition to Bilbao. But when I
heard the instructions, those like me who had carried
weapons and ammunition, made sure that where the weapons
had been stored, ammunition could not be found and then
used by elements who later could not be controlled.. . U• 96)
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Some of the statements made later by the members of the
Strike Committee were astonishing. The August movement had been
after all a revolutionary attempt. It had been a serious bid to
overthrow the oligarchy by illegal and extra-constitutional
means.(97) It is difficult to see however how a revolution would
succeed if the revolutionaries lack weapons. Indeed many
witnesses would later describe the August days as a shooting
gallery in which the troops had fired relentlessly on the unarmed
crowds. (98)
The Socialists' historical record shows that
traditionally they had always been against any kind of
revolutionary adventures. The events of August 1917 constituted
a departure from their normal cautious position. They starved
their followers of weapons not only to assure the bourgeoisie of
their moderate intentions but also because they were totally
convinced that they were bound to succeed. They believed that
their initiative could not fail as it seemed to have the support
of the bourgeoisie and at least the neutrality of the officers.
Had the Juntas and Assembly not expressed their willingness to
overthrow the corrupt ruling governing elites and regenerate
Spain?. Once the government had made a solution for the railways
conflict impossible and the railworkers had voted for strike
action, the Socialist leadership cast away its usual prudence
and, blinded by the regenerationist atmosphere of 1917, had
decided to declare a General Strike. They believed that it. was
their necessary contribution to the political renovation of the
c untry. A c ntribution which would be welcomed by the others.
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The mastermind of the operation, Julián Besteiro, would latter
comment bitterly:
'.. .If we had thought that there was no possibility of
victory we would not have voted for the strike. There could
not be victory in a General Strike with a political
character if there was not a section of the bourgeoisie
prepared to take over, or if the army was united against
the people and ready to crush the rebellion...
the act of 1 June had an inevitable impact. . .It
represented a moment of jubilation. . . We were naive enough
to believe the revolution had already been
accomplished. ..". (99)
The labour movement in Spain paid dearly for the
optimism and excessive confidence of its leaders. They were
carried away by their own dreams.(lOO) Their ideological
subordination to the bourgeoisie and their misinterpretation of
the officers' attitude would strike a deadly blow against all the
revolutionary illusions. It also put an end to the dream of a
united workers' movement. The moderate Socialist leadership
decided to abandon revolutionary activity and return to reformist
and legalist tactics. The CNT re-affirmed its a-political
leanings and its reliance on direct action.
Hopes that the army would refuse to defend the regime
quickly disappeared. The peasant soldiers obeyed the orders of
their officers who in turn ignored all their anti-oligarchical
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language of the previous two months and followed the instructions
of their Generals. The military response was if anything shocking
in its unexpected brutality. The army acted once more as the
praetorian guardian of the regime, the last bulwark of law and
order. General Echague, the Captain General of Madrid, drowned
workers' protests in blood and transformed the mutiny at the
Ca'rcel modelo into a massacre. (101) In Barcelona, the city of
origin of the Juntas, the officers did not hesitate to obey the
orders of General Marina. Artillery was often used to subdue the
revolutionary zeal of the Anarcho-Syndicalists. In order to
prevent sniper fire, Marina commanded that windows and shutters
should remain open and soldiers instructed to shoot at those
houses which had not complied. (102) Despite Socialist efforts to
stage a peaceful movement in Bilbao, General Souza was no more
merciful there. He announced that all those caught with weapons
would be summarily executed and that soldiers would respond to
any aggression in kind. Strikers were unfairly blamed for an
unfortunate accident: the derailment of a train which caused many
casualties. Reprisals were savage. The city was occupied by
troops who for days kept shooting at any moving target. Children
and elderly people were the main victims of the indiscriminate
slaughter. (103) Yet first prize for violent repression went to
General Burguete in Asturias. Burguete hitherto had been regarded
as an intelligent and sophisticated officer. On the first day of
the strike he had already published a manifesto promising to
fight the revolutionaries to the death. Burguete encouraged the
use of a train, nicknamed the Train of death, to patrol the
province. From its windows, soldiers shot at random on the
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unarmed and terrorised population. In a new manifesto on 17
August he described as "wild beasts" those miners still resisting
in the mountains and vowed to hunt them down. Hundreds were
tortured and many shot, but he fulfilled his promise. (104)
Right-wing Mauristas quickly abandoned their opposition
to the government and declared that the duty of every good
citizen was to fight those encouraging social disorder. Some of
them volunteered to act as honourary policemen. (105) With a few
exceptions, Republicans adopted a passive role. Melquiades
Alvarez collaborated with the Socialists in Asturias and even
gave shelter to Manuel Lianeza, the miners' leader whose life was
in serious danger if captured by General Burguete's troops. (106)
Lerroux confirmed his moral bankruptcy and his ability to
disappear as soon as trouble arose. He met in his hide-out a CNT
delegation who informed him of the fighting behind the barricades
in the streets. He was horrified when they asked him for weapons
to continue the struggle. The CNT then sought to collaborate with
Marcelino Domingo and the separatist Francesc Macia. Lerroux
stayed in hiding to see whether the revolution was successful.
If so, he would demand to become President of the Republic. When
it became clear that the authorities had gained the upper hand,
the Radical leader bribed a police superintendent and fled to
France. (107)
The attitude of the industrial bourgeoisie towards the
revolutionary movement was ambivalent. Cambó and his friends were
not happy with a move which could well mean that the initiative
260
was slipping from their grasp. For the Lliga, the Assembly had
always been an exercise in high politics in which the proletariat
had to play a subordinate role. The Lliga was not necessarily
anti-monarchist. On the contrary, it was happy to seek a
political accommodation within the regime. The objective was
simply to end once and for all the monopoly of government enjoyed
by the centralist landowning oligarchy and definitely not to
subvert the social order. In that scheme, the proletariat was one
more bargaining factor with which to persuade the King to accept
the Assembly programme. The August revolution could endanger all
that. It is more than obvious that the Lliga was not enthusiastic
about the prospect of trigger-happy Anarchists taking to the
streets in Barcelona. However, disowning an initiative which was
being made on its behalf would have been a political error. If
the revolution did succeed Cambó would have become the leader of
the moderate forces in the new political order. He was aware of
what was being prepared and would not have wasted time in
demanding his share of the spo±ls.(108) The strategy to follow
was to wait for the evolution of events without making any
specific commitments. Thus the Catalanists hastened to make clear
that they had nothing to do with the strike, but, expecting to
collect the fruits if successful, they did not condemn it either.
The Catalan bourgeoisie had behaved very differently during the
Tragic Week of 1909 when its newspaper, La Veu de Catalunya, had
even encouraged the citizens to inform the police about the
leading agitators. During the first moments of confusion there
were rumours that the Assembly was throwing in its lot with the
strike and was delegating Lerroux to co-ordinate the offensive.
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That was rapidly denied in a statement signed by the leading
Republican and Catalanist politicians on 14 August. Yet in that
docwnent blame for the grave situation was put down to the
government's refusal to pay attention to the demands of public
opinion. That attitude had provoked the violent protest of the
people. (109) The following day Carnbó's lieutenant, Abadal, wrote
in La Veu that it was ridiculous to accuse the Lliga of being
behind the General Strike. On 16 August, all the Catalanist
leaders appeared before a judge to deny any allegations that they
were involved in the revolution. (109) The Strike had been
virtually crushed and therefore it was time for Cambó to make
statements on behalf of law and order.
The August revolution was purely a domestic affair. No
foreign state was involved in its preparation. Yet the Allies
were accused of being behind the events in order to push Spain
into the war on their side. Almost all Republicans and Socialists
strongly supported the Allied cause and had the General Strike
succeeded the nation would probably have moved closer to the
Western Powers. Nevertheless, at no time were they encouraged or
financially backed to overthrow the regime. On the contrary,
extremely conservative diplomats like the British Ambassador,
Arthur Hardinge, continually went out of their way to prove their
good intentions to the Dato administration.
As the situation became more and more radicalized,
Hardinge avoided seeing any of the representatives of the left
but was informed by the Portuguese Ambassador, who obviously did
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not share his scruples, of the strides made by the revolutionary
movement. He regretted that his Portuguese colleague seemed to
be in personal sympathy with them. Yet in conversation both
agreed that Lerroux was unprincipled and venal and Melquiades
Alvarez was a well-meaning idealist who after a revolution would
be swept away by mobs and military tyrants. (110) The Western
Powers were the main foreign investors in Spain. They owned many
of the economic resources of the nation, particularly mines, and
were the main recipients of Catalan and Basque industrial
production. Thus they preferred the existing status quo to the
prospect of economic disruption and social turmoil which might
be produced by a revolution staged by the pro-Allied forces in
Spain. Furthermore, the example of Russia, torn apart by
political militancy and military chaos after the fall of Tsarism,
persuaded the British and French governments not to encourage
initiatives which could lead to similar situations. It is
difficult to believe that the French and British governments were
conspiring against their own profits and shareholders. They had
nothing to gain from civil disturbance in Spain. That was the
message that Hardinge tried to pass to his hosts on several
occasions with little success. Following his reports, twice in
July the British cabinet stated in parliament that it was not its
policy to force Spain or any other neutral country into the
war.(lll) Simultaneously, Hardinge was being advised by
E.A.Unthorff, manager of the London and Westminster Bank, that
gold was entering Spain but only due to profitable financial
circumstances produced by the war. He denied categorically that
the gold was being introduced to support civil unrest. (112)
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In fact, fear and paranoia that the Western Entente was
behind a revolution gripped the Spanish rulers. The Gerrnanophile
press did not waste time in exploiting the situation and spread
rumours that unrest was being caused by foreign gold. Its alleged
objective was to blackmail Spain into the war by threatening her
with domestic revolution if she continued to remain neutral.
There existed all sorts of rumours, mostly unfounded, that
Catalanists, Socialists and Republicans were in close contact
with their French counterparts so as to launch a revolution in
Spain. The Embassy at Paris was continually bombarded with
instructions from the Spanish governemnt to put pressure on the
French government to end the unfriendly press campaign being
conducted there. Leon y Castillo confirmed the hostility of
certain newspapers towards the Spanish regime, but also noted
that it was not officially sanctioned by the French
administration whose publications were behaving with courtesy and
moderation. It was absurd to demand that the French government
silence those newspapers which in fact were only showing their
support for those in Spain who were the most ardent friends of
the Entente. Castillo suggested that the Spanish Socialist Fabra
Ribas, a former member of the PSOE's National Executive now
resident in Paris, could be at the centre of the intrigue and
vowed to keep him under surveillance. (113) The paranoia sometimes
appeared ridiculous. For instance, Dato commented that the
railworkers were floating on French money., travelling everywhere
by car and drinking champagne. (114)
The revolutionary events in the summer of 1917
264
constituted a serious setback for the Allied diplomatic campaign
in Spain. Rumours and suspicions that the Entente Powers were
working to produce disturbances which might thereby force the
nation to enter the war on their side were real enough. Hardinge
even met Dato and his Foreign Minister, the Marquis of Lema, and
offered his services for investigating the truth of any such
stories. (115) It was to no avail. A known Allied supporter like
Lema even suggested that his former pro-Entente position had been
rendered very difficult as a consequence of the existing
incidents. Additionally, the Monarch, who since the events in
Russia in March had been shifting towards the German camp, now
thought his worst fears confirmed.On several occasions he
declared that British and French radicals were behind the
revolutionary conspiracies in his country. (116)
During the General Strike the Minister of Interior
through his tight control of the press tried to hint that foreign
agents were behind the unrest. Sanchez Guerra could thus present
the government not only as the defender of law and order but also
as the saviour of a nation under attack from an international
conspiracy.(117) The calumny that the members of the Strike
Committee had been found with millions in foreign currency was
believed in many quarters, not least among many officers and
provincial authorities. Some, like the Civil governor of Huelva,
Eusebio de Salas, or the notorious General Burguete in Asturias,
proclaimed that foreign gold was behind the disturbances. (118)
Many believed that it was better to shoot workers in Spain than
to dig trenches in France. Thus they did not hesitate to repress
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the strike with extreme brutality. (119)
The Spanish authorities could never prove that the
Western Powers had any link whatsoever with the events of that
suirgner. La Acción tried to present as proof of their complicity
some editorials in French left-wing newspapers like La Victorie
and L'humanite which regretted the failure of the revolution and
argued that those who had taken part were the pro-Allied forces
in Spain. (120) This did not prove anything which was not already
known. Republicans and Socialists had always backed the Allied
cause and it was not a secret that a Republican regime dominated
by them sooner or later would side with the Entente in the
European conflict. Furthermore, it was normal for the French left
to side with its Spanish counterparts. Yet this was far from
showing any involvement of the Western governments at an official
level. In fact, only one diplomat, Monsieur Gilliard, the French
Consul at Coruña, was expelled from Spain and even he was allowed
to return when the French government guaranteed that those
"revolutionaries" who had escaped to France, in particular
Lerroux and Macia, would remain away from the border. (121)
The damage to the Allied image within Spanish ruling
circles was done despite the lack of evidence. The King himself
could not restrain his temper and when he met the French
Ambassador the first time after the crushing of the General
Strike accused France of supplying gold and encouraging the
revolutionary movement in Spain. Taken by surprise the Ambassador
Geof fray replied with dignity in a country of 40 million people
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there might be a certain number of persons who would be willing
to participate in revolutionary plots against Spain but that was
not a proof of the complicity of the French government. (122) The
Central Powers had won an important propaganda coup. More than
ever, they could now claim to be the true friends of Spain and
her Monarchy. Thus for almost one more year they would be able
to carry on undisturbed with their subversive activities against
the allies both in the peninsula and in Morocco.
5.3. -The end of the Turno PacIfico:
The collapse of the General Strike constituted the
failure of democratization from below. Yet if the Canovite system
resisted that attack, its governing elites would no longer be
able to put the clock back. The events of August exposed clearly
the moral and ideological bankruptcy of Turno politics. The first
ever political initiative led and co-ordinated by the Socialists
heralded the arrival of mass politics and social mobilization.
The old-fashioned Liberalism of elites and notables represented
by the dynastic parties was inevitably broken. Their permanence
in power henceforth merely rested on the goodwill of the
repressive forces of the state. The army had stopped the
revolution but who was going to stop the army?.
The victory of the Conservative government would be
short-lived. Dato was soon to realize that he was living on
borrowed time. Quashing the General Strike had offered a
temporary respite to his cabinet. Yet once the revolutionary
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spasm of August was over, the government found itself back with
the situation of July: isolated, discredited and loathed by
nearly all the social and political forces of the country.
All the attempts made by the Dato administration to
link the Assembly with the revolutionary movement failed. The
bourgeoisie under the leadership of Cambó returned to the attack.
The Catalan leader's objective was to re-organize the Assembly
in order to put his political revolution into practice. On 30
August he declared to El Heraldo de Madrid that the General
Strike had been a foolish action which had only served to delay
and obstruct the offensive mounted in July. He denied having
supported or encouraged the movement and even added that a
General Strike was an old-fashioned political method which was
always bound to lead to failure. Cambó was seeking to distance
himself from his IuembarrassingN and now defeated partners on the
left and also stress the moderation and seriousness of his
alternative. The Catalan leader was singled out by Dato and his
ministers as the mastermind of the anti-governmental offensive
and the main political threat to their continuity in office. From
the Conservative organ La Epoca, Cambó and his plans were
continually criticized when not ridiculed. His initiative was
described as a recipe for civil war and he was portrayed as a
skilful but unprincipled politician who had tried to exploit the
unsophisticated working classes. Now that they were no longer of
any use to him, they alleged that he cynically called the August
events a foolish thing and dubbed as fools the very people who
he had encouraged to strike. 1 Cambó retorted by calling the
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Turno "an orthopaedic device" and starting a tour throughout
Northern Spain. There he met members of the Basque Nationalist
party and Melquiades Alvarez. He also made contact with the
leaders of the Liberal party Aihucemas, Romanones and Alba. (2)
on 27 September he wrote to Maura and tried to persuade the
veteran statesman once more to join forces with him. Cambó
suggested that both were working for the same ends. He insisted
that a radical change from above was urgent. If the King kept
relying on the discredited dynastic parties, it would not be long
before a real revolution, different from the Ngrotesque
adventure" of August, would take place. Cambó added that the
situation was so grave that it imposed duties upon all of them,
but particularly on someone with the charisma and prestige of
Antonio Naura. A disaster would occur if they remained passive
and Data obtained the decree of dissolution of the Cortes with
which to call new elections and continue with the political
fiction. (3)
As in July, Cambó's appeal to the veteran Conservative
leader went unheard. Maura's orthodox legalism and reluctance to
take an active stand was one of the strongest assets of the
government. He agreed with Cambó on the need to reform the system
from above, but refused once more to endorse any project which
could endanger the safety of the regime. He continued to present
himself as the only dynastic leader with a real mass following
in the country who could offer a popular solution in a moment of
political and military unrest. It was short-sightedness or
naivety on Maura's part not to realize that, although he loyally
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distanced himself and his movement from any active renovating
tendency in the country, the Monarch was not prepared to back him
against the dynastic parties, all the more so since Maura, as a
result of his own refusal, was not an alternative who could count
on the support of either the Juntas or the Assembly. Moreover,
the King, always jealous of his central and paramount position
in the state, was happier to deal with people like Dato or
Romanones than with Maura. The latter's strong personality and
style made him much more difficult to manipulate. On 4 October
he confided to the foreign Minister Marquis of Lema: II With Maura
there will arrive a moment in which it will be he or the
Monarchy. I had enough of him after what he did in 1909 and
1913". (4) The only pleasure left to Maura was to see the
fulfilment of his prediction that the Turno was about to crumble.
He had chosen, however,the position of passive spectator rather
than that of a leading protagonist. The information he received
in September from his sons Gabriel and Miguel, during his holiday
at the village of Solozarno in Santander, seemed to confirm his
prophecy. The conclusion they drew was that Dato's days in power
were numbered. The Prime Minister was a political corpse who was
doomed to fall as soon as the State of War was lifted and the
constitutional guarantees restored. They noted that Dato was
still working to fix the next general elections and had even
offered a safe seat in Tenerife to Delgado Barreto, the
right-wing editor of La Acción, in exchange for a truce. Barreto
had naturally declined. Both brothers pointed out that the
government was isolated and despised by everyone, Liberals,
Republicans and Juntas. The officers' anger with the cabinet kept
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growing. They were tired of economic shortages and fed up with
the moral bankruptcy of the Data administration. (5)
In fact, the main threat to the existence of the
government came from military quarters. Their crucial role in
August suppressing the revolt had placed the officers in a
privileged position. Dato was aware that the military issue was
still a thorn in the flesh. His strategy was to continue with his
policy of appeasement and flattery in order to deflect the
attacks coming from that sector. His objective was to win a
substantial number of the officers over so that once the army was
divided it would be politically harmless.(6) It did not work.
Soon the Juntas discovered that the popularity they had enjoyed
in June had evaporated after the brutal repression of the August
movement. To add insult to injury, they realized that they had
been used by the government to put down a rebellion which it had
itself provoked. The officers turned their anger on the
administration.
By unleashing the might of the army against the
workers, Data was unconsciously sealing the fate of his
government and of the constitutional Monarchy. The Prime Minister
was the first to be shocked by the ferocity displayed by the
troops. The armed services normally loathed the idea of being
called out to police the streets. Yet once they had been given
the task they did not want to be told how to do their job. For
them putting down a revolt was just a military operation in which
the workers were treated as enemies who deserved no mercy. On 12
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August the Captain General of Madrid, General Echague, had
already advised the Prime Minister that his s idiers would obey
orders. The General also hinted that the job would be
accomplished to its final consequences and without political
interference.
The members of the government were appalled by the
number of casualties. They were oligarchical politicians who,
although eager to cling to power by any means, were not
particularly blood-thirsty. Dato appeared as a panic-stricken
leader who was responsible for the fact that the army was out of
control massacring people in the streets. The members of the
Strike Committee were captured and threatened with immediate
execution. For weeks, they were held incommunicado before being
told that they would be tried by a military court. Additionally,
in flagrant violation of the constitution and by orders of the
Captain General of Barcelona, General Marina, the Parliamentary
Deputy Marcelino Domingo was arrested. The publication of his
pamphlet appealing to the troops to join the workers had aroused
the anger of the officers. He suffered all sorts of physical and
verbal abuse and only the personal intervention of Colonel
Márquez, who rushed to the military barracks, saved him from
death. Finally, for his own safety, Domingo was sent to a prison-
ship and placed under the custody of the navy. Dato was either
too weak or too frightened to stand up to the officers. He had
to condone their actions while at the same time dealing with the
growing protests of the politicians. Romanones himself wrote to
Dato regarding the Domingo affair and demanding respect for the
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constitution. The Speaker of Congress Villanueva defended with
praiseworthy energy the rights of Marcelino Domingo and won the
support of several influential Deputies. According to the law,
a member of parliament could only be tried by the Supreme Court.
Data tried to evade the question and Marcelino Domingo was not
finally released without charges until October. (7)
The officers were furious when they saw that they had
apparently been pawns in the hands of the government. On 21
August, as a reward for past services, seventy-one million
pesetas were granted to increase defence expenditure. (8) It was
not enough to appease them. They returned to their
anti-oligarchical and regenerationist rhetoric. The Central Junta
at Barcelona issued a document on 7 September to all the members
in the provinces. The operation of putting down the rebellion was
praised but strong words were reserved for the Dato Ministry
whose lack of foresight had turned a peaceful strike into a
revolutionary movement. In a clear allusion to the government,
they suggested that certain malicious politicians were trying to
blame the army for the subsequent repression in order to build
a wall between armed services and people. Therefore to clean up
their image and demonstrate their benevolence, they demanded from
the government the lifting of martial law, the re-establishment
of constitutional guarantees and the acceptance of responsibility
for the repression, Finally in what amounted to a dire warning,
they stated that it was their duty to intervene more actively in
politics so as to impose justice and morality upon
politicians. (9 In fact, the decision to take a more active role
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in politics was nothing new. The novelty was that for the first
time they recognized it officially. The Juntas had reached
important conclusions before being interrupted by the outbreak
of the General Strike. On 9 August they had decided to act
against those Generals considered enemies of their organization.
Eight were singled out: Alfau, Luque, Figueras, Aguilera, Primo
de Rivera, Carbó, Bazán and Riera. The following day they
introduced first and second class sanctions to deal with them.
Second class sanctions applied to the first four Generals who
were blacklisted and no officer would consent to be their
assistant. First class sanctions would apply to the last four
Generals who would be given respectful advice to change their
methods and practices. Then on 11 August the Juntas concluded the
need to have at least one representative in each region to stand
for Deputy or Senator in the next General Elections. In September
this process of increasing intervention and protagonisrn was
stepped up. On 14 September they re-affirmed their goal of
maintaining the system of promotion by strict seniority. Three
days later a crucial decision was taken. This concluded that it
was the officers' duty to intervene more actively in politics to
impose upon the politicians the principles of morality and
justice. The Juntas also decided to send letters with their
resolutions to the Prime Minister, the Speakers of both chambers,
the leaders of the political minorities, the Ministers of
Interior and War, the most important newspapers and if necessary
to the Monarch. On 21 September an overwhelming majority of
Junteros endorsed that conclusion and General Marina was
designated as
	
their representative to mediate with
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politicians. (10)
The confirmation of the Juntas' entry into the
political arena was a shattering blow for the government's hopes
of normalization. A disaster was looming for the constitutional
system. The officers had voted for their direct involvement in
politics. For the next six years no politician would be able to
push the arrrr' back and restore civilian supremacy. Although
denied by Dato when interviewed by the press, the officers had
plunged the country into a deep crisis with no apparent solution.
The Prime Minister rushed to San Sebastian to see the King. He
managed to convince the Monarch that with caution and concessions
the army's threat could be diffused. Thus a smiling Dato told the
journalists that everything was under control. He had the
confidence of the King and his purpose was to stay in office and
celebrate local and general elections in November 1917 and
January 1918 respectively. He cynically added that if the
population was not happy with his conduct of government they
would vote against the government--as if nobody knew that
elections were fixed by the Minister of Interior. Back in Madrid,
Dato met General Marina and confronted him with the fact that he
was supported by the Monarchy. Then a statement was released for
the press. Dato, in his most flagrant display of hypocrisy and
flattery to date, stated that the army was a patriotic and
disciplined institution always prepared to fulfil its duty and
obey the laws. It was therefore understandable that the officers
should be annoyed by the unfounded rumours and fantasies of
recent days. (11)
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The government was making a gross miscalculation if it
was trying to please the officers by flattery and distortion of
the reality. The officers had intercepted a cable from Sanchez
Guerra to the Civil Governors advising them to let the Jun tas
carry on with their activities. In the meantime they were to find
out the names and political tendencies of their members until the
moment arrived to turn against them. (12) The Junteros became more
determined than ever to overthrow the Dato cabinet. Furthermore,
the strategy of flattery did not produce the expected results any
more. On the contrary, it only provoked disgust among the officer
corps. (13)
The government was to become a victim of its own game
of misinformation. Insisting that everything was normal and
obviously well informed by Marina of the wishes of the Juntas,
there was no way in which the state of emergency could be
maintained. Thus on 7 October the State of War was lifted and
thereafter constitutional guarantees were restored. Immediately
an avalanche of criticism came from all quarters. It was a
deafening clamour against the administration without parallel in
the history of the Restoration Monarchy.
On 29 September the trial began against those accused
of having led the revolutionary movement in August. On 4 October,
the four members of the Strike Committee were found guilty of
rebellion and sentenced to life imprisonment. Three other
militants were sentenced to eight years and one day, two others
to two years, four months and one day,and the only two w men were
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acquitted. The occasion was used by Julián Besteiro, who spoke
on behalf of himself and the three other accused, to blame the
government for provoking the General Strike. One of the military
lawyers, the Captain of Infantry Julio Mangada, pursued that line
of defence and found himself facing fifteen days under
arrest. (14) After almost two months of suspension, El Socialista
returned to the streets on 9 October and continually hammered
home the view that the strike in August was not what the
Socialists had wanted but what the government had forced them to
do. A resolution was adopted to work for the amnesty of their
comrades in prison and to concentrate on the next local elections
in which the four members of the Strike Committee would be
standing for councillors in Madrid. On 25 October, the Socialists
voted unanimously to end all participation in official bodies as
long as Dato remained in power. That measure had been adopted
before against Maura in 1909 after the Catalan Tragic Weeks.
Now, for a second time an essentially reformist organization
vetoed a politician and broke all channels with the state. (15)
In October Cambó re-affirmed his position as leader of
the anti-Turno offensive. He was once more the engine behind the
organization of the second meeting of the Assembly. Seventy-seven
parliamentarians met on 15 October in Madrid. The government,
unable to ban it now due to the restoration of constitutional
guarantees that obviously included the freedom of association,
had to watch the show from the sidelines. The Assembly's sub-
committee for constitutional reform presented its conclusions
which were dully approved. Those initiatives if put into practice
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could represent a real transformation of the political structure
of the country and the establishment of a genuine Constitutional
Monarchy. They significantly limited the prerogatives of
governments and of the Monarchy itself. Article 17 which enabled
an administration to suspend constitutional guarantees was to be
reformed. It was agreed that the suspension of the constitution
should not exceed fifteen days and within that period parliament
should be consulted. It was also decided that the Cortes was to
remain open at least between 1 October and 31 December of every
year. The principle of shared sovereignty between Monarchy and
parliament was to be reformed as well. Emphasis was placed on the
fact that sovereignty lay with the Cortes, the only body entitled
to pass laws. The Monarch would be allowed to veto a bill but,
if the next Cortes was to pass that bill again it would
automatically become law. Moreover, the King would no longer
appoint members of the Senate. Henceforth all Senators would be
elected through a corporate franchise among representatives of
the economic life of the nation. Finally, regional autonomy would
be recognized as a natural and basic foundation of the state and
not regarded as an obstacle to national unity. The
parliamentarians again demanded the creation of a national
government which would hold clean elections for a Constituent
Cortes. (16)
The programme of the Assembly was a personal triumph
for Carnbó and the b urgeoisie. It was essentially a recognition
of the federal aspirations of the Lliga and amounted to a
profound but m derate political reform. The Catalan leader
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continued his crusade to overthrow the government and clear the
way for his initiative. On 22 October he declared in El Heraldo
de Madrid that the Conservative administration had to go since
it lacked moral authority, economic plans or valid ideas for
post-war reconstruction. The next government ought to be the
product of the country's will and not of a dynastic faction. The
following day in a speech at the Centro Autonornista de
Dependientes ( ' Autonomist Centre of Clerks') in Barcelona, Cambó
kept up the pressure. He argued that the ruling oligarchies had
bankrupted the country. The Juntas did not create the crisis in
June but only made it public knowledge. According to Cambó, in
any democratic state such indiscipline would not have been
tolerated but the fact that in Spain it found the support and
encouragement of the population revealed the crisis of authority
of the political system. No remedies had been undertaken to solve
the evils complained of, instead the government had resorted to
condemning the Assembly which was working for a peaceful
solution. The Dato cabinet had then sown discord and intrigue in
order to provoke a General Strike which the army had to crush
with violence and consequently led to the inevitable
confrontation between people and army. Thus, concluded Cainbó, the
Turno was morally dead and should not continue any longer. Public
interest required a complete change of the system with new men
representing genuine sectors of public opinion in charge of a
government of coalition. Then and only then the military and
other problems could be solved. 17)
The Mauristas were no less forthright in their attacks.
279
La Accio'n noted that Dato had hitherto managed to retain the
confidence of the Crown only by imposing silence on public
opinion and following a campaign of deceit and misinformation.
He had united workers, bourgeoisie and army in common opposition
to a collapsing political order. Dato was portrayed as the most
cynical and unprincipled politician of the Turno group. He was
a man who still tried to cling to the fiction that everything was
normal when it was glaringly obvious that everybody was against
him and what he stood for. Claiming to speak for the only
remaining healthy monarchist sector in the country, the Maurista
organ warned the King of the dangers ahead if he granted the
decree of dissolution to the government. In an editorial called
"From the people to the King", La Acción claimed that it was the
duty of loyal monarchists to tell Alfonso that it would be a step
towards national catastrophe if the old politics of caciquisrno
prevailed once more against the will of the entire nation. Thus
the Monarch should act while he still had time rather than
recognize too late that he had been badly advised and even
deceived by those who did not permit others to inform the Crown
of the real desires of the nation. (18)
On 21 October Maura himself broke his perennial
silence. In what was a bitter onslaught against the system and
display of his liberal principles, the old Conservative leader
stated publicly his opposition to the government for the first
time since August. He accused the Dato Ministry of having placed
civilian supremacy in the gutter by bowing to the demands of the
Juntas. According to Maura, the crisis of authority and prestige
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was worsening daily. In a clear allusion to Dato's insistence
that his government enjoyed the confidence of the Monarch, Maura
added: "it is sad to see these blind politicians taking refuge
in proofs of royal confidence which they were never short of,
while distancing themselves from what they really need, the
support of the people. It is a foolish attempt to associate the
Crown with the vile interests of a faction". (19) Two days later,
La Accio'n, feeling fewer scruples than Maura in supporting the
initiatives of the army, encouraged the officers to take the
final step and force the government out of office.
Simultaneously, the Juntas were lambasting the
government at will. On 8 October their leader, Colonel Márquez,
wrote to the Minister of War, General Fernando Primo de Rivera.
With no effort at subtlety, he harshly attacked the actions of
the cabinet in response to the August disturbances. Márquez
suggested that the carelessness shown during those days
inevitably gave the impression that the government had been
deliberately encouraging the conflict with a view to letting it
reach a head and then suppressing it with a severity that was
bound to influence the popularity of the army among the
people. (20) On 17 October Primo de Rivera, alleging health
problems, resigned and was replaced by Marina, the General most
favoured by the Junbas. In fact, this was another instance of
Dato trying to please the officers. Primo de Rivera had refused
to bow to the Juntas' demands to remove the Military Governor of
Valencia, General Carbó, one of those blacklisted. Under pressure
from the government to comply, he had preferred to resign. Dato's
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move did not pay off. El Ejército Espaflol and La Correspondencia
Militar, the two main military newspapers, called his action "a
disgusting act of servility". They concluded that the old General
had given his fellow ministers a lesson in honesty and honour,
and warned that Dato was making a new mistake by trying to seek
shelter behind the prestige of General Marina.(2l) The
ex-Minister was to prove his loyalty two days later when he
declared his total support f or Dato and his belief that he should
continue in power. Primo pointed out that he had the backing of
twenty-two Generals who all agreed that the Jun tas had made a
terrible error when they decided to intervene in politics and
deviated from their original worthy objectives. Rather naively
Primo de Rivera stated that Dato should be allowed to f ix the new
elections or otherwise the mob would be the new ruler of
Spain. (22) La Correspondencia Militar replied that the Juntas
were not political and did not support any particular party but
as patriots the officers had the duty and right to oppose the
system of oligarchs and caciques which was embodied in the
existing administration. On 24 October in an interview with El
Heraldo de Madrid, Márguez made a devastating criticism of the
government. The Colonel once more wrapped up his arguments in
regenerationist rhetoric. He stressed that the Juntas were only
moved by patriotism and therefore had no interest in politics.
Márquez claimed that any political offer made to them by
right-wing or left-wing groups had always been rejected. He
pointed out that the hardships suffered by the population were
shared by the army and so they identified with the popular
clamour for radical solutions. M re suggestive and alarming for
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the government was that Má.rquez confirmed in the last part of his
statement that, although the Juntas were not willing to step into
the political arena, their monarchist character implied that
nobody should be surprised if they looked to the Crown for
redress. (23)
Not even after the "Tragic Week" in 1909 had the echoes
of discontent and opposition to a monarchist administration had
reached such scandalous levels. All sectors of public opinion
were in total agreement. From the left-wing El Socialista, Espafia
and El Liberal to the Catholic El Debate, the military La
Correspondencia Militar and the 1Iaurista La Accio'n, all concurred
not only that the position of the government was untenable, but
also that the Turno PacIfico had to be replaced by a new
political formula. (24) The Dato cabinet was totally isolated and
fighting against everyone. This state of irreversible crisis was
also confirmed by the attitude of the leaders of the Liberal
party. Like rats escaping from a sinking ship, they were already
distancing themselves from a doomed system and talking as if they
had always been part of the regenerationist movement in Spain.
Santiago Alba was busy drawing up a programme which he claimed
to be of economic reconstruction and political cleansing. The
ex-Chancellor suggested that his plan sought to appeal both to
Socialists and Regionalists.(25) The Marquis of Alhucemas was
declaring that the Turno did not exist anymore. (26) Even Count
Romanones, probably the best living example of a professional
politician associated with the Tin-no, was arguing that a new
order based on new political practices had to be created. A
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bewildered La Epoca wondered how it could be possible that
Romanones was now also a regenerationist. (27) On the front page
of its edition of 26 October, La Accio'n called for a miracle and
presented a cartoon of a huge broom sweeping away Dato, S.nchez
Guerra and Romanones, the representatives of the old order.
The miracle did happen. There had been rumours since
23 October that the Juntas were planning to deliver a final
message to the Monarch. It finally arrived on the night of 26
October and, shattering Dato's last hopes that the army could be
divided, was drawn up by the Infantry but signed unanimously by
all the Corps. It was irrefutably the ultimate proof of the
strength of the army and consolidated its position as
power-broker in the state. The main points were as follows:
"The Infantry has come to the conclusion that the procedure
of government has not changed nor has any new spirit been
observed which might direct the country towards the
progress which is required for it to achieve the state of
preparedness and defence now made necessary by the
approaching end of the war in Europe...
Furthermore, morality, justice, equity and respect for
the law are neither respected nor observed, nor can any
hope be entertained that in its future acts this government
may be inspired by such considerations, since the party
politicians have neither expressed regret nor shown any
intention of mending their ways. On the contrary, they have
adopted a stance in opposition to the Juntas de Defensa
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whose action should have served as a regenerative force for
them to employ. Instead this government regards them as a
hostile force to be exterminated by any means, from
violence to calumny, passing through the whole range of
insidious allegations, enticements and bribery more
appropriate to Byzantine politicians than to men who aspire
to rule the destinies of free people...
The Infantry deems it advisable respectfully to bring
these dangers to the notice of His Majesty. (28)
It represented a death warrant for the government.
Gustavo Peyr wrote to Maura: "If Dato had been waiting for the
bayonets to speak in order to leave office, he has now the
awaited signal".(29) The message amounted to an ultimatum. The
King was very respectfully urged to act upon their document
within a deadline of seventy-two hours. The army demanded the
creation of a national government which would respect the vote.
That could be ensured by entrusting, the post of Minister of
Interior, to a neutral person, untainted by the business of
electoral falsification. In return, the officers would guarantee
to the Crown that no Constituent Cortes could challenge the
dynasty because in such an event, it would automatically be
dissolved by them. The King could not fail to pay heed to the
army's wishes. The following day he notified his Prime Minister
that he had to consult other politicians in order to solve the
pending crisis. It was a diplomatic way of letting him know that
his services were no longer needed.
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According to Hardinge, Dato believed that he could
survive the political crisis. As late as 25 October he had
expressed his intention to stay in office, dissolve the Cortes
and hold new elections. (30) The Conservative leader relied on the
support of the Monarch until the last moment. He must have
realized the increasing political isolation of his government;
nevertheless, he believed that he possessed some important assets
which, if used carefully, could guarantee his survival. The
dangerous situation of the summer had been successfully defused.
The labour movement had suffered an important set-back and the
Lliga had failed to enlist the support of the Catholic and
Conservative middle classes who followed Maura. There were many
hostile forces in the country but they were not co-ordinating
their actions. Furthermore, the Monarch could not forget that his
throne had probably been saved by the existing government. On
several occasions the King had shown his gratitude and trust. In
early October, Alfonso had advised Dato of his readiness to grant
a decree of dissolution of the Cortes which would permit him to
manipulate fresh elections in his own interests. The Prime
Minister had preferred to wait and see the dangers that the new
gathering of parliamentarians represented. The Monarch had made
very clear his refusal to have Maura back in power. (31) The new
resolutions passed by the Assembly were not likely to have
pleased the King especially since their implementation would mean
a curtailment of the royal prerogatives. Then on 20 October
Alfonso sent a cable to Dato on his saint's day encouraging him
to carry on with his good work. 31)
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The main danger was posed by the Juntas. The
government, however, had hopes that the military could be divided
and the faction which followed Márquez isolated. (33) Some voices
of dissent had begun to be heard within the armed services. A
certain Colonel Moratinos from Barcelona had issued a statement
criticizing the growing involvement of officers in politics. (34)
Yet if Dato had relied on his strategy to divide the army and on
the King's confidence, his hopes were to be dashed. The army
closed ranks, court-martialled Moratinos and approved the
ultimatum to be submitted to the Monarch. Alfonso was not
prepared to take the suicidal step of supporting a loyal
politician against the whole country and the army. Dato therefore
had to go. The King frankly admitted to the Italian Ambassador,
Count Bonin, that he had no alternative but to act in the way
desired by the army as the future of the dynasty depended on the
maintenance of military goodwill. (35) It was not the first time
that he had dismissed faithful servants for cynical motives. (36)
The fall of the Conservative government on 27 October
initiated a crisis which due to its length and final outcome
would be crucial in the evolution of the constitutional Monarchy.
Confusion, uncertainty and doubts about the future were the order
of the day. (37)All the main dynastic politicians, with the
exception of Dato, agreed that an era had come to an end. With
the Liberal party broken, and the Conservatives forced out of
office, the political formula of the Turno PacIfico, foundation
of the established order since 1875, had to be abandoned.
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The existing governing elites had to resolve a series
of difficulties in order to retain control of the apparatus of
the state. Firstly, although following separate routes, the
programmes of both Assembly and Juntas were remarkably similar.
They echoed the desires of the country by demanding political
renovation and a thorough change of methods. They opposed the
survival of the dynastic factions at the centre of the decision-
making. Except for Maurismo, those factions were all artificially
based and lacked a real ideological programme with which to
mobilize parts of the electorate. Natalio Rivas, a former
minister and influential personality in the Liberal party,
commented that there was no way that the Turno men could accept
free elections as they would be wiped out of existence. (38)
Secondly, it was unlikely that the different monarchist groups
could shelve their internal disputes and agree to work together.
Factionalism was a symptom and not a cause of the crisis.
Thirdly, whatever political solution came out of the existing
crisis would have to deal with the fact that the army had become
politicized and would not be easily persuaded to give up its
privileged position. Maura himself acknowledged that fact when
he pointed out that the new government ought fully to restore
civilian supremacy or otherwise responsibility would have to be
handed over to those who would not let others govern. (39)
As emerged during the following day, the solution
pursued by the throne was to find someone who could manage to put
together a monarchist coalition which would attract the backing
of the Juntas and win over the moderate sectors of the Assembly
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represented by Catalan Regionalists and Reformists. (40) Alfonso
first entrusted the Conservative Joaquin Sth.nchez de Toca with
that task. A member of the Board of Directors of the Bank of
Spain and of several sugar companies,former minister in 1902 and
Speaker of the Senate in 1914, Sanchez de Toca represented the
soft and paternalist side of the Conservative party. He attempted
to form a coalition with members of all the dynastic groups,the
Reformists and the Regionalists. He was opposed to a Constituent
Assembly or indeed to any constitutional reform but declared
himself in favour of granting an amnesty to all those imprisoned
for the events of August. The only person willing to support Toca
was Rornanones. For the parliamentarians it was not enough, and
the monarchists declined. His own fellow Conservatives were
infuriated. Sanchez Guerra believed that the amnesty was a
manoeuvre of Romanones which he described as an infamy. (41) It
was then the turn of the Marquis of Alhucemas, the leader with
the largest minority in Congress. He did not fare much better.
His overtures were also rejected by Cambó and Melquiades Alvarez
and he had to decline.
On the fifth day of the crisis Alfonso finally resorted
to the services of Antonio Maura. By 2 November he too had
declined. The edition of La Acción for that day gave a full
explanation of the unsuccessful steps taken by the veteran
leader. In fact, there was very little that was original in
Maura's plan. He had also rejected any possibility of
c nstitutional changes and instead had concentrated on forming
a strong coalition with men drawn from all the factions. The
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Marquis of Lema was to continue at the Foreign Office, Juan de
la Cierva, a hard-liner who had been his former Minister of
Interior in 1909 and was now emerging as the man defending the
interests of the Juntas, was to be Minister of War, a
Germanophile Liberal, Alcalá Zamora, would be in charge of
Education, and Gonzalez Hontoria, an Allied sympathizer belonging
to the Liberal-Romanonista faction, would be in Justice.An
obscure officer, Admiral Ferrándiz, would take over the Navy
department, three leading Mauristas, Goicoechea, Ossorio and the
economist Flores de Lemus, would be in charge of Interior, Public
Works and the Treasury respectively. Finally, Maura thought of
appointing Carnbó, Aihucemas and the Reformist .Azcárate as
Ministers without portfolio. His scheme was rejected by nearly
everyone. Support came only from Romanones and Azcárate.
Melquiades Alvarez made it clear that Azcárate was speaking on
a personal basis and not representing his party. The proud Maura
had gone begging, cap in hand, to the different dynastic groups.
The enlightened politician who had preached for years a
revolution from above and vilified the country's leaders since
1909 had ended up by turning up at the their doorsteps. It is no
wonder he was rebuffed.
As days went by, the atmosphere of despair and
confusion among ruling circles grew. On 30 October a crucial
event took place. Canibó was summoned to the Palace. That day the
Assembly had been convened at the Ateneo of Madrid to discuss the
current situation. When news filtered out that the King had
called for Cambó, the parliamentarians cheered. They thought that
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the victory of their plan was within reach. The Catalan leader
made a triumphal speech in which he claimed that the signal that
the principles of 19 July had been successful had finally
arrived. However after his meeting with the Monarch, Carnbó
declared to the press that he had told Alfonso that the only
possible solution to the crisis was the creation of a wide
coalition to replace the discredited Turno of two artificial
parties and to appoint a neutral person as Minister of Interior
to ensure a fair election. The Catalan leader was swiftly moving
away from the positions held by the others. Constitutional reform
was no longer one of his demands. He was giving the Crown a valid
way out.
After Maura's abortive attempt to create a coalition,
Aihucemas was entrusted with the task again. Two days later he
had been successful. The government crisis had lasted a record
eight days but was at least temporarily over. The new government
was to be formed by
Prime Minister:
Foreign Office:
Interior:
Treasury:
Education:
War:
Justice:
Navy:
Public Works:
Marquis of Alhucemas (Liberal-Democrat)
Marquis of Alhucemas.
Viscount Matamala (neutral)
Juan Ventosa (Lliga Regionalista)
Felipe Rodés (Left Catalanist)
Juan de la Cierva (Leader of his own
right-wing Conservative faction)
JoaquIn Fernández Prida (Maurista)
Z ma1io Gimeno (Liberal-Roinanonista)
Niceto Alcalá Zamora (Liberal-independent)
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The outcome of the October crisis was a victory for the
Crown, Catalan industrial bourgeoisie and Juntas. In the long-
term, the losers were the traditional governing elites and all
those forces pushing for democratization. It was a warning of
what would take place six years later when Miguel Primo de
Rivera, Captain General of Catalonia, established a military
dictatorship. This time the constitutional practices had been
conserved but the Liberal Monarchy was in tatters. The King had
preserved his privileged position in the political order.
Alfonso's advantage was that neither the Catalan bourgeoisie nor
the Juntas were anti-monarchist per Se. The King had pushed for
a solution in which the ambitions of both were satisfied and in
exchange they had forgotten all their demands for constitutional
reform. The officers' recently acquired political role was
confirmed by the presence of Juan de la Cierva in the cabinet.
Cierva, cacique of Murcia and a man of shady reputation and
authoritarian manners, had accepted what Maura had refused: to
be the officers' political voice. Cierva clearly did not have the
charisma nor the following which Maura possessed and all to which
he could aspire, at least for the time being, was to be in charge
of the War Department. Yet from the first moment he was to make
clear his particular status in the cabinet as a minister
appointed personally by the Monarch and counting on the support
of the Juntas. (42) The Regionalists' strength had been confirmed
by the presence for the first time of two of their men in a
central government. Carnbó had refused to join personally the
government but had placed his friend Juan Ventosa at the head of
the Treasury. Moreover, to disguise his manoeuvre, the Lliga
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leader had persuaded Felipe Rodés, a left-wing Catalanist with
Republican leanings, to accept the Education portfolio. Their
plan to achieve Catalanist hegemony in Madrid had been
successfully completed. Politics could no longer be made without
their support.
The Lliga's manoeuvre was a shock to the other
parliamentarians. The Regionalists had deserted them and joined
forces with the hated governing oligarchy. Melquiades Alvarez
himself had been approached by Aihucemas and, when the latter had
refused to endorse the Assembly programme, he declined to join
the government. His surprise was total, when Cambó, seated next
to him when Alhucemas made his offer, had swiftly accepted.
Cambó's switching of allegiance was rightly regarded as a
betrayal by the left. His move had been decisive in saving the
regime and dashing all hopes for political democratization. (43)
Cambó's sudden about-face in November 1917, abandoning the
progressive forces for an alliance with the oligarchy in Madrid,
was in fact a defence of his class interests. After the August
revolt, the bourgeoisie was scared. (44) The situation could get
out of control. Having to choose between its hostility to the
established ruling oligarchies and its fear of the working class,
the bourgeoisie, followed the trend historically adopted since
1848. Namely, using the proletariat as a travelling companion to
put more pressure on the ruling class, but once the power of the
latter had been broken, seeking an accommodation with it in order
to become part of the new ruling bloc. When Dato was toppled,
Cambó held out as long as he thought it wise. He knew he had a
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good hand and played it well. But as the government crisis
continued, he became worried that the stakes were too high. There
was the risk that not only would the Turno parties be swept away
but also that in consequence, either a military dictatorship or
a period of anarchy could destroy his initiative. He felt that
it was time to abandon the game and settle for what he considered
to be an acceptable outcome. Cambó's mistake was to refuse to
play the role of Kerensky when there was no Spanish Lenin to
render that role dangerous.
Melquiades Alvarez on behalf of the other members of
the Assembly stated that he could neither join nor support a
solution which did not make its central objective the political
renovation of the country by means of a Constituent Cortes. He
could see that the presence of La Cierva in a coalition cabinet
was a guarantee that a profound transformation would not happen.
Cambó's Machiavellian approach to the whole crisis was then
revealed in full. He had created the Assembly and he also killed
it as soon as his basic goals had been achieved. The hegemony of
both dynastic parties embodied in the Turno had been destroyed.
Catalan Regionalism was at the centre of decision-making with two
portfolios which included the Treasury. The Interior was in the
hands of a neutral person. Carnbó soon tried to justify his move
and even accused his former partners in the Assembly of having
been behind a far-reaching revolutionary process all the time.
He professed himself as zealous as ever for political reform. He
declared that he was happy with the creation of a coalition
cabinet which put an end to the Turno. Cambó added that any
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ordinary Cortes, freely elected, was as competent as a
Constituent Assembly to deal with constitutional reforms as with
any other subject. (45) Cainbó seemed to be arguing that political
realignment would come but not in one go. His gradualist and
opportunist approach could not fail to arouse the suspicions of
the left. Regardless of all the rhetoric his disloyalty to the
Assembly was an evident fact. The settlement of the 1917 crisis
had given a breathing spell to the Monarchy in a moment of
despair and possible deadlock while a thorough political reform
had been delayed if not finally abandoned. It was no wonder that
Canthó's manoeuvre appeared to the other parties of the left as
a betrayal for the sake of two seats in the Aihucemas ministry.
They declared that the new coalition cabinet looked like a
patchwork contrivance put together to tide over the existing
crisis.
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6.- The last year of the war: Governments of Monarchist
Coalition:
The year 1917 revealed that Spain was plunged into a
deep crisis that was irreversible. A process of events began to
bring a near-feudal political structure into contact with the
economic and political realities. That movement had begun and
could not be reversed. As the country was coming to terms with
the changes brought about by the war, demands increased for new
men and new practices to take over. Yet the crisis of the system
was to continue as the old discredited governing classes were
still strong enough to prevent the triumph of the democratic
forces. Antonio Gramsci, the political thinker and General
Secretary of the Italian Communist Party until his arrest in 1926
has defined that situation as 'organic crisis of the state'. (1)
The ruling Turno PacIfico had been left behind by the
times, but the incorporation of the Catalan bourgeoisie gave a
new lease of life to the regime. For the last year of the war the
monarchist factions ended up cobbling together "Salvation
Governments" or coalitions fighting for survival and continuity
but paying lip service to the idea of change. They temporarily
halted the downfall of the ruling order but could not solve the
crisis. Lacking clear-cut ideological principles and riddled by
factionalism, they found it impossible to agree on a common
agenda. They would be bogged down by problems of legitimacy and
credibility from the outset and failed miserably to tackle the
serious economic and social problems confronting the nation.
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Problems would multiply on all fronts, and a population already
suffering grinding deprivations became restless.
The Aihucernas cabinet failed miserably. It never
managed to put aside its internal quarrels and to co-operate
whole-heartedly in the fulfilment of a common programme. The
coalition government never really got off the ground, being at
most a bad attempt to patch up an unbearable situation. The
ministers never worked as a team but followed different
directions while the socio-econornic crisis worsened by the day.
They behaved not as a real government but as a shadow of one.
Public opinion was not enthusiastic about the
government of supposed renovation. (2) At best, as in the case of
the Maurista Angel Ossorio it could be regarded as an uncertainty
and given the benefit of the doubt since nothing could be worse
than the former Dato administration. The Left rejected it
outright and considered it to be an obstacle to the victory of
democratic principles. Romanones, who was represented by one
minister, called it "a chaotic freak" ('engendro caático').(3)
Santiago Alba's response was even more indicative of the
increasing factionalism and disintegration of the dynastic
parties. He accused Aihucemas of having wasted a precious
opportunity to create a modern and radical government which could
include leftist representatives. Alba thus stated openly his
intention to break with the faction of the Liberal party led by
the Marquis of Aihucemas. He left Julio Burrell, a former
Minister of Education and one of his closest supporters, to
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launch a vicious attack on the government. Burrell wrote that the
cabinet was merely a coalition of men who, with the exception of
the Catalanists, did not represent anyone. He was in tune with
the majority of the country when he pointed out that it was
difficult to see how the authoritarian La Cierva could work with
the antimilitarist Rodés, the Regionalist Ventosa and Rodés with
the Centralist Alcalá Zamora; but above all Burrell wondered how
a government containing people like Alhucemas and La Cierva could
preside over any political renovation. (4) Thereafter Alba founded
his own group, the Liberal Left, which by early 1918 possessed
its own organ, La Libertad.
Indeed the government could not have offered a more
chaotic image than when on its first day in power three different
statements were released to the press. One came from La Cierva
clarifying the distance that separated him from the others and
stressing that his presence was due to the personal insistence
of the Monarch. A second statement emanated from the Catalanists
claiming their adherence to the principles of the Assembly and
their determination to reform the political system; and a final
one was delivered by the other ministers declaring that the
existing coalition was not a fusion of parties but a transitory
union imposed by circumstances upon men of goodwill who aimed at
continuing the policy of neutrality, dealing with the urgent
socio-economic problems and intended to summon a new parliament
without any kind of ministerial interference. From this beginning
the new government could not avoid being viewed as a pathetic
experiment. It was a marriage of convenience which was doomed to
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break up at the first serious setback. (5)
Initially the general impression was that the most
serious threat to the survival of the cabinet was represented by
the Catalanist ministers. Aihucemas, a clear exponent of
political inmobilisrno, was regarded as Carnbó's lackey. The
Catalan leader was believed to be the real power, the mastermind
pulling the strings behind the scenes. This seemed apparent from
his still regenerationist rhetoric. Furthermore, the Lliga was
making no secret of its plan to extend its political influence
beyond the Catalan borders. In December Cambó and the other
leaders of Catalan Regionalism initiated a huge propaganda tour
throughout Northern Spain, Valencia and even Andalusia. The idea
of a peaceful political revolution to be achieved after the
creation of a modern conservative formation which could appeal
to the national bourgeoisie was still very much on the cards. The
neutrality of the administration in the forthcoming elections
offered Carnbó the golden opportunity of selling his programme to
similar groups all over Spain. The Lliga would naturally be at
the centre of that political initiative. Thus Carnbó was bent on
immediate general elections. (6) The Cortes were finally dissolved
in early January 1918 and elections were summoned for 24
February.
Yet the real danger not only to the government but to
constitutional politics came from La Cierva. His goal was to
neutralize the Juntas' political leanings by the passing of a
military reform law tailored to their demands. It raised
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salaries, increased employment opportunities and established
strict seniority promotions in both war and peace. The main
problem affecting the army, that of excess personnel, was
deliberately ignored for fear of alienating the officers. (7) The
hope was that a satisfied army would not only drop all its
regenerationist dreams but would be more than ever willing to
serve as the praetorian guard of the Monarchy. La Cierva
constantly visited barracks and met officers. He went out of his
way to praise the Juntas and describe them as a movement born out
of patriotism. All their excesses, including vetoes, were
condoned by the Minister. (8) In turn he sought to purge the
idealist elements from their ranks, in particular Colonel
Mrquez, and manipulate them to build his own power base. This
inevitably hastened the erosion of civil supremacy.
On 26 December El Imparcial published an article
written by the Conservative Sanchez de Toca. Undoubtedly his
words were partly motivated by the role played by the Juntas in
the fall of the Dato administration. Nevertheless, his message
was an accurate and precise attack on the officers' trade unions.
He described the Juntas as a corrosive element in the army. They
were the opposite of what the armed services ought to be.
According to Sanchez de Toca, Syndicalism was a basic form of
economic struggle which was to be expected and accepted in the
working classes but never in the army. Military Syndicalism was
merely a source of abuses and authoritarian demands. It was a
monstrous usurpation by the armed defenders of the state of the
right perhaps appropriate to the unarmed proletariat, the
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negation of military discipline and the violation of the
soldier's oath to defend the flag. Sanchez de Toca begged the
Minister of War to put an end to this situation.
Sanchez de Toca's appeal went unheard. La Cierva had
other things on his mind. On the same day that El Imparcial
issued Sanchez de Toca's article, an isolated Márquez resigned
as Chairman of the Central Junta at Barcelona. As an idealist
committed to bringing about a real cleansing of politics, Colonel
Márquez represented the kind of dangerous officer who had to be
eliminated if Cierva wanted to succeed. Through a strategy of
rewards and promises the minister had no great difficulty in
winning over the officers and eroding the Colonel's position.
When the final showdown between the leading Juntero and the
Murcian cacique arrived, Márquez found himself abandoned by his
former colleagues and forced to resign. He was replaced by
Colonel EchevarrIa who had been Chairman of the Provisional
Central Junta in June 1917. Márquez refused to be silent and on
30 January 1918 El Mundo published his version of his clash with
the minister. On 13 March he again accused the Juntas of having
lost all their initial credibility and acting as the spring-board
to power for one man, La Cierva. Márquez was court-martialled two
days later and expelled from the army in March. (9)
The Alliance between La Cierva and the officers was
cemented in January 1918 with the dissolution of the so-called
Unión de las Clases de Tropa or Juntas of NCOs. They had been set
up immediately after those of the officers and from the outset
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they were regarded by the latter as an embarrassment and
potential threat. Their demands were moderate in the extreme but
their existence represented a parallel source of power in the
barracks that the officers could not tolerate. (10) They found in
La Cierva the perfect accomplice to proceed against them. After
spreading various unfounded rumours that the Jun tas of NCOs were
preparing a revolution in collaboration with Pablo Iglesias, the
government decreed their dissolution. On the morning of 4 January
all troops were confined to barracks and the NCOs brought before
their commanding officers and given the choice of dismissal or
signing a declaration swearing their loyalty to the Monarchy and
pledging themselves to break up their Juntas and have nothing
more to do with such societies in the future. Several hundred who
refused were automatically expelled from the army. The Minister
had taken precautionary measures such as interrupting telegraphic
and telephonic communications all over the country and mobilizing
the civil guard. (11) The King and the officers were delighted
with the energetic attitude of the Minister of War. The former
even noted that the Russian winds could bring nothing good. (12)
La Cierva, who could now even claim to be the saviour of the
regime, was at the peak of his career. Such an authoritarian and
despotic character, backed by the army and counting on the
sympathy of the Monarch, was becoming a threat to liberalism in
the country. (13)
From late 1917 onwards the social situation worsened.
Both cities and countryside were seething with discontent
produced by shortages of fo d and fuel. The Crisis de
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Subsistencias was causing widespread desperation. From an index
of 100 for overall prices in 1914, they had shot up in September
1918 to 161.8 in the cities and 172.8 in the countryside. The
price of one kg. of bread had increased 62.1%; that of meat,
78.2%; potatoes, 80%; rice, 50%; sugar, 56.7%; one litre of milk,
40% and a dozen eggs, 85.3%. Salaries were lagging far behind.
Over the same period, they had increased by a mere 25.6% and
35.1% for the average male and female worker respectively. (14)
In December 1917 the government established a new organisation
called the Comisari'a de Subsist encias with the task of setting
quotas for the export of basic products and cornbatting profiteers
and speculators. As in the past, it failed utterly to accomplish
anything positive.
Famine, unemployment and misery forced the distressed
population to acts of violence and disorder. Throughout 1918
disturbances became a common feature all over the country. They
took the form of food riots, demonstrations for cheaper goods and
assaults on shops and bakeries which often involved women and
children. There were clashes and sporadic rioting in Valencia,
Salamanca, Madrid, Santander, La Corufla and Cádiz. In early
January a general strike broke out in Málaga and Alicante and in
both places several women were shot dead while demanding cheaper
food. Women broke into several bakeries in Barcelona where a
State of War was subsequently declared. Three people were killed
in Noblejas (Ciudad Real) during food riots. The following month
there were several casualties in Palma de Majorca due to protests
at the lack of charcoal and mutinies and arrests in Barcelona and
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Valencia. The atmosphere of chaos and violence continued for the
rest of the year but by then the epicentre of the disturbances
had shifted from the cities to the Andalusian countryside. (15)
The Socialist movement did not profit from the
widespread feeling of gloom and desperation. Disturbances were
spontaneous acts of rebellion as the militancy of the masses was
left leaderless. El Socialista and Espafla accurately reported the
violent events and accused the government of doing nothing to
alleviate the suffering of the people and put an end to the huge
profits enjoyed by wheat-growers and ship-owners. However, after
the experience of the previous August the Socialist leadership
was not prepared to undertake more revolutionary initiatives. A
proposal by the CNT on 17 January 1918 jointly to launch a new
general strike demanding amnesty was rapidly rebuffed by the
Socialists. They claimed that it would only give the government
an excuse to postpone the general elections and suspend
constitutional guarantees in the country. (16)
The UGT-PSOE emerged demoralized from the experiences
of the summer of 1917. Recovery meant for the Spanish Marxists
a return to their traditional reformist and political practices.
Thus they swiftly confirmed their alliance with the Republicans,
organized the electoral campaign and pursued the release of their
comrades in prison. (17) The PSOE's Madrid branch voted in favour
of selecting the members of the strike committee as candidates
for the next local elections.(18) On 25 November a pro-amnesty
demonstration gathered 30,000 people in Madrid. Yet the approach
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adopted by the Socialists was one of extreme caution. The
moderate Julián Besteiro wrote in his prison cell that Pablo
Iglesias and editor of El Socialista, MarIano Garcia Cortés, were
behaving disgracefully in trying to erase the memory of the
August strike. (19)
The Bolshevik take-over in Russia was not altogether
welcomed by the Spanish Socialists. Totally dominated by their
pro-Allied views, they received the news with misgivings. El
Socialista mentioned it on 9 November 1917 for the first time.
It described such a crucial event merely as the triumph of the
Maximalist tendency in Russia. The following day the newspaper's
attitude was entirely negative. It feared that the Bolshevik
Revolution could become an obstacle to the Allied victory:
HWe regret the news we have received from Russia. We
believe that for the time being the mission of that great
country is to devote all its energy to the task of crushing
German Imperialism. . . If the events of today were to give
rise to a separate peace, to a desertion from the Western
Alliance which is faced with the enemy of all liberties and
popular rights, what will then be left of that
revolution...'.
The Spanish Socialist party clearly sided with the
Menshevik position in Russia. They feared and despised the
Bolshevik victory. On 29 March 1918 Pablo Iglesias wrote that the
"Russian perturbation" w uld not last long. Comments on the
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Russian Revolution totally disappeared from the pages of El
Socialista. Despite, or perhaps because of, the glaring reality
of social distress and a political vacuum in Spain, the Bolshevik
example was not only ignored but not even analyzed. Instead the
Spanish Marxists concentrated on electoral practices despite the
notorious corruption of the Spanish political system and in the
international agenda they continued to express their support for
the Allied cause. This approach encouraged the creation of an
anti-leadership tendency within the Socialist movement. It
brought together the neutralist minority and the revolutionary
wing of the party around a new journal, Nuestra Palabra, founded
in the summer of 1918. They organized several pro-Bolshevik
meetings from the autumn of 1918. The objective was both to
combat the reformist trend within the organization and to reform
the rigid orthodoxy and oligarchical structure of the party.
Nuestra Pal abra was to be the cradle of the future Spanish
Communist party created when the final split occurred in the
spring of 1921. (20)
The CNT did not let the occasion pass.
Anarcho-Syndicalism benefited from the growing militancy of the
workers and their prevailing rebellious mood to become the
leading workers' organization in Spain. It confirmed its
supremacy both in the Southern countryside and in the industrial
North-East, even making inroads into traditional Socialist
strongholds such as Asturias and Vizcaya. Its naturally
revolutionary instincts and apolitical leanings were in tune with
the wishes of the distressed masses. The CNT certainly paid more
306
attention to the Russian Revolution than did the UGT. (21)
Ironically, unlike the more moderate Syndicalists who showed
restraint on receipt of information from Russia, it was the more
orthodox Anarchists who could not contain their enthusiasm.
Virtually unaware of the role played by the Communist party, the
revolution appeared to them as a confirmation of their own vision
of revolutionary spontaneity. (22)
The impact of the Russian Revolution was especially
formidable in the Andalusian countryside where in May 1918, the
hitherto independent Andalusian Regional Confederation of
landless labourers--Federacio'n Regional Andaluza (F.R.A. ) --joined
the CNT. The anarchic mood of rebellion had never been
extinguished in that region. Working under staggeringly poor
living conditions on large estates or latifundios and practically
at the mercy of semi-feudal landowners, peasants in Southern
Spain had a tradition of sporadic uprisings and rebellions that
had to be put down with cruelty by the authorities. The
instrument of repression was usually the brutal Civil Guard,
although at times of greater tension, the army was used. The
outbreak of the war in 1914 had found the rural South
disorganized and apathetic. The General Strike in August 1917
went almost unnoticed. However, news of the Russian Revolution
was to change everything. Knowledge of the Bolshevik victory and
the subsequent land expropriation provided the impulse needed to
trigger an upheaval in the Spanish countryside. Overnight
hundreds of workers' centres sprang up and membership of the
Anarcho-Syndicalist movement expanded. The first strikes began
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in March of 1918 with C6rdoba becoming the epicentre of the
movement. Buildings were set on fire, land seized, crops burned
and hundreds of enthusiastic Anarchists travelled from village
to village spreading news of the Russian Revolution. On 27
October 1918 an Anarcho-Syndicalist Congress was held at Castro
del RIo (Córdoba) with the task of co-ordinating the
revolutionary wave. A minimum programme was approved demanding
higher wages, an eight hour working day, expulsion of foreign
workers unless there was full employment and the suppression of
deslajo (piecework). The landowners were thunderstruck. Despite
the apparent moderation of the demands, if implemented, they
represented a real revolution in the countryside. The power of
the landowners rested on their knowledge that there was an
unlimited reserve of hands that they could exploit at will.
Peasants worked from sunrise to sunset for miserable wages.
Furthermore, outside workers acting as blackleg labour were often
brought from distant areas to put more pressure on the local
workers. Thus the rising militancy and organizational activity
of the peasantry in 1918 threatened the status quo in the
countryside. Naturally, the rural bosses were not prepared to
accept their world being turned upside down. A terrible conflict
loomed ahead which would reach its climax during the years 1919
and l920.(23)
Simultaneously, a crucial event was taking place that
would lead to the rapid re-construction and expansion of the CNT
after 1918. The Catalan Regional branch of the CNT, the
Con federación Regional del Trabajo, held a Congress at Sants
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between 28th June and 1st July 1918. Several fundamental
conclusions were passed at the Congress. Workers could have
different political leanings but the CRT rejected any form of
political activity and instead its members would have to base
their struggle on direct action. Much of the appeal and strength
of the CRT stemmed from its adoption of industrial unionism in
the form of the so-called Sindicatos Unicos.The old trade unions
were discarded and replaced by new Sindicalos Unicos which
attempted to include all the workers in a given area working in
different jobs but in the same industry. Henceforth the whole
labour force would be divided into thirteen industrial activities
or ramos. The number of strikes would be reduced but at the same
time the duration of the conflict would be longer and the
strength of the movement bigger. The adoption of the new strategy
by the CRT and later by the CNT represented the triumph of the
pragmatist Syndicalists Salvador SeguI and Angel Pestaña who now
became President of the CRT and editor of Solidaridad Obrera
respectively. By late 1918 the CNT had 114,000 members with over
70,000 in Catalonia alone. One year later its growth had been
remarkable. The national organization could boast more than
700,000 militants, over half of them in Catalonia.(24) Thus in
1918 the CNT laid the foundations which would definitively allow
it to replace the UGT as the main movement representing the
interests of the working classes. The amalgamation of the
proletariat into Sindicatos Unicos provided an extremely
efficient weapon with which to conduct the social struggle. The
bourgeoisie soon realized that the newly re-organized CNT
presented a serious threat. In order to safeguard its class
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interests, it would seek the destruction of the Sindicatos
Unicos. Years of violence and terror were forthcoming.
While social distress, economic dissatisfaction and
ideological militancy were emerging into the open, the political
deadlock in the state was becoming a reality. Both the local and
the general elections in November 1917 and February 1918
confirmed that trend. No political force could really draw solace
from the results. Those groups representing public opinion made
some consistent advances in the large towns but caciquisrno
reigned supreme over rural Spain where elections were actually
won.
In the local elections of November 1917, Mauristas and
the Republican-Socialist alliance triumphed in Madrid. A similar
process was seen in the major cities. In Barcelona Regionalists
and Republicans swept away the dynastic competition. Yet in the
countryside, official candidates were returned. Almost all the
newspapers claimed that the results, especially those in the
capital, indicated the erosion and decline of the Turno parties
and the consolidation of alternative forces both on the Right and
the Left of the political arena. (25) Public opinion was gradually
turning against the bulwarks of the Restoration system. It was
impossible to defeat them in the countryside but an overwhelming
swing in the cities could prove enough to bring the regime
down. (26)
The General Election of 24 February 1918, heralded as
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the gateway to political renovation, proved to be disappointing.
Hopes that it would be conducted without official manipulation
were soon dashed. The Minister of Interior, the apolitical
Viscount Matamala, was the guarantor of a clean vote. He
certainly did not intervene in the results and even issued a
statement ordering the Civil Governors to take measures against
electoral cheating and corruption. If Matamala fulfilled his
task, the same could not be said of his deputies. They were busy
fixing the elections in the traditional way to benefit Alhucemas'
Liberals, Data's Conservatives and La Cierva's friends. Count
Rornanones, an old expert in these practices, complained to
Alhucemas until virtually the eve of the ballot of all sorts of
manoeuvres which favoured Conservative or Ciervista candidates
to the detriment of his followers. (27) Clearly, if Romanones'
political friends suffered from unfair treatment and even
persecution, electoral manipulation was certain to be more acute
in the case of Republicans or Socialists. The elections of
February 1918 were falsified but nevertheless, the fact that they
were organized by a coalition government in the presence of a
neutral at the Ministry of Interior limited to a certain extent
the fixing of the results and encouraged more competition than
in the past.Yet if the government relaxed its pressure on the
provinces, they remained essentially under the control of the
caciques who had no intention of withdrawing to allow a free
vote. Their activities together with the break up of the dynastic
parties only contributed to produce a new parliament more
fragmented and ungovernable than those returned in the past.
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The final results confirmed the tendency already
indicated in the local elections of November 1917: the
overwhelming supremacy of the dynastic groups in rural Spain and
a certain advance of democracy in the large cities. Furthermore,
it brought to light the final disintegration and factionalism of
the monarchists. The Liberal party was the clear winner, but its
representation was divided between 94 followers of Alhucemas, 40
of Romanones, 25 of Alba and 10 who were friends of two other
independent Liberal leaders, the Gerrnanophile editor of El DIa
and current Minister of Public Works, Alcalá Zamora, and the
former Minister and editor of El Imparcial, Rafael Gasset. The
Liberal party was damaged beyond repair. The Conservative party
presented a similar picture. There were in the new Cortes, 94
Datistas, 29 Maurislas and 25 Ciervistas. The Catalan
Regionalists won a majority in their region with 20 Deputies but
the strategy of creating a nationwide coalition did not succeed
except in the Basque Country. There were 15 other Spanish
Regionalists, seven of them members of the Basque Nationalist
Party. Republicans and Reformists did not fare particularly well.
They returned 15 and 8 Deputies respectively, slightly less than
in 1916. Significantly enough, those like Marcelino Domingo or
Azzati who represented radical positions triumphed and those
defending more moderate stances such as Lerroux or Melquiades
Alvarez failed to be elected. The moral victors were the
Socialists whose representation rose from one deputy to six. The
four members of the Strike Committee were returned: Julián
Besteiro for Madrid, Largo Caballero for Barcelona, Andrés
Saborit for Oviedo and Daniel Anguiano for Valencia. (28
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Any hope of sweeping renovation was dead and buried.
The dynastic groups, totally opposed to any political
transformation, were still in control. Most of their
representatives owed their seats largely due to the established
practices of influence, intrigue and bribery. Yet an important
breach with the past had taken place. In earlier elections, the
government which dissolved the Cortes always returned with a
working majority from the polls. For the first time, in 1918 a
parliament was produced in which no party had an absolute
majority. The two traditional leading groups appeared to be
broken up by internal dissent into a constellation of small
factions. They were a mirror of the fragmented Spanish political
reality. (29) The era of the two party system was over and in its
place a kind of political Tower of Babel emerged. Instability and
crisis would be the immediate consequences.
The coalition cabinet lasted only one more month and
that would be marked by agony and impotence. The impression of
the General Election had not yet faded when the Minister of War
took of f his mask and began to bully his fellow ministers into
accepting his decisions. In a brief period of time, La Cierva,
knowing that he counted with the backing of the King and the
Juntas, bagan to behave as a dictator who did not have to share
the responsibility or his actions with anyone.
At the first cabinet meeting after the General
Election, La Cierva already brought about the resignation of the
government. He raised the question of continuity of a cabinet
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which could not rely on a clear majority in the Cortes. His
objective was to get rid of the two Catalanist Ministers who
represented the renovationist tendency in the government and
could present the most serious objections to his military reform
plan. He succeeded when the King requested Aihucemas to remain
as Prime Minister and both Catalanists, Rodés and Ventosa were
replaced by two Liberals, the former Major of Madrid, Luis
Silvela, and a wealthy Catalan manufacturer, the Count Caralt,
respectively. (30) A satisfied La Cierva then declared to the
press that he could not devote all his energy to satisfying the
fair demands of the officers in his forthcoming Bill without a
strong government behind him. (31) He then proceeded with his
particular agenda.
In early March he presented his military reform Bill.
It did not reform anything. On the contrary, it represented a
further swelling of the defence budget by the fantastic amount
of 92 million pesetas. It deliberately avoided the sensitive
subject of a reduction of the number of officers and instead
increased the number of active posts by 1714. The proposed pay
scale increased salaries for all ranks, rewarding the already
comfortable senior officers more than the truly impoverished
lower ranks.(32) It was a sop to the Juntas in order to win over
their members as the Praetorian Guard of the Monarchy. The
country was starving and the state was shifting much needed
capital to appease the officer corps. Furthermore, showing a
total contempt for constitutional formalities and without
warning, on 6 March La Cierva introduced his Bill by Royal Decree
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alleging that he wanted to avoid any delay in its passage through
the recently created parliament. The political establishment was
shocked. Most dynastic politicians were prepared to appease the
Juntas but La Cierva's action amounted almost to armed
robbery. (33) The Conservative Sanchez de Toca, a fierce critic
of the Juntas in the past, wrote in El Liberal that they were a
monster which was taking over the sovereignty of the state. (34)
Romanones and Melquiades Alvarez declared that the political
class should unite to prevent the Minister of War from sabotaging
civil supremacy. (35) Romanones told the Prime Minister that to
yield to pressure at such a moment would be cowardice or
submission. Romanones warned that if this occurred he would no
longer collaborate with the government and all his friends in the
administration would leave office. (36)
The authority of the state was being trampled upon. The
officers--with the complicity of one minister--were showing who
was the de facto power in the country. A delegation from the
Central Junta in Barcelona had arrived in the capital. There were
all sorts of wild rumours. It was said that hot-heads in the army
had threatened to go and break Sanchez de Toca's head and to
arrest Romanones and take him to the French border. (37) La Cierva
himself took on the role of defending the honour of the army.
Once more without informing any of the other members of the
cabinet, he delivered a statement arguing that Sanchez de Toca's
declarations were just a product of "mean political interests and
sad memories of frustrated ambitions". (38) Aihuceinas, realizing
that all authority had escaped from his hands, presented the
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resignation of his entire cabinet and a unique case in history
occurred when all complied except La Cierva who remained at his
post. He was acting as a dictator and backed by the army refused
to leave his office. (39)
In that chaotic situation all eyes turned to Maura as
the man who might save the day. It was believed that he had
enough authority and charisma both among officers and politicians
to form a new cabinet and restore civil supremacy. Yet as in June
1917, Maura refused to climb to power by dealing with the Juntas.
In a second lesson of liberal principles, he declined to be in
charge of a new government and affirmed that Aihucemas should
continue in power and open the Cortes as quickly as possible.
Maura declared that if civilian supremacy was not to be respected
then those who showed such disrespect should take on the
responsibility of government themselves. Asked by journalists if
he would support a solution presided over by La Cierva, the
veteran statesman answered that to that man he would give
"neither advice, nor support, nor vote".(40)
A formula that barely concealed the humiliation of
civil authority was finally reached. Alhucemas and all the
ministers agreed to withdraw their resignations and accepted La
Cierva's Royal Decree and in turn the reforms would not be
implemented until July after the Chamber had had time to discuss
them. (41) The hand of the Monarch was clearly behind this
formula. He wanted to please his army above all else.
Constitutional guidelines were of secondary importance. Alfonso
316
had even summoned Romanones to the Palace and told him in strong
terms to drop his opposition to La Cierva and his Bill. (42) Thus,
the crisis of authority of the political system continued to
grow. The demoralized and discredited dynastic politicians once
again had to bow before the obstinate pressure of an
authoritarian politician who could rely on the backing of both
King and army. To add insult to injury, the Juntas refused to
dissolve themselves although they declared that henceforth they
would acquire a technical character as their only concern was the
well-being of the services.(43)
La Cierva's position was stronger than ever after the
crisis in mid-March. Furthermore, Benito Mrquez, the only
officer who could have prevented him from manipulating the
Juntas, was expelled from the army in March 1918. Having won the
day on the military issue, he was to display his authoritarianism
when faced by civil disorder. Following the emergence of military
Juntas de Defensa in June 1917, similar bodies had been set up
throughout the public sector and the bureaucracy. The corporatist
fever that had gripped the country since the summer of 1917 was
clear proof of the collapse of authority of the state. Encouraged
by the successes of the officers in obtaining economic gains and
power, the civil Juntas sought to emulate their military
counterparts. Yet here they were to run into Cierva's
determination to restore authority by forceful means. His
ruthless dissolution of the Juntas of NCOs in January had already
revealed how he was prepared to treat the officers differently
from others. On 21 February 1918 the Juntas of Postal and
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Telegraph workers initiated a passive strike demanding that a
grant of three million pesetas be allocated to them without delay
in order to meet the cost of increased staff and new material.
They enjoyed the solidarity of all the other civil Junbas in the
bureaucracy. Thus the victorious military subversion supported
by La Cierva was bound to conflict with the civil unrest of the
civil service. (44)
The ultra-conservative minister took upon himself the
task of dealing with them in his usual manner. By two Royal
Decrees on 13 and 16 March, the management of the postal and
telegraphic services was transferred from the Interior Ministry
to the War Office. The militarization of those services was
ordered and as with the NCOs the staff were presented with the
choice of accepting the dissolution of their Juntas or being
sacked. As the conflict threatened to spread to other sectors the
government dissolved by decree the Juntas at the Treasury,
Interior and Public Works. Public opinion was on the side of the
civil servants. Nearly everybody agreed that the way in which the
same cabinet yielded before the army and employed force to deal
with others was shameful. Progressive journals warned that the
country was heading towards a one-man dictatorship. (45)
Cierva's tough stand backfired. Civil servants en masse
abandoned their posts and refused to disband their organizations.
The military, lacking trained personnel, were unable to run the
services. Chaos was total. Mail was not delivered and
communications were brought to a stand-still. In the meantime,
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the Prime Minister behind Cierva's back began to pursue a
conciliatory solution and initiated talks with the strikers. The
Minister of the War who wanted to fight them to the end presented
his resignation forcing the fall of the cabinet. On 19 March the
Cortes was opened only to be closed a few minutes later when the
fall of the government was announced. For some ministers it was
debut and farewell. (46)
The situation was as critical if not more so than in
October 1917. The gap between Official Spain and Real Spain had
widened. There was widespread turmoil in cities and the
countryside caused by rampant inflation and food shortages. The
strike of the civil service had paralysed the country. The
political vacuum seemed insuperable. The Turno had been destroyed
and the coalition which replaced it had been found wanting. Spain
was in chaos and anarchy. Ironically, there was no challenge to
the regime from Republicans or Socialists. The former lacked
strength and the latter limited its opposition to expressing
solidarity with the struggle of the civil servants. But the
constitutional system was hanging by a thread. La Cierva had
caused three government crises in less than a month. He was now
in a position to make his bid for power backed by the resolution
of the Jun tas not to accept anyone else in charge of the War
Office. He could offer a political alternative: a cabinet
presided over by himself and with leading Junberos as ministers
as the only solution to bring back law and order by force. (47)
The crisis appeared insoluble. Maura was entrusted with
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the formation of a cabinet but he failed to win enough support.
Politicians were demoralized. Carnbó argued in La Tribuna that
only a strong Monarchist coalition could work and halt the
crisis.(48) Rornanones, well aware of what the army was plotting
and probably also that his sovereign was half inclined to try La
Cierva's experiment, came up with the final solution. (49) It
consisted of the Monarch summoning all the main faction leaders
to the Palace at the same time. Once there the King made an
earnest appeal to them to bury all their differences and work
together to solve the existing deadlock. He threatened to
abdicate if they could not agree on a common agenda. The idea
launched by Cambó in his article and then put into practice by
Romanones with the complicity of the Monarch paid off. The
following morning the most impressive government in the history
of the Restoration Monarchy had been created. (50) The cabinet
contained four former Prime Ministers, two party leaders, one
ex-minister and former Speaker of the Upper House, and two
members of the military, one of whom had recently been Minister
of War and had worked alongside the Juntas:
Prime Minister:	 Antonio Maura (Maurista)
Foreign Office:
	 Eduardo Dato (Conservative)
Home Office:
Public Works:
Justice Department:
Treasury:
Education:
War Office:
Marquis of Aihucemas (Liberal-Democrat)
Francesc Cambó (Lliga Regionalista)
Count Romanones (Liberal -Romanoni sta)
Gonzlez Besada (Conservative).
Santiago Alba (Left Liberal
General Marina
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Admiralty:	 Admiral Pidal
The formation of a coalition cabinet of outstanding
politicians as a solution to the ministerial crisis caused
general rejoicing. It was received with enthusiasm and
admiration. (51) A constitutional formula had prevailed over La
Cierva's bid for power. Amidst a general feeling of gloom and
impotence, the regime had managed to produce what appeared to be
the highest model of national authority. However, once the
enchantment of the moment had vanished and the artificiality of
the flamboyant new administration revealed in full, the Monarchy
would begin a downhill path inevitably leading towards a military
dictatorship.
It is extremely revealing that Antonio Maura, the man
who was supposed to supervise the re-construction of the
political order, did not share the optimism of the others. On his
very first morning in office he confided to his son Gabriel:
"They kept me away for ten years, years which could have
been the most useful of my life, and now I am seized to
preside over the whole lot. Let us see how long the charade
lasts. (52)
Maura was right. The National Goverment proved a
ramshackle affair. It lasted just long enough to see the end of
the war in Europe, but it failed miserably to solve the urgent
problems of the country. It fared slightly better than the
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previous administration but only because the names of its members
could impress public opinion and give a false image of strength
and consistency. Also, there was no La Cierva at hand ready to
subvert civil supremacy. Yet the record of the so-called
Minisberio de Primates would be very poor. In the international
field, the desperate maintenance of neutrality despite all the
evidence of German aggression looked not unlike impotence and
humiliation. In domestic matters, nothing constructive was ever
achieved as the government was never able to overcome its
internal dissent and personal incompatibilities.
Since the fall of Romanones in April 1917 the domestic
crisis and the subsequent collapse of authority had virtually
overshadowed the foreign issue which had almost ended the strict
neutrality of Spain during the last months of the Count's
administration. It re-emerged in 1918 and for a second time
threatened to produce the involvement of the nation in the Great
War. However, unlike Romanones, eager to side with the Western
Powers, the National Government went to shameful and painful
extremes to avoid doing so.
The Central Powers benefited from the March Revolution
in Russia and then the August events in Spain to consolidate
their status as friends of the existing regime. The crisis of the
state also helped them increase their particular war on Spanish
soil or in her waters to disrupt the Allied interests. The irony
of the case was that while Germany was subverting the social
order by means of the Anarchist ultra-left, the establishment was
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absolutely pro-German; and, Republican and Socialist pro-Entente
forces in Spain were let down by the Western Powers, themselves
keen on propping up the existing regime. (53) That apparently
contradictory situation helped explain the pitiful and weak
position of the Spanish administrations when confronting the
international question. They found themselves with their hands
tied. Crown, Church and Armed forces identified, especially after
the fall of the Autocracy in Russia, with the ideological values
represented by the Central Powers and despised the principles of
democracy and self-determination for which the Allies stood. Thus
fighting alongside the Allies from their point of view would be
a terrible mistake. It would strengthen the hand of the
anti-regime forces in Spain and would lead to the tragic fate
which befell Tsarism. They were therefore prepared to turn a
blind eye to all the excesses committed or induced by Germany.
After all, the sinking of some vessels or a few Anarchist actions
would not bring down the fall of the ruling order. Thus, though
nominally the defender of order and authority, Germany could go
ahead almost with impunity subsidizing ultra-left groups in an
attempt to destroy the Spanish commerce intended for the
Allies. (54) The fragility, weakness and bankruptcy of the Liberal
Monarchy in Spain made it impossible to put into practice a
coherent, firm and purposeful foreign policy.
In late 1917 the Western Intelligence Services observed
how the Germans were providing vast amounts of money to purchase
votes and caciques in order to return a friendly Cortes. There
were rumours that the Central Powers had approached the Juntas
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and, in exchange for the future entry of Spain into the war on
their side, they had offered to place at their disposal
submarines, Zeppelins, aeroplanes, and a vast territorial booty
which included Portugal and her colonies, Gibraltar, Tangier,
French Morocco and Algeria. A worried Clemenceau suggested that
British and French propaganda should combine their propaganda
efforts. Britain turned down the proposal as she believed that
France was popular only among Catalan, Republican and
anticlerical circles. (55) There was the conviction that Spain
could not afford to quarrel with the Allies with whom her destiny
was linked by reasons of geography and economy. The Allies
commanded the supplies of cotton, oil and coal which Spain needed
to continue her economic life. Furthermore, until the end of the
war Britain believed that the existing regime despite all its
inadequacies was the best possible in the circumstances as the
alternative was a revolution which could only end in a military
dictatorship:
"The end of the present system means revolution, and it is
a very long way from being certain that a revolution would
place the Republicans or any Liberal element of any kind in
power. The present cabinet is the only alternative to a
military government. . .it originated in a crisis caused by
the pretensions of the army and the dictatorial airs
assumed by its chosen statesman, the then Minister of War,
La Cierva, towards whom the King is believed for a moment
to have leaned. . . The most powerful force in the country is
the army, representative with the Church of law and order.
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It would certainly defeat the Left if the country was
thrown into a revolutionary struggle. . The Left is
practically to a man, as a matter of principle, as strongly
pro-Allied as the officers of the army and the men of the
official world are for the most part pro-German. . . We have
to pay the penalty of our principles; and perhaps we do not
sufficiently realize how such phrases as 'making the world
safe for democracy', "final destruction of the poison of
militarism", and the like, inevitably alienate the
aristocratic and officer class in Spain...".(56)
Faced with aggressive German diplomacy, succesive
Spanish governments in 1918 offered a sad image of complacency,
fear and submission, constantly looking the other way before they
were inclined to do anything. Complaints continued to pour into
the Spanish Foreign Office about Morocco. The rebel leaders,
Raisuli and Abd-el Malek, were openly supplied and advised by
German agents with total impunity. Spanish Morocco was regarded
in Western Chancelleries as a hot-bed of German intrigue. A
colony characterized by incompetence, jobbery and both active and
passive pro-Gerinanism on the part of its authorities.(57) The
weakness of the Spanish cabinets was at its worst in relation to
the question of German espionage in the peninsula and on the
matter of protecting the merchant fleet from submarine attacks.
Violence had always been present in the class struggle
especially in Anarchist fiefs, yet it began to acquire a
particularly vicious character towards the end of the Great War.
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In Barcelona, vessels departing from the port with cargo bound
for Allied ports were torpedoed with great accuracy, production
was sabotaged, disturbances paralysed the activity in many
factories and industrialists began to be victims of attempts on
their lives. In January 1918 the killing of José Barret, one of
the leading Catalan employers in the metallurgy industry, shocked
public opinion. Many Syndicalists were arrested and
constitutional guarantees were suspended in Barcelona for over
two months. Yet the question of who benefited from the crime
remained. An industrialist who was popular among his workers and
in whose factory there were no reasons for social conflict had
been attacked. One month later the left-wing newspaper El
Parlarnentario accused a former policeman, Guillermo Belles, of
being a German agent who had infiltrated Anarchist groups in
order to have Barret murdered. Belles had been questioned but
released after the personal intervention of Manuel Bravo
Portillo, the Chief of Barcelona's political police. (58)
Two months later the recently founded newspaper El Sol,
which, owing to the intellectual quality of its staff had a large
influence on public opinion, published a facsimile of a letter
from the First Secretary of the German Embassy, Eberhard von
Stohrer, to Miguel Pascual, one of the leading Anarchists in
Madrid. It was evidence that the Anarchist leader was receiving
money for the printing of revolutionary leaflets. It was an
operation which counted on the blessing of the German Ambassador
himself, Prince Ratibor. There was no doubt about the veracity
of the letter provided by the French Intelligence Services. After
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agreeing to being interviewed by El Sol, Pascual's revelations
were shocking. He described himself as having paid several visits
to the German Embassy where he was received by both Secretaries,
von Stohrer and Grimm. He had been given instructions to create
disturbances, organize revolutionary strikes which were intended
to interfere with the export trade to the Allies, and foment
attacks of any kind upon Count Romanones when he was in power.
Pascual believed that his acceptance of German money did not
clash with his own political leanings. He and many like him were
more than willing to co-operate with the Germans since both
Anarchists and Germans pursued the same goals. Pascual also
claimed that he had been the first Anarchist whom the Germans had
approached in the capital. They had singled him out soon after
the Anarcho-Syndicalist Congress at El Ferrol in April 1915 where
he had given an speech in favour of international neutralism.
Germany did not have many agents in Madrid as the city was mainly
under UGT control, a pro-Allied organization which the Germans
had not managed to penetrate. It was very different in Barcelona
where many militants including Francisco Roldán, the ex-General
Secretary of the CNT, were in their pay. In fact, he had been
told many times by von Stohrer to follow the international line
followed by the CNT organ, Solidaridad Obrera, published in
Barcelona. (59) The response of the Alhucemas cabinet, then close
to its final collapse, was not only to ignore the offense
revealed by the newspaper but also, at the request of Prince
Ratibor, to ban the distribution of El Sol. By then thousands of
copies had already been sold. El Sol agreed to publish Ratibor's
version a few days later which failed utterly to dispel belief
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in German complicity in Anarchist campaigns. Ratibor acknowledged
that Pascual had received some payment for his propaganda but
only as it was believed that he was a good Spanish patriot. As
soon as it was discovered he had revolutionary ideas he had been
dismissed. El Sol commented that even if the improbable account
of the German Ambassador was true, he had abused his diplomatic
status since he had financed material against politicians and
industrialists of his host country. The government simply chose
not to pursue the matter. (60)
Continuous revelations of German infiltration and
manipulation of the CNT had an impact upon that organization. In
June 1918 Angel Pestafla and a new team of collaborators replaced
the former staff, thoroughly discredited by its acceptance of
foreign financial aid, to re-organize Solidaridad Obrera. The
newspaper had been kept afloat by undisclosed income and in turn
had been publishing neutralist editorials. (61) On 9 June the
newspaper published a crucial article which revealed the close
links of German Intelligence with the local authorities. It had
been the constant complaint of Western diplomats that the
submarines which destroyed the Spanish mercantile marine with
such contemptuous disregard for her neutrality were aided in
their task by well-informed confederates on shore. In early June
the suspicious sinking of the French vessel, Provence, near the
Spanish North-East coast led to the conclusion that the Port
Commandant at the small Catalan town of Palamós had been
supplying German spies with timely information on the sailing of
ships and particulars of their cargoes. A few days later,
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Solidari dad Obrera published two letters written by Manuel Bravo
Portillo, Chief of Barcelona's political police, showing that he
was guilty of the same offence. The Anarcho-Syndicalist newspaper
provided documentary evidence that Bravo Portillo had informed
of the movements of the steamer JoaquIn Mumbru' which had left
Barcelona on 20 December and was torpedoed in January near
Madeira. The Captain of the German submarine had told the crew
of the Mumbrti that he was merely following orders from Barcelona.
Solidaridad Obrera stated that it was providing the information
to whoever it might be interested. It appeared that the
authorities were not too interested. On 17 June experts found
that Bravo Portillo had indeed been the author of the letters and
yet he was not lodged in gaol until the night of 20 June giving
him with every opportunity to destroy compromising papers. Two
accomplices were also arrested: Guillermo Belles, the
ex-policeman who had been linked by El Parlarnentario with the
killing of the industrialist Barret, and Royo de San Martin, a
morphine addict and gambler. The sudden death of the latter on
29 June aroused suspicions that he had been poisoned. (62)
The consequent investigation produced a startling and
incredible story of corruption and depravation. Bravo Portillo's
activities had been known to at least two Civil Governors but his
good connections in the social world had placed him in an
untouchable position. He was married to the daughter of a
Vice-Admiral, had served in the past as private secretary to
General Weyler, the most senior officer in the army and a well
known Germanophile, and his brother was a Commandant and leading
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Juntero at the local garrison. He had been working for Germany
since 1915 under the immediate orders of its two leading agents
in the Catalan capital, Albert Honnermann and Friedrick
Riggenbergh and receiving a salary of 50 pesetas a day apart from
expenses incidental to his services. His task was to provide
information leading to the torpedoing of vessels and also to
organize disruption in the factories of those industrialists
producing material for the Allied war effort. To those ends he
made good use of confidants and several members of the police
force. One of these, Guillermo Belles, had made contact with some
Anarchists working at Barret's concern which produced shells 24
hours a day for the French army. There had been several
unsuccessful attempts to launch strikes or to blow up the
factory. Belles finally ordered the killing of the industrialist,
almost certainly with the consent of Portillo and his German
masters. The murder was executed by Anarchist gunmen under the
orders of Eduardo Ferrer, the Anarchist President of the CNT's
Metallurgic Trade Union and police confidant. Bravo Portillo, who
publicly boasted of his energy in defending law and order,
distinguished himself in the persecution of Syndicalists who had
nothing to do with the killing of Barret. In the Cortes, the
Catalan Deputies Francesc Macia and Marcelino Domingo had
denounced in the Cortes Portillo's repressive methods and
demanded his removal. Among other acts, he had sent his friend
José Ezcurra, a Lieutenant of the Civil Guard, to the Canary
Islands to collaborate with the Germans. Portillo together with
Royo had been toying with the idea of assassinating the French
Ambassador although in the end that proposal had to be abandoned.
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The sinister police chief had also been involved in all kinds of
illegal practices such as gambling, extortion and blackmail. In
fact, gambling brought about his downfall. Portillo could not
prevent the discovery by the police of illegal gambling and the
arrest of some friends of Royo. Feeling betrayed and fearing for
his life, the latter produced the evidence which put them all
behind bars. (63)
The arrest of Bravo Portillo revealed the tip of the
iceberg which showed the penetration of German Intelligence at
all levels of society. The Portillo affair was deliberately
covered up by the authorities. Despite the vast amount of
evidence against him provided by experts and witnesses, the case
was dismissed in what amounted to an scandalous subversion of
justice. (64) In early July as the truth of German activities was
beginning to come to light, the government hurriedly passed an
Espionage Bill which caused public uproar. Owing to its timing
and the urgency with which it was introduced, the Bill drawn up
by the Foreign Minister Dato appeared to be a concession to the
German Embassy which had been under constant attack since
Pascual's revelations in March. Its preamble declared that the
government had increasing difficulty in maintaining neutrality
when it was continually threatened by campaigns which, however
respectable in intention, produced lamentable results. The Bill,
therefore, forbade under severe penalties:
1.- The furnishing to the agents of a foreign power
information relating to the neutrality of Spain or of a
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nature to injure any other foreign power. The penalty will
be imprisonment or a fine of between 500 and 20,000
pesetas.
2.- The publication or circulation of any news which the
government has prohibited as "contrazy to the respect due
to the neutrality or security of Spain"; or the spreading
of news of a nature to alarm Spaniards. The penalty will be
imprisonment or a fine of between 500 and 100, 000 pesetas.
3.- The insulting or holding up to hatred or contempt the
Chief of a foreign state, or a nation, arirw or diplomatic
representative, either by word of mouth or in print or
picture. The penalty will be imprisonment or a fine of
between 500 and 100,000 pesetas.
The legislation against spies naturally produced a loud
chorus of protest. The French Ambassador, Thierry, called it a
sweeping and ill-considered measure. (65) The left-wing pro-Allied
press was unanimous in denouncing being put into such a tight
jacket. El Sol noted that henceforth spies in Spain might be
fined 20,000 pesetas, but those who exposed them or their patron
would have to pay 100,000 pesetas.(66) What was even more
shocking was the haste and lack of explanations with which Dato
presented his new Bill in Parliament almost at the same time that
a German espionage network had been discovered in Barcelona. The
fact that a well-known Allied supporter like Count Romanones
expressed in public his backing for the Bill did not change
anything. It was generally regarded as a desperate attempt by the
government to gag the free press in order to avoid an
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embarrassing situation with Germany. At the moment when the
maintenance of strict neutrality was becoming impossible, the
government was stubbornly sticking to it. Romanones had been
right when he had said that there were neutralities which were
fatal. Dato introduced his Bill in the Cortes on 4 July and it
was immediately described by Republicans as a betrayal of liberal
principles and a violation of the constitution. Without delay,
it was put to a vote two days later and made a question of
confidence by Maura. The Deputies of the left withdrew from the
chamber. (67)
The government was not Gerrnanophile. In relative terms,
unlike the former cabinet which had as Ministers people like
Alcalá Zamora and La Cierva, the current one if anything by its
composition seemed to be leaning to the Allies. (68) Yet the
spectre of the Russian Revolution made a deep impression on a
country like Spain where social revolts due to the Crisis de
Subsistencias continued unabated, and the attitudes of army and
Crown were decisive. Thus the flamboyant National Government
would act with a weakness and impotence that in practical terms
amounted to an unconditional surrender to Germany's bullying and
terrorizing methods. That position was finally confirmed in the
summer of 1918 when the indiscriminate German sinking of the
merchant fleet reached such levels that it seemed for a while
that the government was prepared to stand up to it with honour.
It was no longer possible to maintain neutrality with decorum and
the m ment had arrived to take forceful action. Yet words were
not matched by deeds and from the brink of intervention, the
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government retreated once more to shameful capitulation.
Throughout 1918 the submarine campaign increasingly
threatened the economic life of the nation. Between April 1917
and July 1918, over twenty-five Spanish vessels met the same
tragic end as the San Fulgencio. On 25 July, the steamer Ramón
de Larriflaga bringing oil from New York was torpedoed when about
to enter Spanish waters. Eight members of its crew were killed.
Maura informed his Foreign Minister that "the limits of Spanish
patience have been reached. A resolution has to be adopted
without further delay". (69) On 8 August the Council of Ministers
was entirely devoted to the international question. The
discussions would last for two days. Romanones was the only one
backing a course of tough action. According to the Count, Spain
should take advantage of the Allied victories in the continent
and seize all the German ships interned in Spanish ports. The
military ministers were radically opposed any modification of the
position of strict neutrality. Finally, on 10 August a compromise
was reached. A new statement would be sent to Germany. (70) Unlike
in the past, this time the statement of protest would amount to
an ultimatum. It was supposed to be a perfect exercise in both
energy and moderation. The government was prepared to stand up
to Germany but at the same time was going out of its way to
stress its commitment to neutrality and friendship. The statement
made clear that, owing to the submarine campaign, over 20% of the
merchant fleet had been destroyed and one hundred sailors killed.
The situation had gone so far that ships bringing goods
exclusively destined for Spanish consumption were being torpedoed
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without the slightest pretext to disastrous effect for the
material interest of the country. The cabinet had therefore
resolved that it had to adopt effective means for ensuring the
maintenance of maritime trade and for protecting the lives of the
sailors. Consequently, in the event of any fresh torpedoing, it
would replace the tonnage sunk by seizing German ships lying in
Spanish ports. (71)
At no time had the National Government believed that
the statement could lead to a rupture with the Central Powers.
The message, despite its strong tone, was constantly accompanied
by references to their determination to maintain the most strict
neutrality. It stressed that it was a measure imposed upon them
by necessity and that it did not imply the definitive
appropriation of those vessels. Yet the blunt German response of
ignoring the statement and continuing brutal attacks on the
Spanish fleet placed the Maura cabinet in the position of having
to choose between putting into practice its ultimatum and risking
war with Germany or humiliation and retreat.
In the space of ten days after the delivery of the
statement, two more Spanish vessels were torpedoed. The German
Ambassador's excuse that there had not been enough time to give
new instructions to all the submarines might be sincere and yet
raised the question of what the old instructions were. Yet
Germany, after dictating her terms to Spain for so long would not
modify her traditionally bullying approach. She warned that
seizure of any of her vessels would immediately be met by rupture
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of diplomatic relations and war. (72)
The government panicked as the worst was feared. The
Gerrnanophile press returned to its insidious attacks. It was
suggested that Dato, in collusion with Maura and Romanones, had
passed the Ley de Espionaje so as to be able to force the entry
of the country into the war. There were talks of catastrophe to
come if the country was dragged into the conflict. Once more by
appealing to slogans of espaflolismo, those newspapers described
German atrocities against Spanish ships as justified acts of war
and warned that many Spaniards would prefer civil war rather than
to be told by "certain powers to defend a flag that was not
theirs". (73) Yet they had it all wrong. The Western Powers were
far from pushing Spain into the war. In late August, an extremely
worried Dato approached the Allied representatives in Spain in
order to know what support Spain would receive if she was forced
to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. (74) The Spanish
Ambassadors at London and Paris initiated discussions on the
question while the Germanophile Polo de Bernabé, Ambassador at
Berlin, resigned. (75) The response from the Western Powers was
not the one expected from nations trying to impose their terms
on a neutral. As victory was within their reach, the entry of
Spain into the war could make little difference. They had
maintained a policy of non-interference in Spanish internal
affairs and they were not going to modify their behaviour now.
Only the United States seemed to encourage a forceful act on the
part of Spain. Unlike the French and the British, the Americans
had been keen before on forcing the Spanish hand into line by
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strong and merciless commercial pressure, refusing her a single
bale of cotton or gallon of oil. That proposal was rapidly
opposed by the French and British who regarded their industrial
and mining concerns in Spain as of paramount importance and
therefore advocated a conciliatory approach. (76) Mr. Millard, the
US Ambassador at Madrid, published an article in El Liberal on
31 August affirming that if Spain wanted to save her honour she
would have to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. He
argued that the German dirty methods of threats, espionage and
control of the press had already been tried in his country and
had failed. Mr Millard repeated the same promise that he had made
a few days before to Dato. The United States would give all its
support and do all in its power to meet the industrial and
material needs of Spain. (77)
The French and British responses were not enthusiastic.
They were certainly not delighted to see a Spanish move at the
last minute which could give her grounds for territorial claims
or excessive economic demands. Both agreed that they would be
happy to see Spain on their side and were willing to support her
financially, industrially and militarily, but they also insisted
that they were not prepared to push her into the war. It was for
Spain and Spain alone, to decide what course she ought to pursue
to safeguard her honour and protect her interests. (78) In fact,
there was never a serious risk of Spanish intervention. Neither
throne nor arrrry were prepared to let it happen. The former, after
the experiences of the previous August in Spain and the
revolutionary events in Russia, would stick to neutrality to the
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end, never mind the honour of the nation. Moreover, Alfonso
believed that the Central Powers would not be defeated and still
hoped he could be the arbiter of the peace. The army, aware of
the nation's military weakness, was also determined to avoid
intervention at any cost. The government of notables would have
to swallow its pride and negotiate on the terms dictated by
Germany.
On 30 August, in a turbulent cabinet meeting most
ministers were prepared to enforce the ultimatum and seize one
German vessel. Yet they were stopped by the Minister for the
Navy. He hinted that he was speaking on behalf of King and
army. (79) A few days later, Dato wrote to Maura confirming that
idea: the Monarch had told him that under no circumstances was
he prepared to permit a departure from strict neutrality. (80) The
energy shown by the Spanish government on 10 August vanished into
thin air. The Maura cabinet was left in a ridiculous and
humiliating position at precisely the moment that the Allies were
about to win the war. It would have been better if they had never
voted for a strong measure which was not in their power to
enforce. The real victory was for the German diplomacy that could
dictate the conditions.(81) Maura and his ministers could only
hope to find a solution which might permit them to save face.
First, they decided to postpone any drastic action until further
reports had confirmed Germany's guilt in the sinking of the
Spanish ships. Then, they expressed their willingness to give her
more time to warn her submarines. When by 12 October, three more
vessels had been sunk, the government finally announced that
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seven ships of the German fleet in Spanish ports would soon be
seized. The Spanish public's opinion of its government was tinged
with sadness,if not ridicule, when it emerged that far from being
a show of strength, this amounted almost to an act of charity on
the German part. In fact, the seven ships would not be seized but
borrowed as soon as the German Embassy decided which ones to
lend. (82) To add insult to injury, in the end no German vessel
would go to restore the battered Spanish merchant fleet. Before
any concrete agreement had been reached, the armistice was
signed. One of its clauses was the surrender of the Central
Powers' fleet in neutral ports to the Allies. It was the just
reward for a shameful and bankrupt foreign policy.
In the domestic sphere, the National Government also
performed very poorly. The cabinet never worked as an harmonious
body. Its members had been compelled to join forces temporarily
by the attitude of the army. As soon as they believed that the
situation had been normalized, all the personal jealousies,
rivalries and susceptibilities emerged again so that the initial
consensus disappeared and the hopes of propping up the
constitutional system dashed. In general, the principles which
divided them were hollow or imaginary, but the personal interests
were very real. The Conservatives were not at ease in the
coalition. They were presided over by Maura who had vilified them
for years. Moreover, the Conservatives could not be pleased to
work alongside people like Alba or Romanones, and particularly
Cambó, who appeared to them to have benefited from the peculiar
circumstances which they themselves had contributed so much to
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create in the summer of 1917. They could not help regarding them
as unscrupulous politicians always ready to run with the hare and
hunt with the hounds. There were also other internal problems
such as the personal hostility between Alba and Cambó, the
rivalries between the different Liberal leaders and the question
of Catalan Regionalism which had not been overcome. (83)
Bearing in mind all the possible sources of conflict,
Maura did not promise to embark upon a far-reaching programme.
Instead, after solving the dispute with the civil service and
re-establishing constitutional guarantees in Barcelona, he
declared that his government would deal mainly with four items:
the amnesty for political offenses, the army reforms, the reform
of procedure in parliament and the budget. (84) The first three
issues were rapidly dealt with, but the budget proved to be
beyond the grasp of the government.
The debate on the Bill for the reform of the internal
regulations of the Spanish parliament began on 26 April and was
approved by the Deputies on 8 May. The introduction of the
so-called guillotina which limited the amount of time to discuss
an issue was met by the protests of the left. They argued that
there were more important problems of national interest and that
the Bill intended to curtail the liberty of the Deputies and
hurry through the passage of the Bill for military reforms. (85
The same day the Bill of Amnesty became law and the four
Socialist Deputies were released from gaol at Cartagena and
allowed to take their seats in the Cortes. One month later and
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despite the total opposition of the left the Bill for military
reforms was finally passed.
The first cracks in the government of coalition
appeared in early June when discussing the role of the
Conservative government during the revolutionary events of 1917.
on 4 June several Deputies of the left presented a motion
approving the conduct of the Speaker Villanueva with regard to
his efforts to obtain the release of the arrested Deputy
Marcelino Domingo. In reality, the motion was intended to be a
vote of censure of the Dato cabinet. It represented, in fact, a
question of confidence in the current cabinet in which, as
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dato was a leading member. It was
therefore a clever tactic which gave the ministers the choice of
voting down a motion which actually defended the rights of a
Deputy and thereby save the coalition or vote for it and bring
the government down. In the end, although the government
survived, when the motion was rejected by 129 to 18 votes, but
its credibility as a united body was undermined. Carnbó, Aihucemas
and Rornanones instructed their followers to vote against the
motion but they all made qualified explanations which implied a
tacit disapproval of the course followed by the Dato
administration in 1917 and insisted that Villanueva, the
President of the Chamber, had acted correctly by insisting on the
rights of the Deputy Domingo. Alba did not even make the effort
and his friends abstained. (86)
During the summer, the March coalition disintegrated.
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The Conservatives began to consider that the circumstances which
had compelled them to join the government did not exist anymore
and expected to return to the pre-June 1917 situation. At the
same time, the two up and-coming personalities in the Monarchist
camp, Alba and Carnbó, had ambitious plans of their own which were
bound to clash with the concepts of the "old guard". The budget
brought all those differences of opinion to the surface. The
Conservative finance minister, Gonzalez Besada, backed by his
leader Dato, planned to pass an unexceptional budget. His main
concern was to balance the numbers and curb inflation. He was
opposed by Cambó and Alba who wanted to take advantage of the
immense wealth which the war had poured into Spain to develop her
resources on a larger scale. Unlike Besada's traditional views,
Carnbó and Alba were keen for the state to take an interventionist
and active role in developing the econoimy and therefore they
wanted a budget of thousands of millions of pesetas for the
reconstruction of the country. They initially joined forces to
fight Besada, but soon quarrelled with each other. Alba wanted
to be the leader of a new populist formation on the left of a
re-constructed Power Bloc which hopefully would attract support
from anti-dynastic groups. Carrtbó would play a similar role on the
Right. Alba seems to have resented the fact that as Minister for
Public Works, Carnbó had been given the chance to shine that he
lacked at Education. In the summer of 1918 the Catalan leader was
commonly perceived as the soul of the government. Unlike the
other ministers, Cambó was willing to prove his ability as an
economist in his department. He thus embarked on a far-reaching
programme for the modernisati n of the nation's economic
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infrastructure. His proposals touched on road building, a mining
code, irrigation and afforestation. He also set out in a detailed
six-volume survey a railway plan which called upon the state to
nationalise and thereafter maintain and develop the Spanish
network as well as to assume responsibility for subsidising
passenger fares and freight rates. In early September, Cambó
travelled on a tour with the King and Queen and in a famous
speech at Covadonga he played down his regionalism and instead
put forward his vast financial and economic schemes to build up
a greater Spain. The Catalan leader had to keep something for his
nationalist constituency in Catalonia and he planned to persuade
the other ministers to delegate some of their competences in the
regional Mancomunidad, the administrative body granted by Dato
to placate the Regionalists in 1913. (87)
Alba feared that for a second time his rising star
could be eclipsed by the success of the Lliga's leader. He
hesitated between forming a common front with Cambó or fighting
him. Finally, he opted for the latter. Thus in August and
September, Maura saw himself increasingly isolated as a leader
of a government which was collapsing due to its internal
quarrels. Firstly, the umodernizersu Cambó and Alba with the
backing of Alhucemas were opposing the plans of Besada; and
secondly, Alba led an offensive against Cambó's nationalisation
plans and intentions of delegating powers to the Mancomuni dad.
Maura had to go out of his way to ensure the survival of the
Cabinet. The Conservatives and Cambó, joined by Ventosa who had
been appointed Minister of Supply, were threatening to quit.
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Aihucemas with the backing of Alba was declaring in the press
that he would be prepared to form a government which would
include the Socialist Besteiro in charge of Employment. The Prime
Minister managed to keep the government afloat by persuading both
Cambó to postpone his regionalist demands and Besada to add 400
million to his original budget.(88)
Alba himself inflicted the government a mortal blow in
late September. He was aware that the cabinet was disintegrating
and hoped to be the first to take advantage of the situation.
Thus he demanded 20 million for increases in schoolmasters'
wages. In fact, he was simply seeking an excuse to resign and
found it when the others denied giving him more than 11
millions. (89) He left office on 2 October. Up until that moment,
Maura had managed to maintain the notables' pact alive. Alba's
departure inevitably produced a domino effect and in one month
the National Government had collapsed. Alba's real intention
could not be hidden for long. He rejected any compromise and
refused to withdraw his resignation. Yet he agreed not to make
public his departure from the administration until the King
returned from his summer holiday in San Sebastian a few days
later. On 3 October El Liberal published Alba's version of the
causes of his resignation. The former minister questioned if the
country wanted to have a worthy education system or not and
accused Maura and Carnbó of having torpedoed his initiatives and
forced him to quit.
For one month, the spectacle presented by all the
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monarchist leaders was pitiful. Alba had opened the door and now
all the rivalries and squabbles which had hitherto been kept
hidden came to view. Cambó did not waste time in providing a
response and on 5 October in La Veu he alleged that Alba was an
ambitious and unscrupulous politician who had fabricated an
artificial crisis to leave office and then had broken his promise
not to reveal his resignation. Romanones replaced Alba at
Education and Maura himself took over Justice. The solution would
not last. A few days later, the Cortes were re-opened and there
appeared the sad spectacle of one minister attacking the other
and all of them claiming to be the successor of the still
existing National Government. (90) Alba spoke against Cambó,
Rornanones and Maura. According to the ex-Minister of Education,
the Count had wanted his portfolio and so had conspired against
him. Cambó had tried to introduce his regionalist plans by
threats and had found all the time the support of a declining
Maura. Alba asked Cambó whether he really believed that his
region was oppressed in Spain and if the answer was negative why
all his veiled hints that Catalonia would find in France what was
denied to her in Spain. In turn, Alba was attacked mercilessly
by the others. They accused him of cheating, lying, breaking his
promises and working for his own ends and not for those of the
country. They had never opposed any of his initiatives. In fact,
he had not presented any in all his time at Education. He had
only come up with demands for money for the schoolmasters. He had
known all the time that what he asked for was impossible. Civil
servants and other workers had recently obtained increases of up
to 30% and he was demanding raises of 80% for the
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schoolmasters. (91
Alba's move did not pay off. He was ridiculed and
rebuffed by the Left and did not manage to emerge from the crisis
as the leader of a new leftist and populist force.(92)
Nevertheless, he had left the government mortally wounded. Maura
knowing that fact declared that his cabinet would continue in
power just to pass the budget. Spain had been without a budget
since 1914. Three days later Dato initiated his particular
campaign to claim the empty throne and resigned. In early
November, Alhucemas made a speech in the chamber which sounded
like his plans for a future government. He quarrelled with Cambó
when he denied the need for Catalan autonomy. Even in Restoration
Spain it was unusual for two members of the same cabinet to
reveal their differences in public. The final blow came the
following morning when Besada read out his budget and was opposed
by none other than Sanchez Guerra, the second in command of his
own Conservative party. It was an illusion to pretend that a
government still existed. Maura resigned. (93)
The fall of the National Government virtually coincided
with the armistice in Europe. The dynastic parties had spared the
country from the ordeals of the war but had not managed to save
themselves from political decline. With the demise of the Maura
cabinet of 1918, the last great hope of the constitutional
Monarchy vanished. The old Conservative leader declared: 'let us
see who is now the smart guy who can take power' ("A ver quien es
ahora el guapo que se encarga del poder! ") . (94
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7.-Epi].oque:
The First World War proved to be a watershed in
European history. The outbreak of a conflict of such magnitude
produced economic dislocation, social distress and ideological
militancy which inevitably eroded the foundations of European
Liberalism. Already before 1914, the supremacy of the Liberal
governing elites was under threat: economic rnodernisation,
industrialisation, secularisation and other related contemporary
phenomena were breaking down and challenging the existing ruling
systems based on hierarchical, elitist and clientelist politics.
Now the formerly dominant groups were confronted with the
uncertainties of popular politics, the often unwelcome prospect
of more genuine democracy, and the fast-advancing threat of
socialism. (1) Four years of appalling human and material losses
intensified the movements of protest which had existed before
1914. Furthermore, to the existing problems of food and fuel
shortages, economic dislocation and social distress, were added
the plea of displaced national minorities and the revisionist
feeling of the losers of the Great War.
The armistice of 1918 did not put an end to the
struggle on the continent, it only changed its appearance. The
armed conflict was over but a new kind of ideological warfare had
just begun. After its success in Russia in November 1917,
Bolshevism found a ready audience among the war-weary populations
and began to spread westwards, initiating the richest period of
revolutionary activity in Eur pe since 1848. Traditional rulers
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soon discovered that it was impossible to put back the clock.
Years of misery had brought about political militancy which in
turn led to the breakdown of existing forms of elitist politics.
The political and social upheaval would be felt throughout the
continent, from London to Moscow, opening an era of utopian
ferment and class struggle. Nevertheless, the main battlefield
had two centres: firstly, the newly born regimes of Central
Europe created out of the disintegration of the Hohenzollern and
Habsburg Empires which found themselves having to cope with the
bitter taste of defeat and the political vacuum left by the
forced departure of their rulers. Secondly, there was the case
of Southern Europe, where the governing class, whose hegemony had
hitherto been based upon electoral falsification and patronage,
proved unable to successfully face the arrival of mass politics.
The year 1919 constituted the peak of the revolutionary
offensive. This was a moment in which bourgeois Europe seemed
about to collapse. In Russia, the Bolshevik forces gained the
upper hand in the civil war against the various White armies led
by former tsarist officers; in Germany, as the old regime
collapsed in November 1918, councils of soldiers and workers were
formed in the main cities. In the spring of 1919, a soviet state
was set up in Bavaria and during that year there were Communist
uprisings against the socialist-led government of the newly
created Republic in Berlin and in other capitals. In Hungary, the
revolutionary forces also seized power in March 1919. In Italy,
peasants occupied the land and not only in the South, but even
in places in the North and Centre where it had never happened
348
before. During 1919, internal committees which had been created
in industrial centres in Italy during the war were turned into
'Factory Councils' whose objective was to take over the means of
production at the workplace, fulfilling simultaneously the
economic role of direct workers' management of the plant and the
political function of self-government. The strength of the
Factory Councils was fully displayed in the summer of 1920 when
more than half of a million workers occupied their factories.
In the meantime, the ruling social and economic classes
were biding their time and waiting for the tide to turn. By 1920
the revolutionary thrust was exhausted. The Red Army had been
defeated at the gates of Warsaw and the European labour movement
was hopelessly divided between Communists and Socialists. The
challenge of the working classes had either been brutally
crushed, as in Hungary and Germany, or channelled towards
reformist goals, as was the case in Italy. The traditional
governing elites were pushed aside and, with them, liberalism and
constitutionalism were discarded as valid political forms.
Instead, authoritarian solutions were advocated--not so much to
suppress revolutionary Socialism, which had already ran out of
steam, but so as to wipe out the gains in social and industrial
legislation which the labour movement had achieved since 1914.
The establishment of a dictatorship in Hungary in the summer of
1919 represented the beginning of a period of virtually
uninterrupted working class defeat and a concomitant advance of
the new Radical Right across the continent: the Left was
destroyed in Italy after Mussolini's seizure of power in 1922;
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military dictatorships were established in most Southern and
Eastern European countries in the l920s and 1930s; in 1933
democracy was annihilated by Hitler in Germany and within one
year Austria had meet a similar fate. (2)
The Spanish case cannot be separated from the wider
European conflict. The First World War brought about the crisis
of hegemony of the Constitutional Monarchy in Spain: neutrality
did not spare the country from political upheaval and radical
social and economic transformation. In the summer of 1917, the
industrial bourgeoisie, the armed forces and the labour movement
mobilized their forces and attempted to overthrow the ruling
liberal oligarchy. The irony of the events of this year was that
a large range of groups sharing comparable levels of hostility
and contempt for the ruling oligarchy never managed to co-operate
in a common initiative. Catalans and Republicans tried to win
over the Juntas, but the latter were looking to Maura who, in
turn, refused to get involved in the conflict. The strict
legalism of Maura prevented his movement from playing a crucial
role at that historical moment. Carnbó emerged as the only
significant figure trying to establish a political alternative
based upon a coalition of forces with a common programme of
economic and political modernization. The Left, outmanoeuvred by
the cunning of the Catalan politician, was not up to the job. The
Socialists, in particular, found themselves in the odd situation
of being moderates forced by circumstances to become
revolutionaries, and they paid dearly for their own ideological
contradictions. The result was a situation of chaos and turmoil,
350
violence and revolution in which the government scored an
important victory in the short-term simply by exploiting the
internal disputes of the different opposing forces.
The Liberal Monarchy survived the revolutionary
challenge of 1917, but the constitutional regime had to pay a
high price for that victory: the alliance of Throne and arrry was
consolidated at the expense of the discredited political elites.
Henceforth the officers were to act as an anti-constitutional
party with powers of veto, able to make and topple cabinets. The
carefully-constructed edifice built during the last decades of
the nineteenth century collapsed and the Turno between dynastic
parties had to be abandoned.
After the failure of the coalition government of 1918,
the best solution produced by the existing ruling order to fight
back, the Canovite system was doomed. It lasted until 1923, but
those years would be marked by agony and decline. In an era of
mass politics and ideological mobilization the politics of
notables and elites could no longer work. The organic crisis of
the state would be long and painful, as although the political
system was mortally wounded, it was still strong enough to
prevent the creation of a political alternative.
In the international field, the country paid the
penalty for its neutrality. Under the harassment of a proud
France, which remembered the Germanophilia of key Spanish
institutions, an isolated Spain found herself struggling alone
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against the well-armed and well-trained Moorish guerrillas. The
lack of efficient planning and the unpopularity of that campaign,
which was grossly underfunded, finally led to the disaster at
Annual in the summer of 1921, when over 12,000 Spanish troops
were killed and nearly the whole eastern part of the Protectorate
was overrun by the Moors. The impact of that defeat resembled
that of 1898. It led to a national uproar demanding the heads of
those responsible for such disaster. It was one more nail in the
coffin of the dynastic politicians, accused again of inefficiency
and incapability, and of leading Spain to international
humiliation. (3)
The domestic situation presented a chaotic image. Rural
caciquismo was still omnipotent and delivered the awaited
results, but the dynastic parties were fragmented into a variety
of rival factions. The political deadlock could not be solved.
There were 30 partial crises and 13 total crises of government
between 1917 and 1923.
The Allied victory, the Bolshevik triumph in Russia and
the post-war economic recession intensified the class struggle
in Spain. It was evident by the autumn of 1918 that Spain was
sliding into a revolutionary situation which now, unlike in 1917,
possessed both an urban and a rural dimension. Yet the swift
suppression of the revolutionary strike in August 1917 had halted
the revolutionary impetus of the Socialist leaders and broken up
the coalition created against the regime. The Spanish Socialists
were inflexibly opposed to any further revolutionary adventures
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and thereby lost the opportunity to become, at a time of growing
popular discontent, hegemonic among the forces fighting for
radical change in Spain. Their power base was rapidly taken by
the CNT which henceforth became the leading force of the
organized working class, even making inroads into traditional
Socialist strongholds. In 1920, the membership of the Socialist
trade union, the UGT, lagged (with 211,342 members) far behind
that of the CNT (which boasted a membership of 790,948). The
Anarcho-Syndicalist movement, however, lacked the discipline, the
organization and the ideological coherence of the Socialists.
Rather than being an homogeneous group, the CNT constituted the
amalgamation of opposite factions which ranged from moderate
Syndicalists to uncompromising Anarchists.
The militancy of the masses and the revolutionary
atmosphere could not be eradicated. Throughout 1918 food riots
and workers' protests against the rising cost of living rocked
the normal life of most cities. Workers had to cope with
worsening living conditions produced by an increasing scarcity
of basic commodities and a mounting inflation. The situation was
even worse for the peasants, who had to survive with miserable
wages and unhealthy diets and who had, in most cases only
temporary jobs. News of the Bolshevik take-over and the
subsequent land distribution in Russia was the ideological push
needed to trigger off an all-out revolutionary upheaval in the
Southern countryside. The traditionally rebellious mood of the
Andalusian anarchist peasants had never really been extinguished
and it was the Russian revolution which now provided for them the
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necessary myth which, historically, had been needed to spark
uprisings in the countryside. Between 1918 and 1920, the starving
and long-suffering masses, showing an unprecedented degree of co-
ordination and organization, rose throughout Southern Spain
demanding 'land and bread'. Authorities and the rural bourgeoisie
were caught by surprise. They lost control of the events and many
fled in panic to the safety of the cities. Power lay in the many
workers' trade unions, normally controlled by the Anarcho-
syndicalists, which had sprang up amidst the revolutionary
euphoria. Thus in 1919 a kind of dictatorship of the proletariat
reigned over large swathes of the Andalusian countryside. (4)
Simultaneously, the CNT experienced an astonishing
success and rapid advance in the industrial centres, in
particular in Catalonia. In the suiruner of 1918, the Catalan CRT
abandoned the old craft trade unions and instead adopted the
model of the Sindicato Unico. It was a new strategy which soon
proved a formidable weapon in the hands of the resolute
Syndicalist leaders. The first major test of strength for the new
Sindicato Unico took place in February 1919, when a strike broke
out at the Anglo-Canadian hydroelectric concern known as 'La
Canadiense'. The conflict began as a normal wages dispute between
the management and workers who had recently joined the CRT and
had been sacked, but soon became the most successful strike in
Spanish labour history. The co-ordination, organization and
careful planning of the Syndicalists as well as the solidarity
of the Catalan proletariat was stunning. The mobilization of the
workers was remarkable and lasted forty-four days, leaving the
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city of Barcelona totally paralysed. To add insult to injury, the
trade union of graphic artists even put into practice the so-
called 'red censorship', that is the prevention of any
publication hostile to the workers' position. The victory of the
labour movement was total: the current Liberal administration,
led by Count Romanones, promised the introduction of the eight-
hour working day and the company agreed both to accept the re-
hiring of its employees without penalties of any kind and to
raise wages. (5) When the CNT held a Congress at the Teatro de la
Comedia in Madrid in December, the organization was at the peak
of its power. The structure of the Sindicato Unico was nationally
adopted and amidst revolutionary optimism the CNT voted for
adhering provisionally to the Comintern.(6)
The Spanish ruling classes shared with their European
counterparts the fear of an imminent revolutionary victory. The
revolutionary offensive in Spain, however, never really
represented a challenge capable of bringing down the regime nor
did it offer a viable political alternative. There did not exist
any leading group that attempted to link the ruralside revolt
with the urban unrest. The Socialists were not prepared to lead
a violent insurrection and although the CNT stepped in and
attracted massive support at a time of intensified class
struggle, their own apolitical and libertarian principles
prevented the Anarcho-Syndicalists from even considering the
seizure of state power. Nevertheless, the expansion of the labour
movement and the offensive of the CNT contributed decisively to
the final disintegration of an already bruised and discredited
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political system. They would persuade the ruling classes to
discard the existing governing class which could guarantee
neither social order nor political stability. The Spanish
bourgeoisie in general, and the Catalan in particular, frightened
by the growing power of the Syndicalists, finally dropped any
reformist intentions that they might have coveted in the past,
and sought to protect their economic interests by relying on
sheer force. With the end of the war in Europe, the golden era
of huge profits had ended. Industrialists could foresee an
imminent economic recession in which they planned to resort to
massive lay-of fs of workers and cuts in production. Yet this
could not be carried out with a powerful and combative CNT. Hence
the Anarcho-Syndicalist movement had to be crushed.
In 1919 arose the first loud calls for a military
dictatorship.(7) The bourgeoisie was clearly not prepared to
surrender its social and economic privileges without a battle and
hence it turned to the army for protection. The alliance between
the bourgeoisie and the army acted not only behind the back of
the central government in Madrid but even in open defiance to its
orders on many occasions. In 1919 alone two cabinets confronted
with the intransigent opposition of officers and industrialists
had to resign. (8) The result would be the final collapse of civil
supremacy and the final crisis of authority of the dynastic
parties.
In the spring of 1919 an army of 20,000 troops was sent
to Andalusia. Towns were occupied after pitched battles, workers'
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unions were closed and hundreds of militants imprisoned. Even
more brutal and violent was the reaction in Catalonia. There
constitutional guarantees had been suspended in January 1919 and
would remain so for more than three years. Real power thus lay
with the Captain General of that region. Under his cormiand, an
old bourgeois militia dating from medieval times, El Somatén, was
resurrected and its members granted permission to carry weapons,
patrol the streets and arrest strikers. Not being satisfied with
this, the industrialists hired gangs of thugs--one of them was
led by the infamous former chief of police Manuel Bravo Portillo-
-whose task was to beat up and shoot leading Syndicalists. The
streets of Barcelona soon became a battlefield. In November 1919,
the Catalan employers launched a massive lock-out which lasted
two months and left 200,000 workers jobless. One month later, the
so-called Sindicatos Libres were established in Barcelona. They
were a new trade union controlled by Catholic and Carlist
workers. They presented the employers with a great opportunity
to split the labour movernent.(9) The climax of violence and
repression was reached with the appointment of General Severiano
Martinez Anido as Civil Governor of Barcelona in October 1920.
For two years, this blood-thirsty and vicious officer was to run
Barcelona as his private fiefdom. He disregarded any
consideration of civil rights and regarded the CNT militants as
war enemies. Thousands of Syndicalists and left-wing sympathizers
were imprisoned or deported to distant provinces (making the
journey on foot and in chains). Counter-terrorism received
official protection. Gunmen of the Libres were trained and armed
in military barracks and the notorious 'Ley de Fugas' or the
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shooting of captured Syndicalists 'while trying to escape' in
custody introduced. Between 1919 and 1923, hundreds of the best
militants of the CNT, including three General Secretaries, were
killed. (10)
The intransigent attitude of the propertied classes and
the brutal repression carried out against the CNT played into the
hands of the extremists who began to dominate the organisation
after 1919. As the CNT seemed to have reached its apex of
efficiency and strength, its energies were to be channelled into
a crazy wave of assassinations and terror. This was not only to
end the collective discipline which had yielded its most
successful fruits in the past, but was also ironically to play
into the hands of those who only needed an excuse to smash the
labour movement.(1l) Moreover, the irony of indiscriminate
repression was that the moderate Syndicalist leaders, and not the
lesser known Anarchists, became the targets of Employers' gunmen.
It was the extremists in the CNT who were best equipped and
prepared to operate clandestinely and who were most disposed to
meet violence with violence. From 1919 Anarchist groups of action
responded in kind and industrialists, overseers and
strikebreakers were gunned down. Among these, the most
outstanding victims of Anarchist violence were the Conservative
Prime Minister Eduardo Dato and the Archbishop of Saragossa, shot
dead in March 1921 and June 1923 respectively. The endless spiral
of violence spread from Catalonia to other regions. Spain
resembled a country in civil war: seldom did a day pass without
the newspapers reporting fresh assassinations or new acts of
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vandalism.
Following the disaster of Annual in the summer of 1921,
the services of Antonio Maura were once more required to save the
political system from collapse. He again formed a national
government, which included among others Juan de la Cierva and
Francesc Cambó. As in 1918, the attempt failed miserably. Once
the temporary cement provided by the Moroccan disaster
disappeared, the coalition government was torn apart by
irreconcilable internal political and personal rivalries. The
last experience of a national coalition collapsed in March 1922.
Henceforth mounting calls for a military take-over became
deafening, while the dynastic politicians saw their role reduced
to that of verbally abusing one another in the Cortes, which now
more than ever, functioned as a mere talking-shop. It was amidst
this climate of colonial disasters, social warfare and political
vacuum that the same groups which had played a crucial role in
the crisis of October 1917--Crown, Army and Industrial
bourgeoisie--decided to throw their support behind an
authoritarian solution in September 1923. In fact, in that year
Prima de Rivera did not overthrow the last constitutional
government, he merely limited himself to filling a vacuum which
had existed ever since 1917.
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Chapter three: The Romanones administration: the domestic
challenge
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of the Turno era. See, for instance, Saborit, La huelga, pp.27,
95-96, 262; Cierva, op.cit., p.58; Cambó, opcit., pp.239-240;
The writer AzorIn portrayed Romanones as lord and master of a
clientele who continually followed him along the corridors of the
Cortes. For the philosopher Ortega, Romanones' concept of
politics did not go beyond the necessary tricks to cling to
power. Both quoted in Javier Tusell, La polItica y los politicos
en tiempos deAlfonsoXill (Madrid, 1976) ,p.61; The novelist and
leading figure of the cultural Generación del 98, Miguel Unamuno,
wrote that the limit of a semantic paradox was that Romanones was
an outstanding leader of Spanish liberalism. Quoted in Salvador
Forner Muñoz, Canalejas y el partido liberal democrático (Madrid,
1993), p.38.
2. Romanones, Notas, p.13. The Count claims that a united and
strong Liberal party ended with the death of the historical
leader, Préxedes Sagasta, in 1903. He also notes that he managed
to seize the leadership of the party after the assassination of
the then Prime Minister and leader Canalejas as a result of the
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role played by the Monarch. His rival, the Marquis of
Alhucemas,seemed to be the best candidate for the post but the
King, always willing to put into practice the principle of Divide
et Irnpera, threw his support behind Romanones.
3. On Romanones' successful manoeuvre to destroy the reformist
initiative see Manuel Suárez Cortina, El reformisrno en España
(Madrid, 1986), pp.89-96; Maximiano Garcia Venero, Melquiades
Alvarez (Madrid, 1974), p.285. Most authors absolve Dato of any
part in the internal coup which ended Maura's leadership of the
Conservative party. In fact, Dato seems to have tried to persuade
Maura until almost the last moment to form a Conservative
government. It was thus Maura's own obstinacy as well as
Romanones (with the connivance of the Monarch) who brought about
his fall. There is abundant evidence of this in the private
archives of both Maura and Dato. See, for instance, in Fundación
Antonio Maura, Antonio Maura's Papers (hereafterA.M.), File 19,
two letters from the former Minister of Interior, Juan de la
Cierva, to Maura. In the first, dated 25 June 1913, Cierva
claimed that he had been informed that Romanones, knowing that
he could not hold on to power for long, was expecting Maura to
replace him in October after the summer recess. On 26 October,
1913 Cierva wrote again to Maura insisting that Romanones had
indeed resigned and therefore Maura should not waste time but
take over immediately. Maura's refusal could only benefit the
enemies of the Monarchy. Also see A.M., File 34, two letters from
Dato to Maura. On 12 July, 1913 Dato confirmed to Maura that
Romnanones had told him that he would leave office in October and
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power. He signed his letter: 'Your Servant'. Maura wrote a few
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who, fearing that he could be replaced by another Liberal cabinet
led by the Marquis of Aihucemas, plotted with 'certain
372
Notea to chapter three
influential elements in the Palace', the end of Maura's
leadership of the Conservative party. Dato was a weak figure who
would become a puppet in the hands of the Count. If not Dato
personally, the solution that he represented is heavily attacked
in Fernandez Almagro, op..cit., pp.191-193. He argues that the
Dato cabinet was created to decapitate a man, Maura, rather than
to follow a programme. Andando de puntillas Dato habla aprenciido
a llegar lejos. Maura pisando .fuerte iba camino del destierro
('Walking on his tiptoes Dato had learnt to go far. Maura
treading firmly was on his way to exile'). See also Maria Jesis
Gonzalez Heredia, CiudadanIa y acción: el conservadurismo
maurista, 1907-1923 (Madrid, 1990), pp.39-40. She suggests that
in October 1913 Data's move permitted the re-creation of the
Turno and a good opportunity to reform the system was lost.
Probably the most important clash between the two Conservative
leaders took place on 1 July 1916 in the Cortes. Dato declared
that he could not understand why Maura, who until 1913 had
described the conservative party as the cream of the nation,
continually vilified his former party colleagues. Furthermore,
nobody had suggested that he should abandon the party in 1913.
Maura replied that he had not quit, but that he had left the
party when he was told by the King that his decision was no
longer of any importance as the other notables had plotted behind
his back to replace him if he did not agree to form a government.
4. Fernández Almagro, op.cit., p.200.
5. Parliamentary Records (hereafter D.S.C.) 10 May, 1916.
6. Araquistáin, Entre l.a guerra, p.101.
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i mercaders Barcelona, 1970); Josép M. Huertas, El Noi del
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3. Heywood, op.cit.,p.36.
4. Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Movirnientos de precios,
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Liberal, El Pals and El Heraldo de Madrid, January-May, 1916, See
also José Maria Farregó, Los atentados sociales en Espafla
(Madrid, 1922), pp.214-217.
7. Andrade, op.cit., pp.8-9, 29-30.
8. See El Socialista (20, 22 January and 24-27 February 1916, 1,
8, 13, 18-20 March 1916); See also Espafla n.51 (13 January,
1916), n.52 (20 January, 1916) and n.58 (2 March, 1916).
9. In Fundación Pablo Iglesias, UGT's Papers. National Committee
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10. See D.S.C. (28 June, 4 and 7 November, 1916) . tjrzaiz insisted
in both June and November 1916 that he had not resigned but had
been sacked as his economic measures were hurting certain
privileged interests, On 28 June Urzaiz provoked a scandal when
he declared that he had to go as he was not prepared to follow
the traditional policy of both Conservative and Liberal
administrations of granting favours and concessions. He named
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some particular cases, including his opposition to the return of
five million pesetas to an Andalusian company which had links
with Dato and to the granting of certain favours to several
ecclesiastical orders. He also opposed the introduction of
certain tariff barriers against the export of pyrites of iron and
the lifting of those in the export of pyrites of copper. A new
scandal broke out in the Cortes in November when Urzaiz declared
that he had to choose between being fired or to prevaricate. He
chose the latter. Organs of the press of opposite political
tendencies had welcomed and backed Chancellor Urzaiz. See, for
instance, Espafla, nos. 51-54 (20 January-3 February, 1916) in
which the work of Urzaiz is praised and n.58 (2 March, 1916).
Araquistáin, in an editorial called "La crisis", argued that the
sacking of Urzaiz was a victory for Romanones and the plutocracy.
In another article called "El rnastIn y el zorro", another
journalist, Luis de Olarriaga, claimed that the plutocracy must
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gipsies prepared to trade with everything regardless of the fact
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11. Archivo Histórico Nacional, Serie A, Home Office Papers
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Chapter 4: The Romanones administration: the international
challenge
1. Soldevilla, op.cit., pp.73-74.
2. In all his interventions in parliament throughout 1916,
Romanones went out of his way to express his commitment to
official neutrality and asked for the patriotic support of the
chamber. See D.S.C. (10 May, 6 June, 13 October and 4 November,
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